Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream by Levitin, Adam J.
Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets
Upstream
Adam J. Levitint
Consumer protection in financial services has failed. A crisis is now
playing itself out in the mortgage, credit card, auto loan, title loan, refund
anticipation loan, and payday loan markets. Consumer protection was a
traditional element of states' regulatory power until federal preemption ousted
states from almost all direct regulation of federally chartered banks without
substituting equivalent protections and enforcement.
This Article argues that one avenue may remain to permit states to engage
in consumer-protection regulation of federally chartered banks. Recent
changes in financial markets have placed the majority of consumer debt in the
hands of secondary-market entities, such as securitization trusts and debt
collectors, which are not protected by federal preemption. States' ability to
regulate the secondary consumer debt market directly also gives them the
ability to regulate the primary market indirectly, even when direct regulation of
the primary market would be preempted.
States can impose targeted regulatory costs on the secondary market tied
to the presence or absence ofparticular terms in consumer debts, regardless of
what type of institution initiated the debt. By tying regulation to the terms of the
debt, states can channel the hydraulic force of the market, which will pass
these costs on to the originators of the debts-including federally chartered
banks. This channeling would create an incentive for originating lenders to
adjust the terms under which they originate consumer debts to avoid state
regulatory costs. This Article contends that such regulation would not run afoul
of preemption doctrine because it does not directly regulate federally chartered
banks; it affects them only indirectly, through the market.
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Introduction
Consumer protection is an essential part of states' police power.' The
banking industry, however, has been largely removed from states' regulatory
ken by federal preemption. States cannot directly regulate federally chartered
banks, thrifts, or credit unions, their operating subsidiaries, or even some of
their agents beyond subjecting them to "state laws of general application ... to
the extent such laws do not conflict with the letter or the general purposes" of
federal banking law. 2 Instead, consumer-protection regulation of federally
chartered financial institutions has become the preserve of a dispersed group of
federal agencies. This arrangement is made more problematic by the fact that
preempted state consumer-protection regulations have often not been replaced
by equivalent federal protections,3 and federal enforcement of existing
regulations has been lax. For much of the consumer financial product market,
the preemption experience has effectively been a deregulation experience.
I Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1581 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Consumer protection is quintessentially a field which the States have traditionally occupied.")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
2 Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1567.
3 Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public Consumer Protection Law
in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 663, 665
(2008); Mark E. Budnitz, Technology as the Driver of Payment System Rules: Will Consumers Be
Provided Seatbelts and Air Bags? 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 918-19 (2008).
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The home mortgage crisis and growing concern over credit card issuers'
pricing and billing practices, payday lending, and title loans have underscored
the shortcomings in federal consumer-protection regulation in the financial-
services area. As Representative Barney Frank, Chairman of the House
Financial Services Committee, stated, "When [Federal Reserve] Chairman
Bernanke testified [before this Committee at a recent hearing] ... he said
something I hadn't heard in my 28 years in this body, a Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board uttering the words, 'consumer protection.' It had not
happened since 1 9 81 .4
There are two possible (and non-exclusive) regulatory architecture
solutions to the current consumer-protection problem. One solution that has
been discussed is to concentrate the consumer-protection mission at the federal
level in the hands of a single federal agency.
5
This Article proposes an alternative solution to the regulatory architecture
problem: reinvigorating the role of state regulators as consumer-protection
advocates. While preemption doctrine is presumed to have foreclosed
meaningful state regulation of federally chartered financial institutions, this
Article argues that states possess a major, untapped regulatory tool: the
regulation of secondary-market purchasers of consumer debt from federally
chartered financial institutions. Preemption doctrine prevents only direct state
regulation of federally chartered financial institutions. It does not prevent states
from regulating secondary-market purchasers of debt from federally chartered
financial institutions.
States can go farther than regulating the secondary market itself, however.
States can pass what this Article terms "hydraulic regulations"-regulations of
a secondary market that have a net positive social welfare effect by imposing
negative externalities on a primary market that will shift primary market actors'
incentives. 6 Because preemption doctrine prevents only the direct regulation of
federally chartered financial institutions, it does not prevent states from
channeling the pressures of the market in order to use regulation of the non-
federally-chartered secondary market as a tool to regulate upstream in the
origination market indirectly.
4 The Credit Cardholders' Bill of Rights: Providing New Protections for Consumers: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial
Services, 110th Cong. 5-6 (2008) [hereinafter Credit Cardholders' Hearing] (statement of Rep. Barney
Frank, Chairman, H. Comm. on Financial Services), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=l 10_househearings&docid=f:41731 .wais.pdf.
5 Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008);
Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Consuming Debt: Structuring the Federal Response to Abuses in Consumer
Credit, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 43, 82 (2005).
6 The "hydraulic" terminology is inspired by Benjamin Sachs, Employment Law as Labor
Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685 (2008), where it is used to describe the process whereby the




Hydraulic regulation aims to impose targeted regulatory costs, tied to
specific terms in consumer debt, on secondary market purchasers of the debt,
such as securitization trusts and debt collectors. Because the regulatory costs
are tied to the terms of the debt, these costs will be passed on to the federally
chartered financial institutions that originate the debt in the form of lower
secondary-market prices. 7 Faced with a less robust and profitable secondary
market, banks will have a strong incentive either to alter the terms of the debts
they originate to avoid the hydraulic regulation or to keep the debts on their
own books.
Either outcome improves social welfare. If financial institutions remove
the offensive terms from their debts, consumers benefit, as there will be less
inefficient rent-extraction caused by asymmetric bargaining power and
informational advantages. And if financial institutions keep loans on their own
books, they will have stronger incentives to engage in careful and prudent
underwriting and to avoid abusive terms likely to trigger defaults and make
consumer debt more volatile. States can thus effectively regulate federally
chartered financial institutions without running afoul of federal preemption
doctrine.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly reviews the current state of
bank regulation and the crisis in consumer protection in financial services. The
structure of banking regulation and the current consumer-protection crisis have
been amply explored elsewhere, 8 so this Article seeks to provide only a general
background for readers. Part II considers the scope of preemption doctrine in
the financial-services industry and examines the extent to which states
currently can regulate national banks and thrifts. Part III presents the idea of
hydraulic regulation and shows how it would change the dynamics of
regulatory architecture and capture. Part IV considers potential obstacles to
hydraulic regulation-specifically the uncertain reach of preemption doctrine,
the nature of securitization, the holder-in-due-course doctrine, and the ability of
financial institutions to structure around hydraulic regulation. Part V concludes.
7 It is important to note that the secondary market will not disappear, as at a minimum there
will be a secondary market among federally chartered financial institutions.
8 See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 5; Katherine Engel & Patricia McCoy, Turning a
Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007); Christopher
L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by Banking Agents: Are Federal
Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can Chew?, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 515 (2007); Schooner, supra
note 5; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency's Authority and
Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 225 (2004).
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I. The Consumer-Protection Regulatory Crisis
A. The Current Regulatory Architecture of Consumer Protection
"Consumer protection" is an elusive concept; while it is easy to provide
examples of consumer-protection legislation and litigation, it is much harder to
define consumer protection. This Article uses the term "consumer protection"
to refer to laws, regulations, and enforcement actions that aim to protect
consumers both from unsafe or potentially unsafe products and services and
from products, services, or sales methods designed to exploit informational or
bargaining-power asymmetries, including cognitive biases and lack of self-
control, such that consumers do not receive what they expected from their
bargains. Thus, consumer protection is both about prohibiting or restricting
dangerous products (such as lead-based paint or non-purchase-money security
interests in consumer goods) and leveling the playing field between consumers
and the professional sellers (or purchasers) of goods and services.
Consumer protection is an inherently paternalistic endeavor. While it can
sometimes be done with a light touch, such as by shifting default rules-and
menu choices,9 it often requires greater intervention in the market, including
outright prohibition of particular practices and products.' ° The reasons
animating this paternalistic response vary depending on the particular
regulation or enforcement at issue, but typically include both preventing direct
injury (including fraud) to consumers, the risk of which stifles economic
exchange, and deterring third-party externalities caused by product use.
Consumer-protection roles are dispersed among regulatory agencies
depending on the industry and on the nature of the consumer protection
(advertising versus contractual terms, for example)." Moreover, enforcement
powers may not lie in the same hands as regulatory powers do. This situation is
very much the case in banking services. Consumer protection in banking
services is divided among several agencies, some of which have the ability to
promulgate regulations, and others of which may only enforce existing
regulations.
The United States has a dual banking system, meaning that banks may be
chartered by either the federal government or a state government. Regulatory
9 See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008); Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives:
Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003);
Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1159 (2003).
10 As Eyal Zamir has noted, however, paternalism's general efficiency is indeterminate; at
times it can increase efficiency. See Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REv. 229
(1998).
11 See David Adam Friedman, Reinventing Consumer Protection, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 45, 48-
49 (2007) (noting a "veritable alphabet soup" of agencies dealing with consumer fraud).
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authority over banks for consumer protection depends on whether a bank has a
federal or state charter, what type of charter the bank has, whether the bank has
federal deposit insurance, whether the bank is a member of the Federal Reserve
system, what activity is involved (real-estate lending or non-real-estate lending,
for example), and whether the consumer-protection issue arises in advertising
and solicitation.
If a bank has a state charter and is neither federally insured nor a member
of the Federal Reserve system, its primary regulator for consumer protection
will be the state banking regulator and/or state attorney general. There are few
banks in this category because the lack of federal deposit insurance is a major
competitive disadvantage. 2 Non-member insured state-chartered banks are
regulated by the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation. State-chartered
member banks are regulated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.
For federally chartered banks, the regulator depends on the type of
charter. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), a bureau of the
Treasury Department, has primary authority over entities with national bank
charters ("national banks"). Another Treasury office, the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) has authority over entities with a federal thrift charter, such
as savings associations, savings banks, and savings and loans ("national
thrifts"). 13 Although the OCC and the OTS are part of the Treasury
Department, they are autonomous, and the Treasury Secretary lacks authority
to compel the Comptroller of the Currency or the Director of the OTS to
promulgate any rule. 4 Additionally, an independent agency, the National
Credit Union Administration (NCUA), has authority over federal credit unions.
Banking operations are often supported by affiliates and by third-party
service companies and agents. Bank operating subsidiaries (which have state-
issued corporate charters and are limited to engaging in functions in which
national banks may themselves engage), financial subsidiaries (which are state-
chartered and may engage in functions not authorized under the National Bank
Act (NBA)), and independent bank and thrift service companies are subject to
the same regulatory oversight as the parent institution or the institution they
service. 15 Additionally, bank holding companies and financial holding
companies are regulated by the Federal Reserve, 16 while thrift holding
12 Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30
STAN. L. REv. 1, 3 (1977).
13 This Article uses the term "national thrifts" for stylistic convenience and parallelism with
"national banks," but the more common terms are "federal thrifts," "federal savings associations,"
"federal savings banks," and "federal savings and loan associations."
14 12 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (OCC); Id. § 1462a(b) (2006) (OTS).
15 Id. § 24a(g)(3) (2006) (financial subsidiaries); Id. § 1867(a) (2006) (bank service
companies); Id. § 1464(d)(7)(A) (2006) (thrift service companies); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.,
127 S. Ct. 1559, 1564-65 (2007) (bank operating subsidiaries).
16 12 U.S.C. § 1844(b) (2006) (bank holding companies); Id. §§ 1841(p), 1843(l)(1), 1844(b)
(2006) (financial holding companies).
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companies are regulated by the OTS. 17 Other various non-banking affiliates of
federal financial institutions may or may not fall under primary federal or state
regulators, depending on their activities. Other lending institutions, like state-
chartered finance companies, are not subject to banking regulations at all,
except to the extent they are bank service companies. Instead, finance
companies are subject to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and state regulation
and enforcement, but not to supervisory oversight.
Additionally, several other agencies are involved in consumer-protection
regulation and enforcement for real-estate lending, some of which are part of
the Department of Housing and Urban Development: the Federal Housing
Administration, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO), 18 the Government National Mortgage Association, and the Federal
Home Loan Finance Board. The FTC and the Department of Justice have
authority to address ancillary issues like false advertising, deceptive marketing,
credit reporting, and fraud. Moreover, Congress itself can pass legislation
regulating any banks that fall under any federal regulator's authority.
The role of states in regulating the banking industry has declined
considerably in the past few decades. Non-insured, non-member banks make
up only a small, unimportant corner of the consumer credit economy; consumer
lending is now dominated by federally chartered institutions, especially
national banks. For example, the ten largest credit card issuers, which account
for the vast majority of the card market in terms of total card debt outstanding,
all have federal banking or thrift charters. 19 The banks that conduct the
overwhelming majority of consumer lending now have a federal agency as
their primary regulator.
This shift has brought the tension between state and federal regulation to
the fore. As Howell E. Jackson and Stacy A. Anderson have observed:
The nationalization of consumer lending markets has imposed considerable
pressure on the traditional structure of consumer protection laws in the United
States, most significantly in the application of these laws to national banks. In
the past, there was relatively little conflict between state consumer protection
laws and national bank powers. Consumer protection was generally understood
to be the province of state governments, and national banks routinely complied
with local consumer protection rules.
20
Beginning in the 1970s, however, as banks began to engage in large-scale
interstate consumer lending, courts began to hold that state consumer-
17 Id. § 1467a (2006).
18 As of July 30, 2008, OFHEO was replaced by the Federal Housing Finance Agency. See
Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, §§ 1101, 1301-04, 122
Stat. 2659, 2661, 2794-97 (2008). NILSON REP., issue 921, Mar. 2009, at 1, 10.
19 NILSON REP., Issue 896, Feb. 2008, at 1, 10-11 (2008). Eight banks had federal banking
charters while two, Washington Mutual and USAA Savings, had federal thrift charters.
20 Howell E. Jackson & Stacy A. Anderson, Can States Tax National Banks To Educate
Consumers About Predatory Lending Practices?, 30 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 831, 836 (2007).
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protection laws were preempted as applied to federally chartered financial
institutions. These court holdings in turn created strong incentives for banks
to opt in to federal charters instead of state charters. The easing of restrictions
on interstate branch banking in 199422 further increased incentives for banks to
opt in to federal charters and then argue that they were not subject to different
sets of legal regimes in different states. Thus, as Jackson and Anderson note, as
"federally chartered entities play an increasingly dominant role in the nation's
lending market, the capacity of states to engage in direct regulation of the




B. Shortcomings of the Current Consumer-Protection Regime
The current consumer-protection regime in financial services has several
serious shortcomings, which have been amply documented elsewhere. 24 While
the financial-services industry and a few libertarian academics have argued that
current regime is sufficient or even too invasive, 25 this Article takes the general
failure of the financial-services regulatory regime as its starting point.
Accordingly, for background purposes, this Article reviews some of the
highlights of the failure of the current consumer-protection regime in financial
services rather than engaging in an exhaustive documentation.
The events of the past year have laid bare the shortcomings of our current
system of financial-institution regulation. These shortcomings have played out
on two levels: consumer protection and systemic risk. Millions of Americans
are losing their homes in foreclosure because of unaffordable mortgages.26
Some of these foreclosures involve speculators who knowingly gambled with
the market, but many others involve consumers who were placed in
affirmatively unsuitable mortgages.27 At the same time, systemic risk-the
failure of a single institution causing a domino chain of failures-has arisen
repeatedly in 2008-2009: with the collapse of AIG, the world's largest insurer,
which had significant exposure to mortgage markets; with the failure of Bear
Steams and Lehman Brothers, investment banks with large exposure to
21 Id. at 837.
22 See Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (2006)).
23 Jackson & Anderson, supra note 20, at 833-34.
24 See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 5.
25 E.g., G. Marcus Cole, Protecting Consumers From Consumer Protection: Watters v.
Wachovia Bank, 2006-2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 251, 264; see also Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D.
Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. COL. L. REV. 1 (2009) (urging caution
in regulatory responses).
26 See HOPE Now, Workout Plans (Repayment Plans + Modifications) and Foreclosure
Sales, July 2007-November 2008, http://www.hopenow.com/upload/data/files/HOPE%20NOW%20
Loss%20Mitigation%20National%2OData%2OJuly%2007%20to%2ONovember/o2008.pdf (last visited
April 17, 2009).
27 Zywicki & Adamson, supra note 25.
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mortgage markets; with the failure of Wachovia National Bank, Washington
Mutual Federal Savings Bank, and IndyMac Federal Savings Bank; and with
the near collapse (but for government intervention) of many other large
financial institutions in the country, including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Bank
of America, and Citigroup. The events of 2007-2008 have also shown that
these two problems are intimately connected-it was troubles in the mortgage
market, stemming in part from unscrupulous lending practices, amplified by
various new and untested financial products, that brought down or nearly
brought down a wide range of interconnected financial institutions. Consumer
protection must be seen as an essential component of systemic-risk protection.
The failure to protect consumers has systemic externalities.
1. Case Study: The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
The actions of the OCC, the primary regulator of the nation's largest
banks, are illustrative of the shortcomings of the current consumer-protection
system. The OCC has consistently intervened on the side of national banks to
prevent any state regulation or enforcement action against national banks for
29
consumer-protection purposes. 9 For example, in 2005, New York Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer requested nonpublic information from several national
banks regarding their mortgage lending policies and practices. Spitzer's request
came as part of an investigation into possible racial discrimination in
residential real-estate lending based on Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data
that indicated that the banks issued a significantly higher percentage of their
high-interest home mortgage loans to minorities than to whites.3" The OCC
responded by suing to enjoin the Attorney General's investigation. 3' The OCC
did not take up the investigation itself.
Statistics on OCC enforcement actions also reflect an agency that has not
prioritized consumer protection. In 2005, only three of the OCC's 2650
employees had investigating and resolving consumer complaints as their
32primary job. This figure contrasts with the resident teams of perhaps twenty
to forty bank examiners at each of the largest national banks, engaged
primarily, if not exclusively, in safety-and-soundness regulation.
28 See FDIC Chairman Sheila C. Bair, Remarks Before the Consumer Federation of America
(Dec. 4, 2008) available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2008/chairman/spdec
0408_2.html.
29 Stephanie Mencimer, No Account, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2007, at 14.
30 Clearing House Ass'n, LLC v. Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 129 S.
Ct. 987 (2009).
31 Clearing House Ass'n, 510 F.3d 105.
32 Mencimer, supra note 29; Best Places To Work in the Federal Government: Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (Treasury), http://bestplacestowork.org/BPTW/rankings/
agency.php?code=TRAJ&q=scores-subcomponent (last visited April 10, 2009).
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Another measure of OCC involvement in consumer protection is the
number and amount of fines it has levied on national banks for various
violations. As Stephanie Mencimer has noted:
In 2003 alone, state bank agencies brought 4,035 consumer enforcement actions.
Since 2000, the OCC has brought just 1 consumer enforcement actions. The
biggest two involved cases that were initiated and investigated by state attorneys
general and that the OCC initially tried to prevent from going forward.
33
Indeed, from January 2000 to April 2009, the OCC has levied a mere seventy-
three fines, only six of which were for consumer-protection violations.34 The
others were for safety-and-soundness violations (46, almost all for failure to
require flood insurance for mortgage loans against collateral in flood plains),
money laundering violations (10), or unspecified in the stipulation and consent
order (11). Of the consumer-protection violations, two related to payday
lending, two related to discriminatory lending (including Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act violations), one related to telemarketing, and one related to data
security. The OCC's fines are generally miniscule, often no more than several
hundred or several thousand dollars, only a small fraction compared to a bank's
balance sheet. Only eight penalties have topped one million dollars, and of
those only two were for consumer-protection violations; the others were for
money-laundering violations. Since 1994, the OCC has brought only one
formal enforcement action on consumer-protection grounds against any of the
top ten national banks, 35 which collectively hold seventy-six percent of OCC-
regulated assets.
36
To be sure, formal enforcement actions and civil fines are not the full
measure of OCC consumer-protection activities, but in light of the myriad
complaints about mortgage, credit card, auto, payday, title, and refund
33 Id.; see also Credit Card Practices: Current Consumer and Regulatory Issues: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial
Servs., 110th Cong. 14 (2007) (statement of Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Professor of Law, George
Washington University Law School); Wilmarth, supra note 8; Robert Berner & Brian Grow, They
Warned Us, BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 20, 2008, at 36, 39, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_42/b4104036827981.htm (stating that 13 of 495
OCC enforcement actions were consumer-related and only one involved subprime mortgage lending).
34 See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Legal and Regulatory: Enforcement
Actions, http://apps.occ.gov/EnforcementActions/ (last visited April 10, 2009) (listing bank civil
monetary penalties).
35 Id.
36 The OCC reached a $150 million settlement in 2008 with Wachovia for deceptive
marketing activities by third-party telemarketers enabled by the bank. Press Release, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, OCC, Wachovia Enter Revised Agreement To Reimburse Consumers
Directly (Dec. 11, 2008), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-143.htm; Press
Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Directs Wachovia To Make Restitution to
Consumers Harmed by the Bank's Relationships with Telemarketers and Payment Processors (Apr. 25,
2008), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-48.htm. The OCC and the OTS were
unresponsive to the Author's FOIA requests regarding individual institutions' share of assets they
regulated. Similar information is freely available, however, from the website of the FDIC, the
institutions' secondary regulator. See FDIC, Statistics on Depository Institutions,
http://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/main.asp (last visited April 10, 2009).
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complaints about mortgage, credit card, auto, payday, title, and refund
anticipation lenders, the OCC's bringing only eleven formal consumer-
protection actions and six consumer-protection-related fines (and only one
against a major institution) over the past seven-plus years creates an extremely
strong inference of enforcement apathy, if not outright disinclination.
Moreover, the OCC has thrown its regulatory weight behind an attempt to
protect national banks from consumer-protection regulation by other federal
agencies. 37 The Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits unfair and deceptive
acts and practices ("UDAP") in interstate commerce 38 and gives the Federal
Reserve Board the power to define those acts for national banks.39 In July
2008, the Federal Reserve proposed an expansion of its UDAP regulations for
national banks' credit card lending practices. Parallel regulations were
promulgated by the OTS and the NCUA for national thrifts and credit unions.4'
The OCC's reaction to the proposed regulations, which many consumer
advocates did not feel went far enough,42 was to write a letter to the Federal
43Reserve Board registering its opposition. In its letter, the OCC argued
(without evidence) that the proposed regulations would harm consumers
because they would reduce available credit.44 It is not clear what bearing an
economic efficiency concern like the reduction in credit availability has on the
37 Vincent DiLorenzo, Federalism, Consumer Protection and Regulatory Preemption: A Case
for Heightened Judicial Review, 10 U. PA. J. OF Bus. & EMP. L. 274, 281 (2008) ("[T]he OCC has not
acted as a neutral forum to resolve conflicting policies. Rather it has acted as an advocate for the
interests of national banks and therefore an advocate for the broadest possible preemption of state
law."). DiLorenzo provides a lucid discussion of the OCC's reliance on the non-acquiescence doctrine,
and the knowledge that the Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari, to ignore adverse lower court
decisions. Id. at 304.
38 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006).
39 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f) (2006).
40 Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices Regulations for the Federal Reserve System Board of
Governors, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,904 (proposed May 19, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 227).
41 Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices Regulations for the Department of Treasury, Office
of Thrift Supervision, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,904 (proposed May 19, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
535); Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices Regulations for the National Credit Union Administration,
73 Fed. Reg. 28,904 (proposed May 19, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 706).
42 Consumer Action, Comments on Proposed Amendments to UDAP Regulations,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2008/August/2008080 l/R- I 286[R- I286-174 .pdf; National
Consumer Law Center (On Behalf of Its Low-income Clients) and Center for Responsible Lending,
Consumers Union, National Association of Consumer Advocates, U.S. Public Interest Research Group,
Comments on Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Truth in Lending,
http://www.naca.net/_assets/shared/633531868730554739.pdf, Consumers Union, Comments on
Regulation AA-Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, Board Docket R- 1314, and Regulation Z, Board
Docket R-1286, http://www.creditcardreform.org/pdf/Credit-Card-Letter.pdf.
43 Cheyenne Hopkins, OCC Presses Fed To Alter Proposal on Card Reform, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 21, 2008, at 1.
44 See id. It is not clear what bearing a reduction in credit availability would have on
consumer welfare or the public interest. It is far from clear that a glut of credit is a boon to consumers; it
was a surfeit of easy credit that led to the mortgage bubble. Indeed, had the OCC done a better job
restraining aggressive mortgage lending practices, national banks would be in better shape financially
and would be better equipped to handle reduced profitability from their credit card operations.
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essential fairness of a business practice, which is what a UDAP regulation aims
to address. Irrespectively, the OCC's real concern is evident elsewhere in the
letter-that the proposed UDAP regulations will reduce bank profitability,
which would hurt bank safety and soundness, 45 particularly in light of the
weakened conditions of national banks because of the mortgage crisis. Left
unstated is the OCC's assumption that it is acceptable for a national bank to
engage in unfair and deceptive acts and practices if that is the only way for the
national bank to make a profit. UDAP regulations are explicitly about
consumer protection, but the OCC's letter to the Federal Reserve shows that
the OCC believes that bank profitability trumps consumer protection.
The OCC's failure to engage in meaningful consumer-protection
regulation and enforcement is symptomatic of larger structural problems in
banking regulation. The OCC is hardly an isolated case; its sister agency, theS46
OTS, has an equally unimpressive track record for consumer protection.
Consumer protection is ultimately a substantive field. The substantive
shortcomings, exemplified by the OCC, stem, however, from organizational
architecture issues.
2. Structural Flaws in the Current Consumer-Protection Regime
Structurally, the current consumer-protection regime has a number of
flaws. First, the present architecture of consumer protection inevitably leads to
consumer protection falling through the cracks and taking a back seat to
agencies' primary missions. The plethora of agencies, each given a small piece
of the consumer-protection field to police along with its other duties, has the
effect of making consumer protection an orphan in the banking regulation
system. Because consumer protection is everybody's responsibility, but each
agency is responsible for a very limited piece of the system, it becomes
nobody's responsibility.
Second, there is a conflict between federal banking regulators' missions.
Federal banking regulators' primary mission is to ensure the safety and
soundness of financial institutions. Safety and soundness ultimately means
profitability because only profitable financial institutions can be safe and
sound. Unfortunately, unfair and abusive practices can often be quite
profitable. 47 For example, banks might not engage in the most strenuous anti-
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum & Ellen Nakashima, Banking Regulator Played Advocate
over Enforcer, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2008, at A 1.
47 To be sure, consumer-protection concerns can align with safety-and-soundness concerns
because predatory loans can lead to excessive defaults. But as banks have shifted from relational lending
to originate-to-distribute business models, the default risk may not be borne by the national bank any
more. Moreover, for some financial products, like credit cards, defaults are actually an important source
of bank profit, as late fees and penalty interest can more than offset lost principal. See Ronald J. Mann,
Bankruptcy Reform and the "Sweat Box " of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375.
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fraud practices because it might not be as profitable as allowing a certain level
of fraud. From a bank's perspective, there may be a nonzero optimal level of
fraud. After a certain point, the cost of preventing the marginal fraud outweighs
its benefit. From a safety-and-soundness perspective, a bank should not
overinvest in anti-fraud security. But from a consumer perspective, the optimal
level of fraud is likely zero, especially if consumers bear the costs of the fraud.
Safety and soundness and consumer protection would thus push for different
regulatory outcomes. Placing the two missions together in a single agency
ensures that one will trump the other, and historically consumer protection has
not won out. Regulators have permitted profitability-protection to trump
consumer protection for all but the most egregious behavior.
This conflict creates a problem, as Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren
have identified, because regulatory authority ends up misaligned with
48regulatory motivation. Federal banking regulators have the authority to
regulate for consumer protection but are not motivated to do so, in part because
of its conflict with their safety-and-soundness mission (as well as regulatory
capture issues, discussed below). The FTC, on the other hand, has consumer
protection as one of its major missions and does not lack motivation, but has no
authority to regulate banks.49
Third, the dispersion of authority that is the salient feature of the current
regulatory architecture has allowed for regulatory arbitrage by financial
institutions, setting off a race to the bottom among regulators competing for
regulatory turf. Federal banking authorities compete with state regulators and
with each other for the business of chartering banks. Banks can and do switch
their charters from state to federal and vice versa, as well as change the type of
federal charter they have, such as from a banking to a thrift charter.
Chartering is a crucial business for banking regulatory agencies for two
reasons. First, their primary authority is largely coextensive with the extent of
their chartering. A regulator that charters few institutions has little regulatory
turf. And second, relatedly, federal and some state banking regulators receive
It is also important to note that even practices that create systemic risk can be profitable in the
short-term and at smaller scales. In other words, banks' incentives are temporally misaligned between
the short term and the long term. Bank executive compensation exacerbates this problem because it
often has a significant short-term component. Likewise, bank officers and directors are sensitive to
short-term stock prices because of concerns over their tenure. Thus, there is strong pressure for banks to
opt for certain short-term benefits over long-term stability.
48 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 5, at 85-98.
49 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006) (barring FTC from regulating banks); 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f)
(2006) (delegating unfair and deceptive trade practice regulatory authority over financial institutions to
various banking regulators). The FTC engages in a very different model of consumer protection than
banking regulators. FTC consumer protection is based on a combination of ex ante rulemaking and ex
post enforcement actions, whereas bank regulators engage primarily in ex ante rulemaking and
consultative, supervisory interaction with banks. See Schooner, supra note 5, at 78-79.
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the majority of their budgets from their chartering fees, unlike other potential
consumer-protection regulators.
50
Charter competition among charter-issuing banking regulators creates a
race to the bottom with respect to consumer protection. 51 As Arthur Bums, a
former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, has noted, the federal bank
regulation system is nothing less than "competition in laxity, ''52 especially in
the area of consumer protection. Consumer-protection regulation and
enforcement imposes regulatory costs that banks want to avoid. Because no
single regulator has complete primary authority over the entire banking system,
any single regulator moving by itself for more vigorous consumer-protection
regulations or enforcement would put its regulatees at a disadvantage relative
to the entities regulated by other banking regulators. These relative costs would
cause a flight of charters from the first-mover regulator, which would affect the
regulator's budget. Similarly, a regulator that adopts a more lax consumer-
protection stance will find itself receiving more chartering business and a
greater budget. Thus, there is a coordination problem among banking regulators
that works strongly against consumer-protection regulation.
One example of how chartering competition has created a race to the
bottom is the fate of state usury laws, which capped the maximum rate of
interest on loans. Usury laws were historically the major form of consumer
protection in banking because they shielded borrowers from assuming
obligations that they could not afford. State usury laws were largely eviscerated
following the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Marquette National Bank of
Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.53 Marquette held that because the
NBA preempted state law, the usury ceiling that applied to a national bank's
lending operations was that of the state in which the bank is located, as
provided by the NBA, not the state of the borrower. This ruling meant that
50 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 5, at 93 ("Assessments comprise 95% of OCC's budget,
with the twenty largest national banks covering nearly three-fifths of these assessments."). In 2007, the
assessments paid by a single institution, Washington Mutual, made up 12% of OTS's budget. Cheyenne
Hopkins, Side Effect: Questions on Future of OTS, AM. BANKER, Jan. 14, 2008, at 1; Corrections, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 15, 2008, at 20. Washington Mutual comprised 20.41% of the assets regulated by the
OTS. FDIC, Statistics on Depository Institutions, http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/main.asp (last visited April
10, 2009). Washington Mutual's failure in September 2008 has cast severe doubt on OTS's future
viability. See Cheyenne Hopkins & Joe Adler, As Thrifts Stagger, OTS Faces Tough Questions, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 15, 2008, at 1. The FDIC and Federal Reserve do not issue charters. State banking
regulators are also largely funded by charter assessments (directly or indirectly). Consumer protection
on the state level, however, is primarily the ken of attomeys'-general offices, which are not budgetarily
beholden to the entities they regulate. See Wilmarth, supra note 8, at 276 (discussing the OCC's explicit
recognition that preemption provided a strong incentive for large multistate banks to select national
charters).
51 Non-chartering regulators, such as the FDIC, have been more aggressive on the consumer-
protection front, perhaps because of the reduced conflict of interest.
52 HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR., REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 52 (1999) (quoting Chairman Bums).
53 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
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national banks could base themselves in states with high or nonexistent usury
ceilings, like Delaware and South Dakota, and export the rate ceilings to other
states.
This situation in turn set off a two-part regulatory race toward the bottom,
as banks began to switch to federal charters and look for states with high or no
usury ceilings. Some states responded by eliminating or raising usury ceilings
to keep national bank operations in their states. Other states adopted parity laws
that would allow their state-chartered banks the same leeway as national
banks.54 As Jackson and Anderson note, "the Marquette decision, coupled with
the cooperation of several state legislatures, effectively ended interest rate
regulation for certain kinds of consumer credit in the United States."
55
Moreover, subsequent court rulings have extended Marquette to preempt state
regulation of late fees, 56 various loan closing fees, 57 and disclosures in credit
agreements.
58
This trend has been strengthened in recent years by OCC regulations
preempting state mortgage-lending regulations and by the increasing entrance
of national banks into insurance, an area traditionally regulated solely by states.
Likewise, state regulations of mortgage-broker subsidiaries of national banks,
59
check-cashing fees,6 0 giftcards, 61 tax refund anticipation loans, 62 and credit card
convenience checks 63 have all been preempted.
54 See Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The
Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672 (1987); Elizabeth
R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect on Predatory
Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518 (2004). Moreover, Congress subsequently enacted section
521 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 183 1d (2006)), which grants FDIC-insured state banks
the power to export local interest rates.
55 Jackson & Anderson, supra note 20, at 838; see also Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson,
539 U.S. 1, 10 (2003) (holding that the NBA is the exclusive cause of action for usury against national
banks). Usury, of course, can be a defense as well as a counterclaim. It is not clear whether Beneficial
National Bank preempts state-law usury defenses or counterclaims. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, No.
07-773, slip op. at 19 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2009).
56 Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996) (deferring to the OCC's
interpretation of its regulation as providing that late fees are treated like interest).
57 Phipps v. Guar. Nat'l Bank of Tallahassee, 2003 WL 22149646 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 17, 2003)
(No. 03-420-CV-W-GAF) (defining interest to include origination fees, loan discount fees, processing
fees, and other closing costs).
58 Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that a
California statute requiring warning statements about implications of making only minimum payments
was preempted, despite the Truth in Lending Act's provision permitting more stringent state disclosure
laws, 15 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (2006)).
59 E.g., Nat'l City Bank of Ind. v. Tumbaugh, 463 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that
Maryland's attempt to exercise visitorial powers and limit prepayment penalties on adjustable-rate
mortgage loans originated by a national bank operating subsidiary was preempted).
60 Wells Fargo Bank of Tex., N.A. v. James, 321 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that a
Texas law prohibiting banks from charging check-cashing fees was preempted by an OCC regulation
permitting national banks to charge "non-interest charges and fees").
61 SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding preempted a New
Hampshire law prohibiting expiration dates on giftcards).
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Fourth, there are general problems of regulatory capture. Consumer
protection is essentially a public good.64 Financial institutions aim to capture
control of consumer-protection policymaking to steer it to their economic
interest, which is generally deregulation. Interest groups like financial
institutions have a concentrated financial stake in consumer-protection
policymaking. This stake incentivizes them to find the means to capture
policymakers, including by creating indirect incentive structures, such as
revolving-door employment, for policymakers. Revolving-door employment
between government and industry is not particularly unique to the banking
industry, although salary differentials between government and private
employers may be more pronounced for banking regulators. The danger with
revolving-door employment is that government regulators might work with an
eye toward pleasing their future private employers.
Other problems are unique to bank regulation, however. Federal bank
regulators have permanent resident teams of bank examiners at the largest
banks, which are also the largest consumer lenders. The regulators' presence
bears an uncanny resemblance to those of outside accountants at Enron and
WorldCom, who abdicated their regulatory role to become enablers. Because
the safety-and-soundness mission often translates into a mission of protecting
profitability, federal banking regulators inevitably find themselves regulating in
the interests of the regulated industry as a whole, rather than protecting
consumers.
In addition to traditional modes, regulatory capture has manifested itself
in a novel way in financial-services regulation: regulators who cater to
financial institutions' concerns by promising lax regulation can benefit
personally through career promotions.65 For example, in the late 1980s, Darryl
W. Dochow served as the head of supervision and regulation at the Federal
62 E.g., Pac. Capital Bank, N.A. v. Milgram, No. 08-0223, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19639
(D.N.J. Mar. 13, 2008) (holding that a New Jersey statute imposing criminal and civil penalties for
certain tax refund anticipation loans was preempted).
63 Rose v. Chase Bank, USA, N.A., 513 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding a California
UDAP statute preempted to the extent it required specific disclosures for credit card convenience
checks). But see Jefferson v. Chase Home Fin., No. C 06-6510 TEH, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94652, at
*36-37 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2007) (upholding application of a California UDAP statute to a national
bank to the extent it is a generally applicable regulation prohibiting misrepresentation).
64 A public good is a good that is non-rivaled and non-excludable. Non-rivaled goods are
those whose consumption by one individual does not affect their availability for other individuals. Non-
excludable goods are those that individuals cannot be excluded from consuming. Consumer protection
appears to be non-rivaled-the consumption of consumer protection does not reduce its availability for
others, although that is only in a world of unlimited enforcement resources. As a generic matter,
consumer protection is also non-excludable-it is available for all consumers-although specific
protections can be limited to certain classes of consumers.
65 The philosophy behind regulatory agencies catering to regulatees can be seen in a
formalized fashion in the Clinton-Gore "Reinventing Government Initiative," which casts government
as being in the "customer service" business with regulatees as the "customers." National Partnership for
Reinventing Government, Who We Are, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/whoweare/history2.html (last
visited Apr. 10, 2009).
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Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) responsible for Charles Keating's Lincoln
Savings & Loan of Irvine. When Lincoln Savings & Loan failed in 1989, it was
the largest and costliest thrift failure to date.66 In the ensuing inquiry, federal
investigators concluded that Dochow "played a key role" in the thrift's collapse
"by delaying and impeding proper oversight of that thrift's operations." 67 Yet,
by 2005, Dochow was back in a major regulatory role for the thrift industry,
serving as the OTS's Deputy Regional Director for the Western Region.
In 2006, Dochow and OTS colleagues met with Countrywide Financial,
the nation's largest mortgage lender, which at that point had a national banking
charter from the OCC. Countrywide was interested in switching its charter to
the OTS. Dochow pitched the OTS as "a more natural, less antagonistic
regulator than OCC. 6 8 In particular, Dochow suggested that the OTS would
permit Countrywide's loan officers to choose their own property appraisers-
including a property appraisal affiliate of Countrywide-unlike other banking
regulators.69 Countrywide shifted to a thrift charter in 2007. Countrywide's
assessments accounted for five percent of the OTS's budget.
70
Six months after Countrywide changed its charter, Dochow was promoted
to the OTS's Regional Director for the Western region.7 1 Bringing the
Countywide business to the OTS was a major coup for Dochow, and the
promotion appears to have been a reward.72 The Dochow example indicates
that at least some banking regulatory agencies view themselves as a business in
which supervised institutions are customers, and salespersons who bring in
business are personally rewarded.
There may also be legislative, as well as regulatory, capture. The
financial-services industry has been the single largest contributor to
66 Richard B. Schmitt, Regulator Takes Heat over IndyMac, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, at C1.
67 Appelbaum & Nakashima, supra note 46, at A10.
68 Id.
69 Id. OTS officials dispute that Countrywide changed its charter because of the promise of
weaker regulation. Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. Notably, the largest thrift failures of the current financial crisis have been entities based
in the western United States: Washington Mutual, IndyMac Bank, and Downey Savings & Loan
Association. See FDIC: Failed Bank List, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html (last
visited Apr. 10, 2009). Countrywide Financial, which narrowly averted failure by means of a forced sale
to Bank of America, see William Heisel & Tiffany Hsu, Future Cloudy for Downey Savings, L.A.
TIMES, October 23, 2008, at Cl, was also a thrift based in the western United States. So was Golden
West Financial, which was sold to Wachovia before the current financial crisis, and whose problematic
Golden West Adjustable Rate Mortgage portfolio was a major factor in the failure of Wachovia. See
Paul Tharp, Wild, Wild Waste-Wachovia's MeSS, N.Y. POST, Apr. 15, 2008, at 38.
72 Dochow was fired in December 2008, after it emerged that he permitted IndyMac Federal
Savings Bank to backdate capital infusions, which allowed IndyMac to maintain its well-capitalized
status and to continue to solicit brokered deposits (creating greater risk for the FDIC deposit insurance




congressional campaigns since 1990.73 Legislative capture of even a portion of
Congress can significantly forestall attempts to regulate via legislation.
Finally, issues of capture aside, the congressional backstop to the
regulatory system is not nimble or expert enough to keep up with the details of
consumer-protection regulation on a quotidian basis. At best, Congress can be
reactive to major developments, but the delay between the origins of a
problematic business practice and a legislative response can be considerable.
In short, consumer protection. in banking services is structurally
subordinated to the safety-and-soundness mission in several ways. The divided
and captured regulatory structure for financial services has left consumers with
limited protection against abusive financial-services practices, stemming from
disparate bargaining power and sophistication of financial institutions and
consumers. Consumer protection in financial services has suffered both in
terms of statutory and regulatory provisions and in terms of public enforcement
actions. These practices range from usurious interest rates to improperly
disclosed fee provisions to universal cross-default provisions in credit
cardholder agreements to penalty fees unrelated to costs,74 to the underwriting
of mortgage products that are affirmatively unsuitable for the borrower and
which will likely end in a default and foreclosure. Unless consumer protection
is separated from safety-and-soundness, it will inevitably lose out.
3. Regulatory Architecture Solutions
There are two possible (and non-exclusive) regulatory architecture
solutions to the current consumer-protection problem. One solution is to
concentrate the consumer-protection mission at the federal level in the hands of
a single federal agency, either the FTC, as Heidi Mandanis Schooner has
proposed,75 or a new federal consumer financial product safety commission, as
Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren have proposed.76 The virtue of these
proposals is to terminate intra-agency conflict between profit-protection and
73 Sunlight Foundation, Industry Sector Campaign Contributions, 1990-2008,
http://media.sunlightfoundation.com/viz/sector_contributions.html; see also Glenn Greenwald, Top
Senate Democrat: Bankers "Own" the U.S. Congress, SALON.COM, April 30, 2009,
http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2009/04/30/ownership/ (quoting Senator Dick Durbin as
stating, "And the banks-hard to believe in a time when we're facing a banking crisis that many of the
banks created-are still the most powerful lobby on Capitol Hill. And they frankly own the place.").
74 Credit Cardholders' Hearing, supra note 4, at 117-39 (statement of Adam J. Levitin,
Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center); cf U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (2005)
(requiring liquidated damages to be reasonable in light of actual or anticipated harms caused by breach);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1979) (requiring liquidated damages to be reasonable
in light of actual or anticipated loss caused by breach.
75 Schooner, supra note 5, at 82.
76 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 5. Legislation has been introduced proposing such a
commission. See Financial Product Safety Commission Act of 2009, S. 566, 11lth Cong. (2009);
Consumer Credit Safety Commission Act of 2008, S. 3629, 110th Cong. (2008).
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consumer protection. They would also have the benefits of concentrating
consumer-protection resources in one agency so that the agency might develop
expertise and attract a professional staff deeply interested in consumer
protection.
The effectiveness of any proposal ultimately rests in the details, and
neither the Schooner nor the Bar-Gill and Warren proposal offers a detailed
policy prescription. Instead, they both offer important insights into the
regulatory architecture of consumer protection. Even as a general approach,
however, there are dangers inherent in these proposals, namely, that the single
agency could easily be captured itself, perhaps more easily than multiple
agencies, and that the effectiveness of the agency would depend heavily on the
sympathies of a particular presidential administration. Consider, for example,
the Consumer Product Safety Commission. At times it has been an extremely
effective advocate for consumer protection, but budget and staff cutbacks in the
Bush administration, coupled with leadership of a decisively anti-regulatory
mindset, have rendered it incapable of proactively meeting public safety
dangers, like lead in children's toys.
77
Moreover, by moving consumer protection to a separate agency, the
Schooner proposal and the Bar-Gill and Warren proposal would merely shift
the conflict between profit protection and consumer protection from the intra-
agency to the inter-agency level. Disputes would be resolved at the White
House policy staff level. This structure would increase political accountability,
but do little to resolve the conflicts. Indeed, because consumer protection
would no longer be presumptively subordinated to safety and soundness, such a
move might create more open conflict.
78
Finally, as a practical matter, creation of a separate federal financial-
services consumer-protection agency might be impossible. Agencies' and their
legislative patrons' reluctance to cede any jurisdiction would impede legislative
action. Moreover, the financial-services industry could be expected to oppose
regulatory consolidation. With focused opposition and only diffuse "good-
government" support, any move to consolidate consumer protection might be
doomed before it could be launched.
77 See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, Bigger Budget? No, Responds Safety Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
30, 2007, at Cl (detailing Consumer Product Safety Commission's Acting Chairman's opposition to
legislation that would double agency budget, increase maximum fines agency could levy, expand
agency authority to protect whistleblowers, increase agency ability to prosecute executives of companies
that willfully violate laws, and ease agency ability to publicize faulty products).
78 Technically, if there were an independent consumer protection agency, conflicting policies
would have to be reconciled by the courts. In practice, however, independent agencies are often
susceptible to pressure from the administration. Thus, in 1998, the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, an independent agency, was pressured by the Treasury Department, Federal Reserve, and
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) into backing off a plan to regulate over-the-counter
derivatives. Jacob M. Schlesinger, Inside 5 Momentous Decisions, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2002, at Al.
Already a similar conflict exists between the SEC (an independent agency) and federal bank regulators.
Vol. 26:2, 2009
Hydraulic Regulation
Either the Schooner proposal or the Bar-Gill and Warren proposal would
be a substantial improvement over the current regulatory landscape, but they
would not resolve every issue. Most importantly, though, they would require
affirmative political action to implement, and imperfect implementation could
undermine the strength of the proposals' regulatory architecture.
Another option would be to separate the safety-and-soundness and
consumer protections by dividing them between federal and state authorities.
This was the traditional regulatory divide, but, as Part II discusses, the growth
of federal preemption has severely curtailed states' consumer-protection
activities in financial services. As we will see in Part III, however, changes in
the market have made a reinvigoration of state consumer-protection regulation
in financial services possible.
I. Federal Preemption Doctrine in Banking Law
Federal preemption is a major obstacle for states seeking to regulate
federally chartered financial institutions.79 State laws regulating financial
institutions have nearly all been invalidated as applied to national banks and
thrifts on preemption grounds, and preemption risk has chilled other potential
state attempts to regulate financial institutions.
80
As a general matter, federal preemption of state law can occur in three
ways: when a federal statute explicitly preempts state law (explicit
preemption), when there would be a conflict between state and federal law
(conflict preemption), and when a federal statute so completely occupies the
field that it leaves no room for state regulation (field preemption).81 For
national banks, federal courts have not yet declared that any federal statute so
79 Preemption in banking law is part of a general question of federalism in the regulation of
financial institutions. Securities regulation is another major context for this question, but is beyond the
scope of this Article. A significant difference between preemption of state banking laws and state
securities laws is that preemption of state securities laws has been by statute, rather than by regulation.
See generally National Securities Markets Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416
(1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2006)) (preempting state securities registration requirements);
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (preempting state-law securities fraud suits). On preemption generally,
see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative
Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2007); Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption,
102 Nw. U. L. REV. 695 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U.
L. REV. 727 (2008); Catherine M. Sharkey, The Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L.
REV. 841 (2008); and Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 869 (2008).
80 Hilary Johnson, N.Y. Official Gives Views on Subprime, Preemption, AM. BANKER, May
14, 2007, at 2 (quoting New York State Superintendent of Banks Richard Neiman, "In addition to
making the national charter more attractive, the [Watters v. Wachovia] decision is likely to chill state
regulation and/or encourage the migration of state institutions to states with less regulation.... No state
wants to put their own state institutions at a competitive disadvantage. Certainly with New York's
vibrant financial markets, this is a critical issue for us .... [The ruling] will further impede local efforts
to respond quickly and with innovative measures.").
81 E.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1585-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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completely occupies the field of banking regulation that it leaves no room for
state regulation. For national thrifts, however, some lower courts have found
field preemption,82 even though the Supreme Court has pointedly declined to
make such a finding,83 instead finding instances of conflict preemption. Thus,
in the banking system, state laws are preempted either expressly by specific
federal statutes8 4 and regulations85 or implicitly by inherent conflicts between
state and federal law,86 although there might be field preemption for national
thrifts. Accordingly, the statutory structure of federal banking law provides the
sources of preemption.
The enabling statutes and regulations for federally chartered financial
institutions depend on the institutions' specific type of charter. National banks'
powers are governed by the NBA;8 7 national thrifts' powers are governed by
88the Home Owners Loan Act (HOLA), and federal credit unions are governed
by the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA). 9 While there are differences in the
preemption for national banks, thrifts, and federal credit unions, the differences
do not affect this Article's proposal for reinvigorating state consumer-
protection powers through hydraulic regulation. Because much of the case law
on preemption has dealt with either national banks or thrifts, this Article
focuses on these institutions and their enabling acts.
82 E.g., Silvas v. E*Trade Mortgage Corp., 514 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 2008); Bank of Am.
v. City & County of S.F., 309 F.3d 551, 559-66 (9th Cir. 2002); Conference of Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'ns
v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1979), affd, 445 U.S. 921 (1980); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417, 425-26 (1st Cir. 1979); Kupiec v. Republic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 512
F.2d 147, 150-52 (7th Cir. 1975); Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145,
1147 (9th Cir. 1974); Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ill.
1975); Lyons Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 377 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1974); People
v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311,318 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
83 Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 159 n.14 (1982) ("Because
we find an actual conflict between federal and state law, we need not decide whether the HOLA or the
[FHLBB's] regulations occupy the field of due-on-sale law or the entire field of federal savings and loan
regulation."); id. at 171-72 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I join in the Court's opinion but write
separately to emphasize that the authority of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to pre-empt state laws
is not limitless.").
84 E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 (2006) (explicitly preempting state laws governing interest rates
on residential first mortgage loans); 12 U.S.C. § 3803(c) (2006) (explicitly preempting state laws
restricting exotic mortgage structures).
85 De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153 ("Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than
federal statutes.").
86 Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1572 (majority opinion).
87 National Bank Act of 1863, Pub. L. No. 38-106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
88 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (2006).
89 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1791k (2006).
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A. National Banks
The NBA vests federally chartered banks with certain enumerated
powers, 90 as well as:
all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of
banking; by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of
exchange, and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and
selling exchange, coin, and bullion; by loaning money on personal security; and
by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes ....
The Supreme Court has noted that the NBA's "grants of both enumerated and
incidental 'powers' to national banks [are] ... grants of authority not normally
limited by, but rather ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law." 92 The policy
concern animating preemption is the fear of "[d]iverse and duplicative
superintendence of national banks' engagement in the business of banking."
93
The aim is to "prevent inconsistent or intrusive state regulation from impairing
the national system." 94 Indeed, the NBA provides that "[n]o national bank shall
be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law .... "95
The NBA also authorizes the Comptroller of the Currency, the Treasury
Department official who heads the OCC and is in charge of chartering and
regulating national banks, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the
provisions of the NBA. 96 The OCC receives Chevron deference 97 in its
interpretations of statutes embodied in its properly promulgated regulations,
98
and Auer/Seminole Rock deference in its informal interpretation of its own
regulations.99 Among the regulations promulgated by the OCC are a set
90 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2006).
91 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2006).
92 Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32 (1996); see also
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
93 Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1568 (2007).
94 Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 311 (2d Cir. 2005).
95 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2006).
96 12 U.S.C. § 93a (2006).
97 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
98 See Clearing House Ass'n v. Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105, 112-14 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted,
129 S. Ct. 987 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2009) (No. 08-453); Nat'l City Bank of Ind. v. Tumbaugh, 463 F.3d 325,
328-32 (4th Cir. 2006); Burke, 414 F.3d at 315; see also NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257-58 (1995) (applying the Chevron doctrine to determine whether the
OCC was authorized to grant a national bank's application to sell annuities); Wells Fargo Bank of Tex.,
N.A. v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 492-95 (5th Cir. 2003) (applying Chevron and deferring to agency rule
preempting state law concerning check-cashing fees).
99 See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1997) (holding that the format of an agency's
interpretation of its own regulation does not affect the level of deference on review); Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (holding that a reviewing court should grant
"controlling weight" to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation "unless it is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.").
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specifically on preemption. 10 0 These regulations define visitorial powers over
national banks, which are prohibited to states by the NBA, as:
(i) Examination of a bank; (ii) Inspection of a bank's books and records; (iii)
Regulation and supervision of activities authorized or permitted pursuant to
federal banking law; and (iv) Enforcing compliance with any applicable federal
.... 101
or state laws concerning those activities.
Courts have held that registration requirements, investigation, and
enforcement actions and other forms of administrative supervision by states are
all preempted by the OCC's exclusive visitorial authority. 10 2 Thus, even when a
state law is not substantively preempted by a federal law, the enforcement of
the state law may still be preempted by OCC regulations.'
03
OCC regulations also preempt state laws on interest and usury, 104 non-
interest fees and charges, 10 5 ATMs, 10 6 deposit taking, 10 7 non-real-estate
lending,10 8 and real-estate lending. 10 9 Finally, there is a catch-all non-specific
preemption of state law.' '° The ultimate importance of all of these regulations
is uncertain, however. Regulations that have been duly promulgated after
notice-and-comment rulemaking have the "force of law" and bind the agency,
the public, and the courts." 11 All federal banking regulators, including the OCC,
are required to publish in the Federal Register both advanced notice and "any
final opinion letter or interpretive rule concluding that Federal law preempts
the application of any State law regarding community reinvestment, consumer
protection, fair lending, or establishment of intrastate branches to a national
bank."1 12 Yet, the Supreme Court has never held that regulations promulgated
by the OCC or any other administrative agency have preemptive force
(excluding specific cases where the agency has been explicitly delegated
preemption powers by statute). The status of the OCC preemption regulations
is therefore uncertain.
100 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000-09 (2008) (these sections compose Subpart D).
101 Id.. § 7.4000(a)(2) (2008).
102 See, e.g., Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1564, 1568-69 (registration and other administrative
supervision); Clearing House Ass 'n, 510 F.3d at 116 (investigation and enforcement).
103 See Clearing House Ass'n, 510 F.3d at 116-17.
104 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001 (2008).
105 Id. § 7.4002.
106 Id. § 7.4003.
107 Id. § 7.4007.
108 Id. § 7.4008.
109 Id. § 34.4(a).
110 Id. § 7.4009. The OTS has similar preemption rules. See id. §§ 560.2, 557.11, 545.2
(2008).
III Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?,
7 YALE J. ON REG. 1,3-4 n.6 (1990).




National thrifts are supervised by the OTS and are governed primarily by
the Home Owners Loan Act.11 3 HOLA grants national thrifts a wide range of
lending powers, permitting thrifts to engage in virtually all the activities of
national banks. The major difference between a national bank charter and a
national thrift charter is that national thrifts are prohibited from making
commercial, corporate, business, and agricultural loans that, in the aggregate,
exceed twenty percent of the thrift's total assets.' 14 As a result, national thrifts
concentrate primarily on consumer lending.
HOLA explicitly preempts only state usury laws as applied to national
thrifts;1 15 otherwise, it contains no explicit preemption of state law. Despite the
negative implication of HOLA's explicit preemption of only one specific type
of state law, the OTS has been quite aggressive in claiming preemptive
authority; the OTS's preemption claim is much broader than that of the OCC.
The OTS not only claims that its own (proper) exercise of regulatory authority
preempts contrary state law, 116 but it has also enacted a regulation that claims
the OTS occupies the field for all regulation of national thrifts.117 While there is
reason to question the validity of this regulation, not the least being the
negative implication of HOLA's explicit preemption of a specific type of state
law, the OTS's ability to enact field preemption via regulatory proclamation
has never been directly challenged and has been accepted by lower federal
113 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-70 (2006).
114 Id. § 1464(c)(2)(A).
115 Id. § 1463(g).
116 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (2008).
117 Id. § 560.2(a) (2008) ("To enhance safety and soundness and to enable federal savings
associations to conduct their operations in accordance with best practices (by efficiently delivering low-
cost credit to the public free from undue regulatory duplication and burden), OTS hereby occupies the
entire field of lending regulation for federal savings associations. OTS intends to give federal savings
associations maximum flexibility to exercise their lending powers in accordance with a uniform federal
scheme of regulation. Accordingly, federal savings associations may extend credit as authorized under
federal law, including this part, without regard to state laws purporting to regulate or otherwise affect
their credit activities .... "). OTS also claims to occupy the field for deposit-taking activities of federal
savings associations. Id. § 557.11 (2008) ("To further these [safety-and-soundness] purposes without
undue regulatory duplication and burden, OTS hereby occupies the entire field of federal savings
associations' deposit-related regulations.").
OTS regulations also provide for specific preemption of state regulation of alternative mortgage
structures, Id. § 560.220 (2008) (adopted under specific congressional authorization in the Alternative
Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1545 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
3803(a)(3) (2006))); of usury laws on residential first-lien mortgages, 12 C.F.R. § 590.3 (2008) (adopted
under specific congressional authorization in section 501 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 161 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1735f-7(a) to
1735f-7a(f) (2006)) and the Home Owners Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1463(g) (2006)); and of state
limitations on due-on-sale clauses in federal savings association loan instruments, 12 C.F.R. § 591.3
(2008) (adopted under specific congressional direction in the Gain-St. Germain Depository Institutions
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469, 1505-07 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (2006))). The
OTS is the successor to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. 12 U.S.C. § 1462a(e) (2006).
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courts. 118 For the purposes of hydraulic regulation, however, the specific natureof the OTS preemption is immaterial.
118 See supra note 82. The Ninth Circuit recently gave credence to the OTS's claim of field
preemption, noting that:
Through HOLA, Congress gave the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") broad authority
to issue regulations governing thrifts. As the principal regulator for federal savings
associations, OTS promulgated a preemption regulation in 12 C.F.R. § 560.2. That the
preemption is expressed in OTS's regulation, instead of HOLA, makes no difference
because, "[f]ederal regulations have no less preemptive effect than federal statutes."
Silvas v. E*Trade Mortgage Corp., 514 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting
Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982)) (citation omitted); see also Bank of
Am. v. City & County of S.F., 309 F.3d 551, 560-66 (9th Cir. 2002).
Notably, the authority cited by the Ninth Circuit, Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
de la Cuesta, upheld the preemptive authority of the OTS's predecessor agency, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (FHLBB). 458 U.S. 141 (1982). But de la Cuesta dealt with a question of conflict
preemption, not field preemption. In de la Cuesta, the issue was whether a specific substantive FHLBB
regulation was authorized under Congress's delegation of authority to the FHLBB, not whether the
FHLBB occupied the field because of the pervasive nature of the Home Owners Loan Act. See id. at
153-54.
The statements made in the conflict preemption context in de la Cuesta should not be read as
applying to field preemption. State, not federal, regulation is the default setting in most areas of law. See
O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994) (refusing to apply federal common law to fill "gaps"
in a detailed federal statutory scheme). While Congress can act to shift that balance, a regulatory agency
cannot do so on its own. A federal regulatory agency's proclamation of field preemption should not
create field preemption.
If Congress has duly authorized an agency to pass specific substantive regulations in a field,
those regulations, if within the scope of Congress's authorization, will have a preemptive effect to the
extent of a conflict with state law. But the mere fact that Congress has authorized an agency to regulate
a field ought not to confer on the agency the right to arrogate to itself all regulating power in the field.
Field preemption must be the result of congressional action, or else agencies are given a blank check to
prohibit state regulation without filling in the regulatory void with their own regulations. See Cal. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987) (noting that field preemption "may be inferred
where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left no room for supplementary state regulation.") (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U.S. 130, 149 (1986)
("Although the regulations are not themselves controlling on the pre-emption issue, where, as in this
case, Congress has entrusted an agency with the task of promulgating regulations to carry out the
purposes of a statute, as part of the pre-emption analysis we must consider whether the regulations
evidence a desire to occupy a field completely. Pre-emption should not be inferred, however, simply
because the agency's regulations are comprehensive.") (internal citations omitted); cf de la Cuesta, 458
U.S. at 154 (addressing conflict preemption: "A pre-emptive regulation's force does not depend on
express congressional authorization to displace state law.... Thus, the Court of Appeal's narrow focus
on Congress' intent to supersede state law was misdirected. Rather, the questions upon which resolution
of this case rests are whether the Board meant to pre-empt California's due-on-sale law, and, if so,
whether that action is within the scope of the Board's delegated authority.").
The OTS's claims to preemption by preamble are of dubious authority. In Wyeth v. Levine, the
Supreme Court noted that although it had "recognized that an agency regulation with the force of law
can pre-empt conflicting state requirements," the Court always performs "its own conflict determination,
relying on the substance of state and federal law and not on agency proclamations of pre-emption." No
06-1249, slip op. at 19 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2009). The Court also noted that although
agencies have no special authority to pronounce on pre-emption absent delegation by
Congress, they do have a unique understanding of the statutes they administer and an
attendant ability to make informed determinations about how state requirements may pose an
'obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.' The weight we accord the agency's explanation of state law's impact on the federal
scheme depends on its thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness.
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Unfortunately, the OTS's ostensible field preemption only furthers the
deregulatory race to the bottom. Whenever the OTS permits an additional thrift
activity or preempts another state law, the OCC is able to piggyback on the
OTS's action and argue that the deregulatory move must be allowed for
national banks to place them, as historically favored lenders, on an equal
playing field with their parvenu cousins, the national thrifts. For example, when
the OCC adopted its preemption rules in January 2004, it specifically referred
to similar rules previously adopted by the OTS. 19 This downward ratchet can
also work when the OCC makes the first deregulatory move and the OTS
matches. As soon as the OTS matches the OCC, the OCC gains additional
cover for its initial move. OTS field preemption claims have furthered the race
to the bottom in financial-services consumer protection.
C. Residual State Authority
OCC and OTS regulations carve out an exception for state laws of general
applicability, to the extent that they only incidentally affect the exercise of
national bank powers. 12 The OCC and OTS exceptions are virtually identical.
OCC regulations provide:
State laws on the following subjects are not inconsistent with the deposit-taking
powers of national banks and apply to national banks to the extent that they only
incidentally affect the exercise of national banks' deposit-taking powers: (1)
Contracts; (2) Torts; (3) Criminal law; (4) Rights to collect debts; (5)
Acquisition and transfer of property; (6) Taxation; (7) Zoning; and (8) Any other
law the effect of which the OCC determines to be incidental to the deposit-
taking operations of national bank powers or otherwise consistent with the
powers set out in ... this section.
12 1
Thus, while states cannot regulate national banks directly, the Supreme Court
has held that national banks "are subject to state laws of general application in
Id. at 67. The mere fact that OTS claims preemption and has enacted a regulation to that effect does not
mean that OTS actually has preemption authority. The same is true for the OCC's more limited
preemption regulations. See also Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies
and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAuL L. REv. 227 (2007). Many scholars have argued that
agency power to displace state lawmaking is and should be more limited than Congress's own power.
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 2097 (2004); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L.
REv. 315, 317-18 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLuM. L. REv.
2071, 2110 (1990). But see Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism:
Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023 (2008).
119 Wilmarth, supra note 8, at 284-85 (discussing 12 C.F.R. §§ 560.2, 557.11 (2008)).
120 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007(c); 7.4008(e); 7.4009(c)(2) (2008) (OCC); Id. § 560.2(c) (2008)
(OTS).
121 Id. § 7.4007(c) (2008) (deposit taking); see also id. § 7.4008(e) (lending); id. §
7.4009(c)(2) (applicability of state law to particular national bank activities); id. § 34.4(b) (real-estate
activities).
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their daily business to the extent such laws do not conflict with the letter or the
general purposes of the" federal banking law. 1
22
Accordingly, national banks' contracts are governed by state contract law
and their property transfers by state law. National banks pay sales tax on
purchases. Thus, in Jefferson v. Chase Home Finance,123 the District Court for
the Northern District of California recently held that a California law
prohibiting all businesses from making misleading representations was not
preempted as applied to a national bank because it was a law of general
applicability.
In Jefferson, the plaintiff alleged that Chase, a national bank, violated
California's False Advertising Act (and therefore California's Unfair
Competition Law) by making false statements about the way it would apply
prepayments on a mortgage loan.' 24 Chase raised a preemption defense,
contending that OCC regulations under the NBA permitted national banks to
make real estate loans without regard to state-law limitations on the terms of
credit, schedule for repayment, and servicing and processing of loans. 125 The
court held that OCC regulations did not preempt California consumer-
protection laws because "such laws of general application, which merely
require all businesses (including banks) to refrain from misrepresentations and
abide by contracts and representations to customers do not impair a bank's
ability to exercise its lending powers." 126 The California Unfair Competition
Law and its trigger, the California False Advertising Act, were laws of general
applicability, not designed to regulate lending, and without a disproportionate
effect on lending. 127 In contrast, cases in which courts have found preemption
involved either state laws specifically directed at regulating banking activities
such as lending 128 or specific conflicts with federal law. 129 Moreover, the
122 Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1567 (2007).
123 Jefferson v. Chase Home Fin., No. C 06-6510 TEH, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94652 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 14, 2007).
124 Id. at *9.
125 Id. at *20-21.
126 Id. at *29.
127 Id. at *36-37.
128 Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that a state law
requiring mortgage-lender licensing and record keeping was preempted); Bank of Am. v. City & County
of S.F., 309 F.3d 551 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a local ATM fee limitation law was preempted);
Montgomery v. Bank of Am., 515 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that a California Unfair
Competition Law claim alleging that bank fees were too high was preempted by a federal regulation
giving banks discretion to set non-interest fees); Johnson v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., No. 07-
526, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50569 (E.D. Pa. July I1, 2007) (holding national regulations preempted a
Pennsylvania consumer protection statute prohibiting various non-interest charges and combination of
home improvement and cash loans); Rose v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1122
(C.D. Cal. 2005), affd, 513 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that California Unfair Competition Law
claims predicated on violation of state law requiring disclosures for credit card convenience checks were
preempted by 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008 (2008)); Wash. Mut. Bank v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 765,
776 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that an Unfair Competition Law claim based on violation of state law
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plaintiffs claims in Jefferson were not general allegations that a lender's
practices were unfair and that the harm from the practices outweighed their
utility. Such allegations would necessitate "an individual analysis of the
lender's acts, untethered to any rule of general application (such as a
prohibition on misrepresentation to consumers)."' 30 Instead, the plaintiff
alleged that Chase had violated a specific, generally applicable state law.
Because California's Unfair Competition Law was a law of general
applicability and only "incidentally affect[ed]" the exercise of national bank
powers, the claims were not preempted.
13 1
The relationship between residual state-law authority and federal banking
regulation was also explored by the Seventh Circuit in In re Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litigation. 32 Ocwen hinged on the
question of whether OTS regulations' 33 preempted various claims in the
complaint. The trial court had denied the motion to dismiss based on the
preemption defense, and Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit,
affirmed. Noting that the validity of OTS regulation had not been
questioned, 134 Judge Posner observed that although the OTS has:
exclusive authority to regulate the savings and loan industry in the sense of
fixing fees (including penalties), setting licensing requirements, prescribing
certain terms in mortgages, establishing requirements of disclosure of credit
information to consumers, and setting standards for processing and servicing
mortgages... [it] has no power to adjudicate disputes between the S&Ls and
their customers .... So it cannot provide a remedy to persons injured by
wrongful acts of savings and loan associations, and furthermore HOLA creates
no private right to sue to enforce the provisions of the statute or the OTS's
regulations. 13"5
Given the OTS's limited remedial authority, the Seventh Circuit read
OTS's preemption regulations "to mean that OTS's assertion of plenary
regulatory authority does not deprive persons harmed by the wrongful acts of
savings and loan associations of their basic state common-law-type
prohibiting interest on mortgages during certain periods was preempted); Mayor of N.Y. v. Council of
N.Y., 780 N.Y.S.2d 266, 272 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding a local predatory lending ordinance preempted).
129 Cf Silvas v. E*Trade Mortgage Corp., 514 F.3d 1001, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding
that the California Unfair Competition Law was preempted by the Home Owners Loan Act because the
alleged trigger violation was of the federal Truth in Lending Act, a specific lending regulation);
Martinez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C-06-03327 RMW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27388 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 30, 2007) (holding that California Unfair Competition Law claims alleging that it is an unfair
practice to charge above cost for underwriting were preempted by an OCC regulation that permitted
banks to set non-interest charges and fees).
130 Jefferson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94652, at *41.
131 Id. at *29.
132 491 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2007).
133 12 C.F.R. § 560.2 (2008).
134 Ocwen, 491 F.3d at 642.
135 Id. at 643.
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remedies."'1 36 Because of the vague drafting of the complaint, however, the
Seventh Circuit was unable to determine whether many specific claims were in
fact preempted under its heuristic. 1
37
As a result, it is not clear how the Seventh Circuit's distinction between
regulatory and common-law claims applies to state statutory claims, including
codified common-law claims. For example, if a state statute defined certain
contract terms as unconscionable, a claim under the statute would appear to be
akin to a common-law-type claim, but it would have a regulatory effect of
prohibiting certain types of terms. This problem is directly raised by unfair and
deceptive acts and practices (UDAP) laws, a staple of state-law consumer-
protection statutes. The Seventh Circuit's heuristic simply does not fit the
ambiguous nature of much of statutory law; Ocwen does not provide guidance
on whether states can regulate by creating rights of action.
The thin case law on residual state regulatory authority over national
banks and thrifts does not provide much guidance about which generally
applicable state laws are preempted. Nonetheless, there appears to be little
residual state authority to regulate national banks directly. Residual state direct
regulatory authority over national banks seems limited to enforcing laws of
general applicability, and even then only when their enforcement would not
prevent a national bank from exercising its powers. Laws specifically enacted
to protect consumers in dealings with financial institutions, where
informational and bargaining power asymmetries are immense, are preempted
as applied to national banks and thrifts.
138
D. Preemption's Reach Beyond National Banks and Federal Thrifts
The preemptive reach of the NBA, HOLA, OCC, and OTS regulations
extends beyond the "federal instrumentalities" of national banks and thrifts. It
136 Id.
137 Id. at 648.
138 Federal credit unions appear to fit the same pattern, but there is much more limited case
law on preemption involving federal credit unions. The regulations of the NCUA under the Federal
Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1795 (2006), provide that the NCUA has "exclusive authority...
to regulate the rates, terms of repayment and other conditions of Federal credit union loans and lines of
credit (including credit cards) to members." 12 C.F.R. § 701.21(b) (2008). This authority "preempts any
state law purporting to limit or affect" rates of interest and terms of repayment, including the amount,
uniformity, and frequency of payments. Id. The regulation does not "preempt state laws affecting
aspects of credit transactions that are primarily regulated by Federal law other than the Federal Credit
Union Act, for example, state laws concerning credit cost disclosure requirements." Id. § 701.21 (b)(3)
(2008); see Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1018-19 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (holding
that FCUA and NCUA regulations preempted a state credit disclosure requirement that effectively
created a minimum monthly repayment percentage); Neal v. Redstone Fed. Credit Union, 447 So. 2d
805, 807-08 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (holding that FCUA usury provisions preempted a state usury law).
Moreover, there is no field preemption for federally insured state credit unions. See Golden I Credit
Union v. H & B Group, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-1717 OWW TAG, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31142, at *22-23
(E.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2007).
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also extends to operating subsidiaries,' 39 their agents, 14  and even, in some
cases, independent third parties who are indispensable for the exercise of
national banks' and thrifts' powers.141
1. Operating Subsidiaries
The Supreme Court has held that preemption shields operating• - 142
subsidiaries of national banks from state regulation. Operating subsidiaries
are a particular type of national bank subsidiary, indirectly authorized under the
NBA. 143 Although operating subsidiaries are state-chartered corporations, the
NBA limits their powers to those of national banks. 44 The OCC exercises the
same regulatory oversight of national bank operating subsidiaries as it does of
national banks, and it treats operating subsidiaries as single economic entities
with national banks.
145
In Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., Wachovia Bank, N.A. ("Wachovia"),
a national bank, sought to enjoin the state of Michigan from enforcing its
mortgage lender registration and auditing requirements against Wachovia
Mortgage Corporation ("WMC"), Wachovia's wholly owned North Carolina-
chartered operating subsidiary that was engaged in mortgage lending.
146
139 See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007); 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2008);
see also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the NBA
preempts state regulation of national bank operating subsidiaries); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414
F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the NBA preempts state regulation of national bank operating
subsidiaries); WFS Fin., Inc. v. Dean, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1024-25 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (holding that
OTS regulations under HOLA preempt state regulation of national thrift operating subsidiaries).
140 None of the cases involving agents have actually conducted an analysis of whether the
regulated entities were in fact agents of the federally chartered financial institutions. See, e.g., Pac.
Capital Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut, 542 F.3d 341, 349 (2d Cir. 2008) (agent of a national bank); State
Farm Bank, FSB v. Reardon, 539 F.3d 336, 347 n.6 (6th Cir. 2008) (agents of a national thrift); SPGGC,
LLC v. Ayotte, 488 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 2007) (agents of a national bank); State Farm Bank, FSB v.
Burke, 445 F. Supp. 2d 207 (D. Conn. 2006) (agents of a national thrift); see also Peterson, supra note
8, at 541-50 (discussing agency costs and incentives to engage in predatory lending).
141 See, e.g., Pac. Capital Bank, N.A. v. Milgram, No. 08-0223, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19639 (D.N.J. Mar. 13, 2008); Pac. Capital Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut, No. 3:06-CV-28 (PCD), 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55627 (D. Conn. Aug. 10, 2006), affid, 542 F.3d 341, 349 (2d Cir. 2008) (adopting
agency rationale). But see SPGGC, LLC v. Blumenthal, 505 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2007) (declining to
extend preemption to protect an independent third party).
142 Watters, 127 S. Ct. 1559. For thrifts, see WFS, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1024.
143 The majority in Watters based its decision on operating subsidiaries being authorized
under national banks' general incidental powers under § 24 (Seventh). 127 S. Ct. at 1569-70. The
majority also noted that the statute regardingfinancial subsidiaries, 12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3)(A), contained
an oblique reference to operating subsidiaries. Id. ("The term 'financial subsidiary' means any company
that is controlled by I or more insured depository institutions other than a subsidiary that--(A) engages
solely in activities that national banks are permitted to engage in directly and are conducted subject to
the same terms and conditions that govern the conduct of such activities by national banks .... "); see
Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1581 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144 12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3)(A) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e) (2008).
145 Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1569-70.
146 Id. at 1565 (majority opinion).
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Wachovia argued that national bank operating subsidiaries are exempt from
state regulation because the NBA and OCC regulations preempt state law as
applied to national bank operating subsidiaries. 147 Michigan contended that
because WMC was not itself a national bank, that preemption did not apply.
The District Court granted Wachovia summary judgment' 48 and the Sixth
Circuit affirmed. 149 The Supreme Court in turn affirmed, holding that states are
preempted from regulating operating subsidiaries of national banks.' 50
The Supreme Court noted that a long line of decisions had repeatedly
made clear that federal control shields national banking from "unduly
burdensome and duplicative state regulation."' 5' And "just as duplicative state
examination, supervision, and regulation would significantly burden mortgage
lending when engaged in by national banks, so too would those state controls
interfere with that same activity when engaged in by an operating
subsidiary."'152 The Court rejected a formalist approach to preemption based on
corporate entity type. Instead, the Court noted that "[w]e have never held that
the preemptive reach of the NBA extends only to a national bank itself. Rather,
in analyzing whether state law hampers the federally permitted activities of a
national bank, we have focused on the exercise of a national bank's powers, not
on its corporate structure."
'' 53
Notably, the Supreme Court had also never held before Watters that
preemption extended beyond national banks. Historically, preemption for
national banks was based on national banks' special status as federal
instrumentalities, deriving from their role between 1863 and 1935 in creating
the national currency. Prior to the Civil War, most paper currency was in the
form of individual banks' notes, which cleared at a discount from face value.' 54
The NBA of 1863 allowed the creation of national banks, which were
authorized to issue national bank notes, backed by U.S. government securities
deposited with the Treasury Department. Shortly after the promulgation of the
147 The Supreme Court's majority sidestepped the question of whether the OCC regulation at
issue exceeded the scope of Congress's delegation of power to the OCC. Id. at 1572. The majority based
its decision on the statutory provisions of the NBA granting incidental powers to national banks, 12
U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2006), and prohibiting the states from exercising visitorial powers over national
banks, Id. § 484(a). The majority did not respond to the claim in Justice Stevens's dissent, 127 S. Ct. at
1579, 1582-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting), that the OCC did not have the power to pass the regulation or
that the regulation should not receive Chevron deference because it was not reasonable. The opinion's
holding of preemption, however, appears to be a tacit endorsement of the OCC's preemption power.
148 Wachovia Bank, N.A., v. Watters, 334 F. Supp. 2d 957 (W.D. Mich. 2004).
149 Wachovia Bank, N.A., v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2005).
150 Watters, 127 S. Ct. 1559.
151 Id. at 1566-67.
152 Id. at 1570.
153 Id. at 1570.
154 WARREN E. WEBER, FED. RES. BANK. OF MINNEAPOLIS RESEARCH DEP'T STAFF REPORT
344, WERE U.S. STATE BANKNOTES PRICED AS SECURITIES? 2-3 (2005), available at
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/SR/SR344.ps; George Selgin, The Suppression of State Bank
Notes: A Reconsideration, 38 ECON. INQUIRY 600, 601 (2000).
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NBA, Congress moved to suppress state bank notes by taxing them out of
existence.155 With the 1913 creation of the Federal Reserve, which issues the
United States currency in the form of uniform par-clearing notes, 156 national
bank notes declined in importance, and they were phased out in 1935.157 This
means, as Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. has cogently argued, that federal
instrumentality status, and thus preemption, should have ended for national
banks in 1913, or at the latest 1935.158
Despite laying out a functionalist test for preemption, the Court hinted
that a formalist approach might be appropriate if the line were drawn
differently. The Court emphasized that Congress distinguished among different
types of national bank affiliates, and that operating subsidiaries were more like
national banks than other affiliates: "unlike affiliates that may engage in
functions not authorized by the NBA, e.g., financial subsidiaries, an operating
subsidiary is tightly tied to its parent by the specification that it may engage
only in 'the business of banking' as authorized by the Act."' 159 Because the
"OCC licenses and oversees national bank operating subsidiaries just as it does
national banks,"'1 60 preempting state regulation of national bank operating
subsidiaries would merely be undoing "[d]iverse and duplicative
superintendence," ' 16 1 and would still leave operating subsidiaries subject to
regulation by the OCC. Thus, it might be that preemption does depend on
formal corporate entity distinctions, despite the Court's protestations
otherwise.' 
62
In fact, a formalist approach is quite sensible for banking regulation
preemption, because banking regulation is centered on corporate form. In
banking law, substantive issues depend on form; form is substance in banking
law and engenders significant reliance. For example, regulatory authority over
financial institutions is dependent on corporate structure-the regulation of a
national bank is done by the OCC, but the regulation of a bank holding
155 12 Stat. 712 (1863) (taxing state bank notes at 2%); 14 Stat. 146 (1866) (providing for a
10% tax on state bank notes), upheld by Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533 (1869). For an alternative
view that argues the state bank note tax was instituted merely to offset inflationary effects of national
banknotes, see Selgin, supra note 154.
156 12 U.S.C. § 411 (2006); 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2000).
157 MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1867-1960, at 442 n.19 (1963).
158 Wilmarth, supra note 8, at 241-42.
159 Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1571-72.
160 Id. at 1569 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(3) (2006)).
161 Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1567.
162 The Supreme Court has previously given great weight to corporate separation. See, e.g.,
Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003); United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
Moreover, as Justice Stevens's dissent noted, a major reason national banks create operating subsidiaries
is to benefit from the risk separation created by an operating subsidiary's corporate veil. Watters, 550
U.S. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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company is done by the Federal Reserve.' 63 The FTC's authority to regulate is
limited by the corporate form of the entity. 164 Likewise, reserve and capital
requirements are keyed to the formal corporate status of an entity. Only
national banks and their operating affiliates are subject to reserve
requirements,' 65 while there are different capital requirements for national
banks and bank holding companies. 66 And the capital structure of financial
institutions depends on corporate form, because formal corporate divisions
create structural subordination of creditors, including the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation and Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC).
General unsecured creditors are subordinated to insured deposit creditors, but
only for FDIC- and SIPC-insured entities, 167 and not every entity within a
financial institution's corporate structure is FDIC- or SIPC-insured. A
functional preemption analysis, like the one Watters endorsed, is inconsistent
with the nature of banking regulation.
Watters's functional banking law preemption heuristic also proves too
much when taken by itself. The Supreme Court explained that banking law
preemption analysis looks to the exercise of national bank powers rather than to
corporate structures. But when this mode of analysis is applied to contexts
beyond national banks' operating subsidiaries, it creates regulatory vacuums.
There are third parties such as agents and counterparties involved in national
bank operations, and their regulation inevitably affects and limits national bank
powers. But these third parties are not subject to federal regulatory oversight,
unlike operating subsidiaries. Extending preemption to them would shield them
from state regulation without substituting federal regulation. Given that the
major policy concern animating federal preemption of state banking regulation
is the concern about duplicative and potentially contradictory regulatory
regimes, there is no reason to expand preemption beyond the extent of federal
regulatory authority. Concerns about duplicative regulation simply do not exist
when there is no federal regulatory oversight of the entity being subjected to
state regulation, such as with the agents or counterparties of national banks and
thrifts.
168
163 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (2008); see also Whitney Bank v. New Orleans Bank, 379 U.S. 411
(1965) (drawing a distinction between Federal Reserve Board authority over bank holding companies
and OCC authority over national banks).
164 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
165 12 C.F.R. § 204.1(c) (2008).
166 Compare id. pt. 3 app. (national banks), with id. pt. 225 app. (bank holding companies).
167 See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(I 1)(A) (2006) (FDIC depositor preference statute); 15 U.S.C. §
78fff-2(c)(1) (2006) (SIPC customer preference statute).
168 It is also worth recalling that national banks are not a policy end in and of themselves.
Instead, they are federal instrumentalities that have been authorized to serve the public interest by
facilitating commerce. To the extent that preemption hurts the public interest, it undercuts the ultimate
policy behind having national banks.
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A broader view of banking preemption issues makes clear that the Watters
powers analysis must have the unstated corollary that preemption can extend
no farther than federal regulatory oversight. The preemptive reach of the NBA
must ultimately be tethered to the regulatory reach of federal banking
regulators, lest preemption create a regulatory no-man's-land of entities not
subject to federal banking laws, but still shielded from state laws by
preemption.
169
The contours of this corollary have begun to emerge in recent case law,
although the doctrinal picture is not perfectly neat. As the following review of
the case law elucidates, while preemption of state consumer protection in
financial services extends to the agents of national banks and thrifts, who are
themselves subject to federal regulation or under the control of a federally
regulated institution, the preemption does not extend to their counterparties.
This distinction is crucial, as we shall see, for it allows for a sensible doctrinal
resolution to the preemption question and enables hydraulic regulation.
2. Agents and Counterparties
a. The SPGGC Giftcard Cases
In 2007, the First and Second Circuits decided cases involving nearly
identical New Hampshire and Connecticut state laws barring expiration dates
on giftcards. 170 Giftcards are electronic stored-value cards that may be used like
a gift certificate for purchases at all accepting merchants. In both cases, a
national bank (as well as a national thrift in one case) had entered into
agreements with SPGGC, a subsidiary of Simon Properties, which owns a
chain of shopping malls, to sell Visa-branded giftcards. Visa requires
expiration dates on all cards carrying its logo as an antifraud measure.171SPGGC and the national banks and thrift involved with SPGGC brought suit to
169 Clearing House Ass'n, LLC v. Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105, 116 n.7 (2d Cir. 2007), cert
granted, 129 S. Ct. 987 (Jan. 16, 2009) (No. 08-453) (noting that preemption might not extend to
national bank affiliates other than operating subsidiaries and focusing on difference between regulating
conduct and qualifications of agents and prohibiting agents from facilitating authorized activities of
national banks.); see also State Farm Bank, FSB v. Reardon, 539 F.3d 336, 347 n.6 (6th Cir. 2008)
(holding that a state law regulating mortgage brokers was preempted by HOLA as applied to a federal
savings bank's exclusive agent, which was itself subject to OTS examination per HOLA: "[W]e are not
confronted today with a situation where a federal savings association has contracted with non-exclusive,
untrained, and unsupervised individuals, over whom it has no control, for the purpose of marketing and
soliciting mortgage products in Ohio. Instead, we are confronted with a situation where Ohio is
attempting to regulate a federal savings association's exclusive agents who are already subject to
regulation by the OTS and [the federal savings bank] itself."); State Farm Bank, FSB v. Burke, 445 F.
Supp. 2d 207 (D. Conn. 2006) (holding that a state law regulating mortgage brokers was preempted by
HOLA as applied to a federal savings bank's exclusive agent, which was itself subject to OTS
examination per HOLA).
170 SPGGC, LLC v. Blumenthal, 505 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2007); SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488
F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 2007).
171 Blumenthal, 505 F.3d at 187.
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enjoin the enforcement of the state statutes, and the OCC filed amicus briefs on
behalf of the national banks.
In the First Circuit case, the arrangement between SPGGC and the
national bank, USB, was that the national bank would issue the giftcards and
provide a stock of the cards to SPGGC, which would then market them to
consumers.172 SPGGC received a commission on each sale. When a consumer
purchased a giftcard, SPGGC would remit the payment to the national bank.
1 73
SPGGC would then load the purchased value amount onto the card.' 74 As the
First Circuit noted:
From this point forward, the purchaser of the gift card has a contractual
relationship only with USB. USB is responsible for servicing the card and is
liable for charges upon it. Any fees associated with the card are set and collected
by USB, and if the card is reported lost or misused, USB may be liable to the
consumer for fraudulent charges. [SPGGC] has no authority under the contract
to alter the terms and conditions of the agreement between USB and the
175
consumer.
SPGGC functioned merely as a sales agent of the national bank (and thrift).
The First Circuit noted that national banks have the power to issue stored-
value cards that carry expiration dates 176 and to use agents, 177 and need not
choose between these powers. 78 Although the New Hampshire statute
regulated SPGGC, a non-bank, it effectively regulated the terms and conditions
of cards issued by USB that govern the relationship between the purchaser of
the giftcard and USB. The New Hampshire statute, the First Circuit held,
is not concerned with [SPGGC's] activity, which is limited to how and where
the giftcards are marketed, but rather with the sale of certain giftcards through a
third party agent, which is the activity of USB, a national bank. Even if the
[statute] does not directly prohibit USB from engaging in such activity, it does
so indirectly by prohibiting [SPGGC] from acting as USB's agent.'
79
The New Hampshire statute thus "significantly interfere[d]" with the exercise
of a national bank's powers. 18 The First Circuit undertook a similar analysis
for HOLA preemption for the New Hampshire statute's application to the
federal thrift. 8 '
172 Ayotte, 488 F.3d at 529. The arrangement with Metabank, a national thrift, was identical.
Id. at 530 n.3.
173 Id. at 528.
174 Id. at 529.
175 Id. at 530.
176 Id. at 531.
177 Id. at 532 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2006)).
178 Ayotte, 488 F.3d at 532.
179 Id. at 533 (footnote omitted).
180 Id.
181 HOLA differs from the NBA in that it does not authorize the use of agents by federal
thrifts. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2006) (permitting national banks to use "duly authorized officers
or agents" to carry out their incidental powers). Instead, the only authority under which federal thrifts
utilize agents is an opinion letter signed by OTS's general counsel. Office of Thrift Supervision Opinion
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In the Second Circuit case, the agreement between a national bank, Bank
of America, and SPGGC was different. It provided that Bank of America
would receive all interchange fees' 82 from transactions on the cards, but
SPGGC received all other types of fee revenue directly. 83  The agreement
provided that all of SPGGC's revenue from the giftcards derived from the fees
associated with the cards, such as upfront handling and loading fees,
maintenance fees, card replacement fees, and call center fees.'
8 4
SPGGC set the original terms and conditions of the cards,' 85 although
Bank of America retained review and approval authority over the terms and
conditions of the cards as well as the design of the cards and the carriers with
which they were sold.
186
The Second Circuit noted that SPGGC had at best "a close agency or
business relationship with [Bank of America]; but that is not sufficient to
entitle it to protection under the [National Bank Act].' 87 Although the
Supreme Court had emphasized the need to analyze the effect of a state law on
the exercise of national bank powers, rather than the entity being regulated, the
Second Circuit stated that "it would be a mistake to read Watters so broadly as
to obscure the unique role assigned to operating subsidiaries in the context of
national banking regulation."' 88 Operating subsidiaries are limited to engaging
only in the business of banking, and the authority to do business through
operating subsidiaries is one explicitly granted to national banks.' 89 SPGGC,
however, was outside the scope of the OCC's exclusive oversight, unlike an
operating subsidiary.' 
90
The Second Circuit thus concluded that the Connecticut statute was not
preempted insofar as it prohibited SPGGC from imposing inactivity and other
fees on consumers. It remanded the question of preemption in regard to the
statute's prohibition on expiration dates.'91
Letter No. P-2004-7, Authority of a Federal Savings Association to Perform Banking Activities through
Agents Without Regard to State Licensing Agreements, at 10 (Oct. 25, 2004), available at
http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/5/560404.pdf. Although agencies' interpretations of their own regulations
generally receive deference unless "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation[s]," Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997), finding preemption solely on the basis of an informal opinion letter
is troubling.
182 Interchange fees are a combination of a flat per-transaction fee and a percentage fee for
each transaction made using the card. See Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Economic Costs of Credit
Card Merchant Restraints, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1321, 1333 (2008).
183 SPGGC, LLC v. Blumenthal, 505 F.3d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 2007).
184 Id.
185 Id. at 191.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 190 (internal quotations and modifications omitted).
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 191.
191 Id. at 191-92. Query whether the states could enforce the giftcard expiration-date bans
against Visa, U.S.A., which is not a national bank, but a Delaware corporation.
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The SPGGC circuit court decisions can be reconciled by exploiting a
distinction hinted at, but not explicit, in the cases-that of enabling agent
versus counterparty. These cases can be read together as holding that
preemption extends to a national bank's agents when the state law would
frustrate the exercise of a national bank's powers. Preemption does not extend
to a national bank's business partners, however, when there is no agency
relationship.
Doctrinally, this solution is sensible. The power granted to national banks
is a power to employ "agents."' 92 "Agent" is a legal term and covers only a
limited subset of business relationships. As the Restatement (Third) of Agency
defines it, "[a]gency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a
'principal') manifests assent to another person (an 'agent') that the agent shall
act on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's control, and the agent
manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act."193 In an agency relationship,
the principal has control over the agent and the relationship creates respondeat
superior liability for the principal for harms caused by the agent within the
scope of the agency relationship.194 Thus, the agent of a national bank is
subject to the national bank's control, and the national bank is liable for its
agent's actions within the scope of the agency relationship.
Respondeat superior liability creates a powerful incentive for national
banks to select and monitor their agents carefully. It also creates an incentive
for national banks' regulators to review carefully the identities and activities of
national banks' agents as part of their safety-and-soundness inspections, as the
liability that comes from being the principal in an agency relationship is part of
the bank's overall risk profile. Banks' respondeat superior liability means that
the activities of national banks' agents would effectively be subject to
regulatory oversight. Preemption would make sense doctrinally here because
the agents' behavior is already policed (at least in theory) by federal banking
regulators, for the national bank is responsible for the agents' actions. But even
with agents, preemption is triggered only when state regulation would impede
the exercise of a national bank's powers-otherwise there is no conflict.
In contrast, when there is simply a contract relationship, not an agency
relationship, the national bank is unlikely to be held liable for its contractual
counterparty's actions, and bank regulators have little cause or ability to
examine the counterparty's activities. In these circumstances, there is no reason
to extend preemption doctrine to shield counterparties from state regulation,
because there is no replacement regulation by federal banking regulators. And
when the state regulations do not impede national bank powers, there is no
conflict to preempt.
192 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2006).
193 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
194 Id. §§ 2.04, 7.03.
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b. The State Farm Mortgage Broker Cases
Different aspects of the enabling agent versus counterparty distinction are
supported by a number of other recent banking law preemption decisions. First,
another pair of cases involving the application of state mortgage broker
licensing laws to the exclusive agents of State Farm Federal Savings Bank, a
national thrift, emphasizes that preemption is appropriate when a non-bank
agent is subject to federal regulatory oversight and oversight by the bank
principal. 195
In both State Farm cases, State Farm objected to state laws that imposed
licensing requirements on mortgage brokers.196 State Farm utilized exclusive
brokers to sell its mortgages.197 The brokers worked solely for State Farm, but
were not State Farm employees. 198 Instead, even though they were referred to
colloquially as State Farm agents, their contracts specifically labeled them as
independent contractors.1 99  Nonetheless, the brokers were under the
supervisory authority of both State Farm and, crucially, the OTS, although it is
not clear if the OTS ever exercised any supervision of the brokers. 2° ° Both the
Sixth Circuit and the District Court for the District of Connecticut accepted the
characterization of the brokers as agents of State Farm. 2° 1 Emphasizing that the
exclusive State Farm agents were subject to OTS supervision, the Sixth Circuit
and the District of Connecticut both held that the state mortgage broker
licensing requirements were preempted as applied to the agents.
The State Farm cases are consistent with the SPGGC cases-only parties
subject to federal regulatory regimes may raise preemption as a defense to state
consumer-protection laws. A party may be subject to a federal regulatory
regime either through direct federal regulation or through an agency
relationship that entails supervision by a federally regulated principal and
respondeat superior liability by that principal for the agent's actions. Either
way, preemption runs only as far as federal regulatory writ.
20 2
195 State Farm Bank, FSB v. Reardon, 539 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 2008); State Farm Bank, FSB
v. Burke, 445 F. Supp. 2d 207 (D. Conn. 2006).
196 Reardon, 539 F.3d at 338; Burke, 445 F. Supp. 2dat212.
197 Reardon, 539 F.3d at 338; Burke, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 211.
198 Reardon, 539 F.3d at 339.
199 Id. at 339; Burke, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 211.
200 Reardon, 539 F.3d at 339; Burke, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 212. The respondeat superior
liability of State Farm for the "agents" was never addressed in the OTS opinion or the court opinions.
Since respondeat superior is a common-law doctrine, it is not clear whether it applies to "federal
instrumentalities" like national banks and federal thrifts. Nonetheless, there is a strong argument that it
should be required as a condition of preemptive immunity for agents.
201 Reardon, 539 F.3d at 339; Burke, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 211-12. Notably, State Farm Bank,
F.S.B. v. Reardon, 512 F. Supp. 2d 1107 (S.D. Ohio 2007), which held that the Ohio state mortgage
broker regulation was not preempted, repeatedly emphasized that the brokers were independent
contractors, rather than agents.
202 Reardon, 539 F.3d at 347 n.6 (specifically noting that non-exclusive agents present a
separate issue, as there would not be undue regulatory duplication).
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c. The Pacific Capital Bank Refund Anticipation Loan Cases
A third pair of cases, Pacific Capital Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut2? 3 and
Pacific Capital Bank, N.A. v. Milgram,'°4 both involving state regulation of tax
refund anticipation loans ("RALs"), underscores that preemption is triggered,
as in SPGGC v. Ayotte, if application of state law to non-bank agents of
national banks would impede the exercise of a national bank power.20 5 RALs
are very short-term loans (often less than two weeks), consisting of high-
interest-rate loans collateralized by an anticipated tax refund. The loans are
typically sold to consumers by tax preparers working with a bank that assumes
the credit risk. The size of the RAL is based on the size of the refund
anticipated by the tax preparer. The bank will then lend out some amount less
than the anticipated refund, taking the refund as collateral. Most RALs are
issued to consumers with very low income who are expecting to receive an
Earned Income Tax Credit.
The RAL cases do not spell out the economic relationship between the tax
preparer and the national bank, but it appears to be similar to that of SPGGC to
the national bank in Ayotte. The tax preparer does not make the loan itself or
bear the credit risk on the loan and does not set the terms and conditions of the
loan. It merely receives a commission-like fee for each loan. This arrangement
would make tax preparers agents, rather than counterparties or partners. With
this reading of the transaction, the rulings on RALs are easy to reconcile with
the agent versus counterparty/partner paradigm.
Thus, in Pacific Capital Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut, the District Court for
the District of Connecticut denied a preemption challenge against a
Connecticut statute that limited the interest rate on RALs, required that certain
disclosures be made when marketing RALs, and required that RALs be offered
only at locations where the principal business was tax preparation. 20 6 The
statute created civil liability for "facilitators" of RALs who violated the
statute; 2° 7 "facilitator" was defined to exclude national banks. 20 8 The district
203 542 F.3d 341, 349 (2d Cir. 2008), aff'g No. 3:06-CV-28 (PCD), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
55627 (D. Conn. Aug. 10, 2006).
204 No. 08-0223 (FLW), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19639 (D.N.J. Mar. 13, 2008).
205 See also Carson v. H&R Block, 250 F. Supp. 2d 669 (S.D. Miss. 2003) (rejecting a third-
party tax preparer's preemption challenge to a state statute prohibiting a third-party agent from making
misrepresentations); H&R Block Tax Servs., Inc. v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 2008 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 2096, at *11 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 6, 2008) (No. 1726/2007) (denying preemption challenge to
investigation of a tax preparer's marketing practices of RALs made by national bank because only the
third-party preparer's marketing activities were being investigated: "A close agency or business
relationship with a federal bank is not sufficient by itself under the National Bank Act to entitle the
agent to protection from investigation or regulation by a state authority.").
206 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-480 (2006).
207 Pac. Capital Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut, No. 3:06-CV-28 (PCD), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
55627 (D. Conn. Aug. 10, 2006) (interpreting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-480 (2006)).
208 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-480(a)(2) (2006).
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court held that the state statute's disclosure requirements were not a significant
burden on national banks, because the disclosures required by the statute were
required not of the national bank but of the facilitators and did "not request
much information, so it should not be burdensome to collect and disclose."
20 9
Likewise, the requirement of making RALs only at locations (other than
national bank branches) whose principal business was tax preparation was not a
significant burden on national banks, which still had "thousands of potential
partners across the state.,,21 And the district court construed the usury
limitation on RALs as applying only when the lender itself was not the national
bank.2 1  As with SPGGC v. Blumenthal, to the extent that the tax preparer
functioned as an agent of a national bank, it was protected by preemption; to
the extent that it functioned own its own, it was not. The statute was preempted
only to the extent that it affected a national bank or its agent.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed that the usury limitation was
preempted as applied "to RAL facilitators that are assisting national banks.
' 21 2
The Second Circuit noted,
If a state statute subjects non-bank entities to punishment for acting as agents for
national banks with respect to a particular NBA-authorized activity and thereby
significantly interferes with national banks' ability to carry on that activity, the
state statute does not escape preemption on the theory that, on its face, it
regulates only non-bank entities.
213
Accordingly, the Second Circuit upheld the district court's ruling that the usury
limitation was preempted if the RAL facilitator was working with a national
bank. The Second Circuit did not address the disclosure requirement issue.
Curiously, the Second Circuit paid no attention to its careful prior
discussion in SPGGC v. Blumenthal. In Pacific Capital Bank v. Connecticut,
the Second Circuit quoted one sentence from SPGGC v. Blumenthal, but did
not engage with the substance of the opinion. 21 Instead, like the First Circuit in
SPGGC v. Ayotte, the Second Circuit adopted a rule that was based on the
power of national banks to employ agents, but then never engaged in an
analysis of whether the tax preparers at issue were agents of the national bank.
Indeed, it is not clear whether such a conclusion could have been reached from
the record. If one adopts the courts' reasoning, then preemption turns on the
question of agency, which is really a mark of the extent of federal banking
supervision. To take these decisions seriously, there needs to be an examination
of whether the business relationship in question is agency or something else.
And if the courts' logic is to stand, then it cannot suffice for there to be simply
209 Pac. Capital Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55627, at *26.
210 Id. at *29.
211 Id. at *30-34.
212 Pac. Capital Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut, 542 F.3d 341, 349 (2d Cir. 2008).
213 Id. at 353.
214 Id.
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an undefined business relationship. Only a reading that incorporates agency
and its implications permits a synthesis of the SPGGC cases and Pacific
Capital Bank v. Connecticut.
Yet, as in Ayotte, the lack of any judicial references to respondeat superior
liability or the need for federal regulatory oversight of agents is very troubling.
Absent a tether of preemption to federal regulatory oversight, either directly or
through respondeat superior liability, the reasoning in Ayotte and the Pacific
Capital cases could potentially be extended to any contract "partner" of a
national bank or federal thrift. Either direct federal supervision or respondeat
superior liability of a federally-supervised entity should be prerequisites for
preemption-conferring agency status.
The agency terminology was not featured in Pacific Capital Bank, N.A. v.
Milgram,2' the second RAL case involving Pacific Capital Bank. Nonetheless,
the case is consistent with an agency rationale for preemption. In Milgram, the
national bank filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that a New Jersey law
that imposed a thirty percent APR limit on RALs and created civil and criminal
216penalties for its violation was preempted by the NBA. The New Jersey
statute applied both to RAL lenders and to third-party independent tax
preparers who assisted in making the RALs. 2 17 Thus, even though national
banks would obviously be exempt from the statute under Marquette, a tax
preparer assisting the national bank would likely face criminal liabilities for
usury.
The District Court for the District of New Jersey held that the statute was
preempted, not only as applied to national banks, but also as applied to tax
preparers. The court reasoned that applying the statute to tax preparers "directly
restricts and frustrates [national banks'] power to make RALs under the
National Bank Act, and does not merely 'incidentally affect' [national
banks], 218 because "the services of an experienced tax preparer are
'indispensable' for the good faith and error free preparation of an RAL.
215 No. 08-0223, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19639 (D.N.J. Mar. 13, 2008).
216 Id. at *8.
217 Id.
218 Id. at *19.
219 Id. at *23 (quoting Pac. Capital Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut, No. 3:06-CV-28 (PCD), 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55627, at *28-29, *39 (D. Conn. Aug. 10, 2006)). This issue appears not to have been
litigated well by the state. It is certainly possible for a bank to make a RAL without using a third-party
tax preparer. Indeed, it appears that RALs are often prepared by third parties without any special
expertise in tax preparation. See Pac. Capital Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55627,
at *6.
In theory, there are two key functions served by the third-party tax preparers in the RAL
industry. The actual preparation of the tax return, which could be done by anyone, is not one of these
key functions. Instead, first, tax preparers are important for RALs because they provide a marketing
conduit for the bank to reach consumers. Using professional tax preparers to reach out to consumers
provides an efficient way for banks to contact their target customers.
The second and more crucial function of a tax preparer in RALs is to provide a valuation of the
anticipated refund. If the anticipated refund is overvalued, the bank could find itself undersecured, and if
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Imposition of criminal penalties on independent third-party tax preparers would
be "an obstacle to allowing [national banks] to charge the interest rates
permitted under the NBA." 220 Whereas the Connecticut statute merely
restricted national banks' pool of agents to assist in making RALs, the New
Jersey statute's criminal sanctions for making usurious RALs (practically
meaning making any RAL) prevented national banks from exercising their
statutory power of employing agents, 221 as no tax preparer would reasonably
face criminal penalties to work with a national bank on RALs. Yet, as in
Ayotte, the State Farm cases, and the other Pacific Capital Bank RAL cases,
there was no showing that national banks had any respondeat superior liability
for these "agents" or that the tax preparers were subject to OCC supervision.
d. The Capital One Subpoena Case
As the RAL cases show, state regulation of national banks' agents is
preempted only when state regulation would impede national banks' power to
employ agents. This rule is consistent with another recent preemption case, this
time involving state regulation of credit card lending. In Capital One Bank
(USA), N.A. v. McGraw,222 the District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia denied a national bank's motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum
issued by West Virginia to an affiliated agent of a national bank.223 In response
to some 264 consumer complaints, West Virginia undertook an investigation of
the credit card lending practices of Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. ("Capital
One"), a national bank, and its servicing agent, Capital One Services, Inc.
("COSI"). 224 COSI is a non-bank affiliate of Capital One and shares a common
parent, Capital One Financial Corporation, a bank holding company.225 As part
of the investigation, West Virginia subpoenaed documents from Capital One
and COSI. 226 Capital One moved to enjoin the enforcement of the subpoenas
against it on the grounds that they were an exercise of visitorial powers against
227
a national bank. Capital One also moved to enjoin the enforcement of the
subpoenas against COSI because "the protections of the National Bank Act
the loan is non-recourse, incur a loss. Notably, the valuation function is one that could be done in-house
at the bank or by an agent of the bank, rather than by an independent third party. Use of in-house
appraisers or agents might provide preemption protection to RALs along the lines of Ayotte.
220 Milgram, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19639, at *24.
221 Id. at *19.
222 563 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D. W. Va. 2008).
223 Id. at 623-29.
224 Id. at 614.
225 Id. at 623.
226 Id. at 615-16.
227 At the time the subpoenas were issued, Capital One was a Virginia state-chartered bank.
Capital One failed to respond to the subpoenas at the time and, after its conversion to a national bank
charter nearly three years later, moved to prevent the enforcement of the subpoenas on the basis of its
status as national bank. Id. at 615.
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extend to agents of national banks carrying out banking activities at the behest
of those banks." 228 Notably, only the ability of the state to investigate, not the
exercise of national bank powers, was at issue.
The Southern District of West Virginia determined that the subpoena
constituted an exercise of visitorial powers by the state that was prohibited
against Capital One, as a national bank 9 but dismissed the motion to enjoin
the enforcement of the subpoenas as against COSI.230 The court noted that
COSI was not an operating subsidiary of Capital One, but merely an affiliated
third-party agent, 23  and emphasized the distinction between operating
subsidiaries, which are subject to OCC regulation and whose powers are
limited to those of national banks, and other bank affiliates. It also underscored
the dissent's observations in Watters that "it would be anomalous if 'a state
corporation can avoid complying with state regulations, yet nevertheless take
advantage of state [corporation] laws insulating its owners from liability,"' 232
and that construing preemption expansively "may drive companies seeking
refuge from state regulation into the arms of federal parents, harm those state
competitors who are not lucky enough to find a federal benefactor, and
hamstring States' ability to regulate the affairs of state corporations."
233
Accordingly, the court noted that if it were to extend preemption to "third-
party corporations such as COSI, the term 'national bank' would not longer
mean 'national bank.' Rather, it would mean 'national bank and any entity that
can find a way to graft itself, remora-like, to a national bank."'' 234 The court
found that expanding preemption was contrary to public policy, because every
time preemption
is broadened and state regulation is supplanted by that of the OCC, state
sovereignty erodes, political accountability dissipates, and a federal agency's
role in shaping state policy increases. [Courts] must be especially cognizant of
these dangers in cases, like this one, involving a state's ability to enforce its
consumer protections laws.
235
Therefore, the court dismissed the motion to enjoin enforcement of the
subpoena against the national bank's non-bank affiliate-agent. National bank
agents are not protected from preemption when national bank powers are not at
stake.
228 Id. at 623 (quoting Capital One's filings).
229 Id. at 621-22.
230 Id. at 623, 628.
231 COSI is likely a bank service company, in which case it is possible that it is subject to
non-exclusive OCC regulation. See 12 U.S.C. § 1867(a) (2006) (regulating oversight of bank service
companies); cf Id. § 1464(d)(7)(A) (regulating oversight of thrift service companies).
232 McGraw, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 628 (quoting Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct.
1559, 1585 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).





e. The Goleta National Bank Payday Loan Rent-a-Charter Cases
The agent versus business partner or counterparty distinction is perhaps
clearest in payday lending rent-a-charter cases. Prior to 2004, many payday
lenders began "renting" national banks' charters to circumvent state usury
laws. The payday lenders were state-chartered finance companies that were
subject to state usury laws. The payday lenders sought to piggyback on national
banks' ability to export their home states' higher or nonexistent usury caps.
They did this by structuring transactions so that a national bank or thrift would
make the loan to the consumer followed by the payday lender's automatically
purchasing the loan from the bank. Under significant political pressure, the
OCC and OTS curtailed rent-a-charter activities in 2004.236
In 2000-2001, a series of suits were filed in state courts by state
government agencies and consumers challenging national banks' ability to
"rent" their charters to payday lenders in order to circumvent state usury laws
and small loan laws. These suits centered around the rent-a-charter
arrangement between the California-based Goleta National Bank and ACE
Cash Express, Inc. ("ACE"), a non-bank finance company.237 Consumers
would apply for a payday loan by going to an ACE branch and deal solely with
ACE personnel, but the documentation for the payday loans would list Goleta
as the lender. Goleta also established the underwriting criteria and controlled
loan approval. Goleta, however, automatically also sold ACE a 90-95% interest
in each loan, and ACE maintained all loan records and serviced the loans.
238
Goleta's rent-a-charter arrangement with ACE was crucial to its operations; in
2001 the arrangement accounted for approximately 20% of Goleta's profit.
239
ACE removed the suits to federal court, arguing that the claims against it were
preempted by the NBA. The plaintiffs then filed motions for remand, on the
grounds that ACE could not take shelter in the NBA, as it was not a national
240bank. In a series of opinions, the motions for remand were granted.
236 E.g., OCC, Formal Agreement: National Independent Trust Company, Ruston, Louisiana,
Enforcement Action No. 2004-36 (May 3, 2004), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/FTP/EAs/ea2004-36.pdf.
237 See, e.g., Goleta Nat'l Bank v. O'Donnell, 239 F. Supp. 2d 745, 747 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
238 Id. at 747-48.
239 Brendan I. Koerner, Preying on Payday, MOTHER JONES, May-June 2001, at 19, 19-20.
240 See North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. 5:02-CV-69-F(3)
(E.D.N.C. May 14, 2002); Colorado ex rel. Salazar v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1282
(D. Colo. Jan. 24, 2002); Brown v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. S 01-2674, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25847 (D. Md. Nov. 14, 2001); Long v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. 3:00-CV-1306-J-25TJC, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24617 (M.D. Fla. June 15, 2001); see also Goleta Nat'l Bank v. Lingerfelt, 211 F.
Supp. 2d 711 (E.D.N.C. 2002) (dismissing Goleta and ACE's motion to dismiss on the grounds of
Younger abstention because of an ongoing state proceeding). But see Hudson v. ACE Cash Express,
Inc., No. IP 01-1336-C H/S, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11226 (S.D. Ind. May 30, 2002) (dismissing
consumer's Indiana state law usury suit against ACE and Goleta on grounds that Goleta was the true
lender and therefore Indiana state usury law was not applicable to it). The Supreme Court has since
clarified the removal issue by holding that state-law usury claims made against a national bank are
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When Ohio sought to undertake a regulatory usury action against ACE,
however, Goleta brought suit in the District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio to enjoin the action.241 Goleta argued it was the actual lender for the
payday loans and that ACE was merely acting as its agent. Therefore, Goleta
contended, the NBA as interpreted by Marquette National Bank v. First of
Omaha Service Corp.242 preempted the application of Ohio's usury laws
because application of the laws to ACE would represent a prohibited indirect
enforcement of such laws against Goleta. 2
43
The court rejected Goleta's arguments and dismissed the suit for lack of
standing. The court reasoned that because ACE bore 90% of the loan risk, it
was not acting as Goleta's agent; even if Goleta was the titular lender, the
economic reality was otherwise.244 ACE was the functional lender, and its
relationship with Goleta was that of a counterparty, not an agent. Therefore,
Goleta lacked standing because, among other reasons, it could not show injury
to itself.245 O'Donnell likewise supports the principle that national banks'
exclusive agents are protected by preemption when the exercise of a national
bank's powers is at stake, but national banks' counterparties are never able to
shelter in preemption.
SPGGC v. Ayotte, the remand in SPGGC v. Blumenthal, the State Farm
cases, the Second Circuit's ruling in Pacific Capital Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut,
and Pacific Capital Bank, N.A. v. Milgram indicate that third parties in
contractual relationships with national banks are protected from state regulation
by preemption only if their relationship is sufficiently close to being a national
bank's agent and if the state regulation would frustrate a national bank's power
to employ an agent. If, as indicated in the SPGGC v. Blumenthal dismissal,
Pacific Capital Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut, and Capital One, state regulation
would not frustrate the exercise of a national bank's powers, however, then the
agent is not protected by preemption. Thus, a regulatory investigation of an
agent is different from a statute limiting a lending or payments practice. And if
the relationship is more like that of a business partner, as in SPGGC v.
Blumenthal, or more like that of a counterparty, as in O'Donnell and Capital
One, then preemption will not apply to the nonbank entity. Thus, preemption
case law indicates that preemption is at best coextensive with the run of federal
regulatory writ. A regulatory vacuum would exist absent either direct
regulation of a nonbank counterparty to a national bank or an agency
completely preempted by 12 U.S.C. §§ 85-86 (2006) and therefore can be removed to federal court.
Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003).
241 O'Donnell, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 747.
242 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
243 0 'Donnell, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 749.
244 Id. at 748. Injury-in-fact analysis for standing is separate from preemption analysis, but
the standing analysis has a lower threshold than preemption, so to the extent that standing is not found,
there will not be preemption.
245 Id. at 753-54.
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relationship that creates respondeat superior liability for the bank "principal"
and thus makes a strong incentive for both the principal and its regulator to
monitor the agent's activities. Banking entities that are not subject (either
directly, or indirectly via agency relationships) to federal regulation cannot
benefit from federal preemption, as the entire purpose of preemption in banking
law is to avoid duplicative and potentially contradictory regulatory regimes.
This concern simply does not exist when there is no federal regulatory
oversight.
III. Hydraulic Regulation
Because of preemption doctrine, states' ability to regulate national banks
and thrifts, their operating subsidiaries, and their agents directly is severely
restricted; states cannot directly regulate federally chartered financial
institutions in any meaningful way. States, however, still have the ability to
regulate federally chartered financial institutions indirectly, by channeling
market forces to incentivize changes in bank behavior.
Changes in financial market structures have placed the majority of
consumer debt within the ken of state regulation. These changes have made it
possible for states to regulate the majority of holders of consumer debt directly.
They have also made it possible for states to regulate national banks and thrifts
indirectly, in spite of preemption doctrine, by channeling market forces to
create incentives for national banks and thrifts to comply with state regulations.
A. The Fundamental Change in the Consumer Finance Business Model:
Securitization
Over the past quarter century, the banking industry has undergone a major
change. The previous dominant business model in banking was relational
banking-banks engaged in conservative underwriting, maintained long-term
customer relationships, and held the debts they originated on their own
246books. That business model has changed. Today, the dominant model is
originate-to-distribute. 247 Banks originate as many loans as possible and sell
them into the secondary market. Banks immediately monetize on loans, rather
than holding the credit risk and maintaining a relationship with consumers.
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the shift to an originate-to-distribute lending
model has created a huge secondary market in consumer debt. Some of this
market consists of debt collection agencies that buy defaulted debts for cents on
the dollar, but by far the biggest component is securitization trusts. These
246 Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in
Bankruptcy, 2009 Wis. L. REV. (forthcoming).
247 Id.
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trusts, as the following two charts show, now hold the majority of mortgage
and credit-card debt, as well as a sizeable amount of automobile and student-
loan debt.













E Securitized 0 Non-Securitized
248 See Federal Reserve, Statistical Release Z., tbl. L.218 (2009) (1-4 family residential
mortgage debt held in agency and private pools as a percentage of total 1-4 family mortgage debt).
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I Securitized 0 Non-Securitized
The basic structure of securitization is relatively simple. A bank or other
entity (the "originator") originates multiple loans. It then sells a bundle of loans
to a specially created entity (the "special purpose vehicle" or "SPV"). This
entity is often a wholly owned subsidiary of the originator. The SPV pays for
the loans by selling them to a second SPV, typically a trust (a "securitization
trust"). The trust pays for the loans by issuing securities, collateralized by the
loans. Thus, the ultimate holder of the securitized loans is generally a
counterparty to the originating bank's own subsidiary-counterparty. There is no
direct transaction between the originator and the trust.
250
The originating entity sometimes serves as the SPV's "servicer"-an
agent that manages and collects the loans. 2 5  The originating bank also
249 See Federal Reserve, Statistical Release G. 19 (2009) (revolving pools of securitized assets
as a percentage of total revolving debt). The majority of revolving debt is credit card debt. The next
largest category is assumed to be demand deposit account overdraft protection. Mark Furletti &
Christopher Ody, Measuring U.S. Credit Card Borrowing: An Analysis of the G. 19's Estimate of
Consumer Revolving Credit 24 (Fed. Res. Bank of Phila. Payment Cards Ctr. Discussion Paper No. 06-
03 2006), available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/payment-cards-center/publications/discussion-
papers/2006/DG192006April1O.pdf. For additional information on these statistics, see the Nilson
Reports. Nilson Report, http://www.nilsonreport.com/ (last visited June 3, 2009).
250 Securitization can be done with only a single SPV, but two-step securitizations are
thought to provide better protection of the trust's assets against the originator's creditors. David
Baranick & Richard Bennet, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles for Issuers of and Investors in
CMBS, in HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 417, 422 (Frank J. Fabozzi et
al. eds., 2d ed. 1998).
251 FDIC, RISK MANAGEMENT CREDIT CARD SECURITIZATION MANUAL (2007), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/credit card-securitization/pdf version/index.html
(describing the credit card securitization process); David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating
Agencies Allow Predatory Lending To Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 985, 1003 (2006) (describing mortgage securitization process).
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sometimes retains an interest in the SPV, either a last-out, first-loss position or
a vertical strip.252 The trust's interests are guarded by a securitization trustee,
typically a financial institution other than the originator.
There are many advantages to banks and investors from securitization. For
banks, securitization can be a lower-cost way to raise funds than issuing
securities directly because the price of the SPV's securities reflects only the
value of a dedicated group of assets rather than the originator's total assets and
liabilities. Selling loan assets reduces banks' capital requirements, thus
providing greater liquidity and enabling greater lending. And, because the loans
are held by the SPV, not the originator, the originator no longer bears the risk
of the loans, except to the extent of its interest in the trust and position within
the trust's priority scheme.
253
For investors, securitization offers a way to make targeted investments in
specific asset pools without having to assume all the risks of investing in the
originator. The securities issued by the SPV are typically tranched--divided
into a subordination series in which lower-priority tranches do not receive a
return unless the higher-priority tranches are paid in full. Tranching enables the
creation of higher-yield securities and investment-grade securities from the
same asset pool, allowing a middling pool of assets to be used to tap high-yield,
middle, and investment-grade investment markets. Additionally, for investors
and originators, there may be accounting and tax benefits from
securitization.
254
While securitization is a significant development in consumer debt
origination, it is not the only one. Increasingly, consumer debts are sold, even
outside of the securitization context, 255 particularly if the debts are past due. A
sizeable industry has developed around purchasing nonperforming loans for
pennies on the dollar and trying to collect at a few cents more.25 6 These loans
will often be flipped multiple times as they age, as some businesses wish to
invest in debts that are 90 days past due, but not 180 days past due. In 2008,
credit card issuers sold over $55.5 billion of charged-off credit card debt to
third-party debt buyers for $2.7 billion or an average of 4.8 cents on the dollar;
the largest debt-buying firms purchased another $15 billion in other charged-
252 The vertical strip that absorbs losses pari passu with other trust interests is prevalent in
credit card securitizations, see FDIC, supra note 251, at I1, whereas a full last-out, first-loss position is
more common in mortgage securitizations. Credit card securitizations also typically involve the
originator retaining any residual funds collected by the trust beyond those paid out to investors. Id.
253 Forty-three percent of new construction mortgages had "early payment default"
provisions, which make the originator liable for defaults on the securitized mortgage loans for a lim~ited
window of time. CREDIT SUISSE, MORTGAGE LIQUIDITY DU JOUR: UNDERESTIMATED No MORE 49
(2007).
254 STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ ET AL., SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CAPITAL
MARKETS §§ 4.01-5.02 (2004).
255 Victoria Haneman, The Ethical Exploitation of the Unrepresented Consumer, 73 Mo. L.
REV. 707, 714-16 (2008).
256 NILSON REP., Issue 92 1, Mar. 2009, at 1, 10.
Vol. 26:2, 2009
Hydraulic Regulation
257off consumer debt (such as medical, utility, auto, and government debt). And
these past-due debts can themselves be securitized by a party other than the
originator.
258
Consumers rarely, if ever, know if the debts they owe have been
securitized or sold, but securitization and debt sales can significantly affect
consumers. Securitization and sales change the incentives of loan originators;
because they do not hold the ultimate risk on the loans, they may engage in less
careful underwriting. 259 As banks move from a relational, interest-based
lending model to an origination- and fee-based lending model, origination
volume has increased in importance relative to origination quality. This shift in
incentives and business models has fueled the subprime lending market and the
mortgage bubble, as lenders have been willing to offer more credit to more
consumers than ever before.
B. Hydraulic Regulation: Using the Market To Regulate Consumer Credit
Upstream
1. Securitization's Unremarked Consequence: The Loss of the
Preemption Defense
The change in the business model for consumer lending has a significant
and unremarked consequence. It has placed a tremendous percentage of
consumer debt in the hands of largely unregulated entities outside the
traditional banking system. 26 In so doing, it has placed the majority of
consumer debt in the hands of entities that cannot claim federal preemption as a
defense against the application of state law.
Securitization depends on the fiction that form is substance. Crucial for
securitization is that the SPVs involved be considered completely separate
entities from the originator and each other for bankruptcy, accounting, and tax
purposes. Thus, every securitization transaction requires a "true sale" opinion
letter from the originator's law firm that affirms the transaction is actually a
sale of the assets by the originator, rather than a disguised secured loan used to
defraud the originator's creditors by removing assets from their reach.2 6
Because most securitizations are now "two-step" securitizations in which the
257 Id.
258 See, e.g. Kenneth A. Froot & Ivan Farman, Commercial Financial Services, Inc.:
Securitization of Charged-off Credit Card Receivables, HARV. BUS. SCHOOL CASE STUDY 9-299-23, at
1 (1999).
259 Engel & McCoy, supra note 8, at 2041; Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost
Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 1061 (1996).
260 See supra figs. I & 2.
261 Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial
Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 1553, 1582 (2008).
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assets are sold from the originator to a first SPV and then to a second one,26 2
the assets are ultimately held by an entity that does not necessarily have either
an affiliation or a contractual agency relationship with the originator. The true
sale is thus the linchpin of securitization's emphasis on formal structures, but
also securitization's vulnerability. For by removing the assets (consumer debt
receivables) from an originator that is a national bank, the true sale also
removes the assets' protection from state regulation under federal preemption
doctrine.
263
Developments in the market have thus given states an important
regulatory lever for consumer protection. While states cannot, with few
exceptions, regulate the national banks and thrifts that originate debts, they can
regulate the purchasers of debt from those banks and thrifts and, more
importantly, they can regulate the national banks and thrifts indirectly by
channeling the hydraulic pressures of the market to incentivize changes in
national banks' and thrifts' behavior.
2. Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Markets Upstream
Because of the existence of a secondary market that is not protected by
preemption, states can harness market forces to regulate not only the secondary
market, but also the primary market in consumer debt. Specifically, states can
craft generally applicable regulations that impose costs on secondary-market
purchasers of consumer debt from national banks and thrifts tied to the terms of
the consumer debt.
States could impose targeted regulatory costs by making consumer debt
with various offensive terms unenforceable or subject to various defenses, or
by creating public or private rights of action against parties that attempt to
enforce consumer debts with the offensive terms. Or, less aggressively, states
could simply provide that the offensive terms themselves are not enforceable,
although this route raises severability issues. The goal of the state's regulation
would be to decrease the value of the debt in the hands of a secondary market
purchaser. The market will ensure that secondary-market purchasers pass these
regulatory costs along to the national banks and thrifts that originated the debts.
The hydraulic forces of the market will thus force a choice on national
banks and thrifts: eliminate the offensive terms in the consumer debt, accept a
262 See supra note 250.
263 The Supreme Court ignored the legally separate status of operating subsidiaries in
Waiters, eschewing the fundamental formalism upon which banking law and capital markets generally
rely, see supra text accompanying notes 163-167, but the difference between a subsidiary and a non-
affiliated counterparty to a counterparty (such as the second SPV in a two-step securitization) is a
formalism so essential to law that it cannot be ignored. Although the formal divisions between parents
and subsidiaries or between affiliates are sometimes collapsed in substantive consolidations, see In re
Owens Coming, 419 F.3d 195, 199 (3d Cir. 2005), this is an extraordinary remedy, id., and not one
exercised to combine bona fide entities with no affiliation.
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lower resale price for the debts, or keep the debt (and credit risk) on their own
books-thereby reducing their lending capacity, interrupting cash flow, and
encouraging better underwriting practices. Reduced resale prices and retention
of debts are unattractive options for national banks and thrifts. If national banks
and thrifts wish to continue to receive the benefits of securitization and debt
sales, they will have to change the terms under which they originate debts. By
adjusting the costs imposed on secondary-market purchasers, states can
strongly incentivize national banks and thrifts to eliminate the offensive terms.
If this Article's reading of a necessary limitation on preemption to entities
under federal regulation or in a respondeat superior liability-creating
relationship with a federally regulated principal is correct, this would provide a
method for regulating federally chartered financial institutions indirectly. Of
course, a broad reading of Watters, Ayotte, and Pacific Capital Bank, N.A. v.
Connecticut would seem to bar such regulation.
264
To illustrate how hydraulic regulation would work in practice, consider a
state legislature that wished to ban universal cross-default clauses in consumer
credit contracts. 265 The state could pass a law of general applicability providing
that all consumer contracts with universal cross-default clauses are
unenforceable against the consumer and providing various penalties for
attempted enforcement. This law would be preempted as applied to national
banks,266 but not as applied to securitization trusts.267 Securitization trusts
would not be able to enforce consumer debts, like credit card receivables, that
contained universal cross-default clauses, at least in the state in question. This
unenforceability would make the debt less valuable to securitization trusts (or,
more precisely, to investors in the trust), as the trust's securities would either
have a lower rating, but the same yield, or a lower yield, but the same rating.
Therefore, going forward, the trust would be willing to pay less to purchase
consumer debts with cross-default clauses or, more precisely, the investment
banks that serve as underwriters for the trust's securities issuance would
demand different deal terms to make the trust's securities marketable. These
demands would force the national banks that originate such debts to accept a
lower sale price unless they either kept the debts on their books (decreasing
lending capacity) or stopped issuing debt with cross-default clauses. The likely
result, if the state imposed sufficient regulatory costs, would be that cross-
default clauses would disappear from that state's market.
264 See supra notes 234, 235 and accompanying text.
265 A universal cross-default clause (also known as cross-default clause or universal default
clause) is a loan provision that defines an event of default to include a default on another obligation.
266 See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(d)(2)(iv) (2008).
267 Cf Henry v. Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc. (In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.), 471
F.3d 977, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming state law aiding and abetting liability of non-federally
chartered warehouse lender to mortgage bank that participated in the securitization of fraudulently
originated mortgage loans).
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Similarly, this regulation could be done with state usury laws, except to
the extent that federal law, such as the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act, prohibits state usury laws as applied to any entity.
268
Old negotiable instrument law in many states provided that usury was a real
defense that travels with the paper.269 A usury defense would likely be
unusable against a national bank because of Marquette, 27 but it could be
asserted against purchasers of consumer debt paper from the national bank.
Statutory provisions clarifying that usury is a real defense that may always be
raised against a claim holder (but to which there may be an affirmative counter-
defense of preemption) would impose regulatory costs on secondary-market
debt holders, which would have a hydraulic effect of raising the costs of
lending at usurious rates for national banks. Likewise, a state could bar certain
prepayment penalties or create various requirements for the enforceability of
mortgages. By regulating the secondary market, state government can affect
changes upstream, in the primary market.
This mode of regulation already exists in other contexts, where it has been
extremely effective. The federal government regulates the primary mortgage
market by regulating government-sponsored entities (GSEs) like Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac that comprise the bulk of the secondary mortgage market.
271
When FHFA sets the conforming loan limits or creates other requirements for
GSEs, it functionally shapes the primary market because there is a much more
limited market for non-conforming mortgages, making them less liquid and
272potentially less profitable than conforming mortgages. Thus, when
congressional Democrats let GSEs know that they were unhappy with binding
mandatory arbitration provisions in mortgages, the GSEs responded by refusing
to buy mortgages with binding mandatory arbitration provisions, and these
provisions disappeared from the conforming (GSE-purchase eligible) mortgage
market almost overnight.273 Likewise, the GSEs' indication that they would not
purchase loans that contain certain terms they deem abusive, such as harsh
268 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 (2006). The Act preempts usury laws for first-priority, residential
mortgages.
269 See, e.g., JAMES BARR AMES, LYMAN BREWSTER & CHARLES L. MCKEEHAN, THE
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 149 (1908) (referring to "usury or other statutory real defense").
270 Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minn. v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
271 This regulation occurs through the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) as of July
30, 2008 and was formerly carried out by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO).
See Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act of 2008, §§ 1101, 1301-04, Pub. L. No. 110-289,
122 Stat. 2654.
272 The very standardization of conforming mortgages adds substantially to their secondary-
market value.
273 Peter G. Miller, Arbitration Clauses Blocked by Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac, REALTY
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2004, available at http://realtytimes.com/rtpages/20040210_arbitration.htrr.
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prepayment penalties, resulted in the elimination of these terms from the
conforming market.274
Hydraulic regulation is a tool that can be used in any industry that relies
on the existence of a secondary market-almost any industry with a wholesale
and retail level. It need not be confined to financial services. Consumer goods
markets function like a secondary market to manufacturers' primary market. If
a state (or the federal government) wishes to regulate a product, it can (within
the scope of its police powers) regulate the manufacturer directly. Jurisdictional
issues might be an impediment, however, such as with foreign manufacturers.
The state could get around this impediment by regulating at various points
downstream of the manufacturer, either by regulating the importers, the retail
sellers, or the purchasers of the product, or anyone else in the chain of sale
from manufacturer to consumer.
275
For example, consider restrictions on leaded gasoline. Gasoline is refined
both domestically and abroad. American governmental units have no ability to
regulate overseas oil refineries directly. Therefore, when the government
decided to ban leaded gasoline, it was necessary to impose a ban on the sale of
the gasoline, rather than on its manufacture.276 Banning gas stations' sale of
leaded gasoline had an upstream effect-oil companies stopped producing
leaded gasoline.
Likewise, if drivers and passengers are required to wear seatbelts in
vehicles, this requirement creates a pressure on automobile manufacturers to
produce only vehicles with seatbelts. Hydraulic regulation can also work with
positive incentives, not just negative ones. When states offer rebates for
recycling aluminum cans, it effectively lowers the cost of purchasing beverages
in aluminum cans, which creates an incentive for beverage manufacturers to
use aluminum.
277
274 Reiss, supra note 251, at 987. Rating agencies have played a similar role to the GSEs, but
without the intention of affecting social welfare. A credit rating by a nationally recognized statistical
rating organization like Fitch's, Moody's, or Standard & Poor's is necessary for a securitization trust to
be able to issue securities, as the rating is the key to the securities' offering price. As Reiss has noted,
the key position of the rating agencies in the securitization process has given them the power to shape
lending regulations-if they are dissatisfied with a regulation, they can simply refuse to rate securities
backed by assets subject to the regulations. Id. at 1024-25. The ratings of secondary market securities
are thus able to impact the primary market upstream.
275 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964) (imposing strict liability on
all sellers of products that ultimately injure the end consumer).
276 40 C.F.R. § 80.22(b) (2008) (a person cannot "sell, offer for sale, supply, offer for supply,
dispense, transport, or introduce into commerce" leaded gasoline, but manufacture or usage is not
regulated).
277 Hydraulic regulation also appears in criminal law, where criminalization of consumption
markets is used to affect the harder-to-police origination markets. For example, the possession of child
pornography (a close proxy for its consumption), abhorrent though it might be, may not by itself harm
children. Criminalizing the possession (and thus consumption) of child pornography, however, helps to
combat the very harmful production of child pornography, as the increased cost of child pornography
may reduce the demand (unless the demand curve is flat), and thereby the incentive to make child
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Hydraulic regulation is a process that already exists quite effectively in
many areas of the economy. Regulating the secondary market to regulate the
primary market is a powerful tool that can be used to bypass jurisdictional
obstacles (either legal or practical), including preemption. It can also be a
sensible regulatory method when it is more efficient to regulate a small number
of secondary market parties (like GSEs) that can be easily monitored than to
regulate thousands of dispersed originators. The process of hydraulic regulation
is quite familiar-so familiar, indeed, that it has not been recognized as a
formally distinct regulatory strategy and alternative to direct regulation. Nor
has hydraulic regulation been applied to the question of consumer protection in
financial services.
We can generalize these examples and define hydraulic regulation as the
regulation of a secondary market that aims to produce a net positive social
welfare effect by imposing an externality on a primary market. Thus, not all
regulation of the secondary market is hydraulic regulation. Only if the
regulation of the secondary market seeks to impose a social-welfare-enhancing
externality on the primary market would the regulation be hydraulic.
Notably, a hydraulic regulation aimed at improving consumer protection
in financial services imposes a negative externality on the primary market in
consumer credit. But this negative externality on the primary market changes
incentives in the primary market in such a way that it will have a positive net
social benefit. The question in any hydraulic regulation scheme is whether the
net social-welfare benefit outweighs the costs from the externality. In the case
of consumer credit, this is a question of whether the benefits of greater
consumer protection outweigh the costs to financial institutions and any impact
on credit availability and cost. This trade-off, of course, will be at the center of
any policy debate on consumer credit, but to the extent that states wish to
express a preference in the debate, hydraulic regulation is a method that can
reinvigorate their role in financial-services consumer protection.
3. Hydraulic Regulation's Limitation to Consumer Protection
Hydraulic regulation of credit-market consumer protection is inherently
limited to laws regulating the terms of consumer debts, because the terms of the
debts are the link that channels the market pressure toward the originating
institution rather than toward the investors in the secondary market holder.
Absent this link, states cannot expect that the result of regulation would be a
change in originating market behavior, rather than a lower return to the
investors in secondary market purchasers' securities. Hydraulic regulation must
look to the paper, not the institution. This means that hydraulic regulation must
pornography. In theory, at least, criminalization of child pornography possession functions as a
hydraulic regulation of the child pornography production market.
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apply irrespective of the originating institution's nature. Therefore, it could not
be used to impose general banking regulations, such as capital and liquidity
levels of national banks or creating rights to inspect books and records.
Hydraulic regulation offers states an important, but limited, avenue
toward the immediate regulation of the consumer debt terms. It creates the
possibility of reinvigorating state usury laws and other substantive debt
regulations. But it does not open the door to state control over national banks'
safety and soundness. As such, it strikes an appropriate balance between states'
traditional interest in consumer-protection regulation and federal interests in
ensuring the safety and soundness of the national payment and credit systems.
C. The Architecture of Regulatory Capture
Hydraulic regulation could revive states' critical role in consumer
protection in banking services. In so doing, it would help solve the regulatory
capture problem that has undermined the effectiveness of federal banking
regulators.
Architecturally, hydraulic regulation has five key features that help avoid
regulatory capture. First, it enlists the energies of normative entrepreneurs like
elected officials who are driven to attract the median voter, which makes them
less susceptible to regulatory capture. Second, entrusting consumer protection
to normative entrepreneurs ensures the spread of successful hydraulic
regulations through bandwagon, cascade, and yardsticking effects. Third, this
success need spread only to a limited number of jurisdictions for there to be a
nationwide effect, because differing states' regulation would create uncertainty
about the state of the law, which would in turn limit secondary market
liquidity. Fourth, state-by-state hydraulic regulation would produce dispersed
targets for regulatory capture and necessitate total or near total capture of all
these targets to be effective. Accordingly, capture would be greatly delayed, if
not made impossible. And fifth, to the extent that it also permits the enlistment
of financial entrepreneurs, like plaintiffs' attorneys, in enforcement, hydraulic
regulation further avoids capture.
1. Harnessing Normative Entrepreneurship
Architecturally, hydraulic regulation puts consumer-protection legislation
and enforcement in the hands of political figures striving for higher office. This
arrangement allows the public choice dynamics of state politics to ensure the
enactment and enforcement of hydraulic consumer-protection regulations.
While state banking commissions oversee chartering processes,
enforcement authority typically rests in the hands of the attorney general. State
attorneys general are elected officials who often harbor ambitions to become
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governors or senators. 27 They have direct political accountability to citizens,
unlike federal or state banking regulators. High-profile consumer-protection
enforcement, particularly in the context of financial institutions, is frequently a
politically popular move that would appeal to attorneys general who aspire to
higher office. Moreover, the offices of state attorneys general, unlike most
federal and state banking regulatory agencies, are funded by taxpayer revenues
rather than bank chartering assessments. These arrangements make attorneys
general much more sensitive to electoral concerns and less beholden to
financial industry interests than federal regulators.
Because consumer protection is a strong electoral issue, it creates different
incentives for vigorous enforcement for state officials than for federal
regulatory agencies. Elected officials like state legislators and attorneys general
are normative entrepreneurs who seek to promote certain policy norms as part
of their political ambitions. 279 To do so, they strive to appeal to median voters.
Just like middle-class tax breaks, middle-class protections in financial
services attract median voters. Consumer protection is a proven method for
appealing to median voters, which rewards elected officials' political
careers. 2 0 Accordingly, elected officials will strive for more stringent
consumer protections because of the personal political benefits.
Federal agency normative entrepreneurship, however, is weaker than
states' because federal agency enforcement is less politically accountable and
there is greater interest group concentration and thus capture risks at the federal
level. The particular nature of normative entrepreneurship in state legislative
and enforcement processes are especially well-suited for hydraulic regulation.
The dynamics of state politics can thus be harnessed to ensure that states would
enact and enforce hydraulic consumer-protection laws.
2. Bandwagons, Cascades, and Yardsticks
By placing consumer-protection enforcement in the hands of normative
entrepreneurs, hydraulic regulation can take advantage of what Cass Sunstein
has termed "norm bandwagons" and "norm cascades." 281 As Sunstein has
explained, "Norm bandwagons occur when small shifts lead to large ones, as
278 The National Association of Attorneys General is often jocularly referred to as the
National Association of Aspiring Governors.
279 See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996)
(discussing "norm entrepreneurs").
280 An example of this process of normative entrepreneurship can be observed at the federal
level in the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the wake of the Enron, WorldCom, and Adelphia
scandals. The combination of headline-grabbing corporate scandals and an impending election
incentivized Congress to appeal to median voters by enacting corporate governance legislation, See
generally William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate
Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619,667 (2006).
281 Sunstein, supra note 279.
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people join the 'bandwagon'; norm cascades occur when there are rapid shifts
in norms." 282 Normative entrepreneurs, such as state legislators and attorneys
general, are eager to copy successful methods of appealing to median voters
from their peers in other states. Thus, if hydraulic regulation is successful in
one state, it will likely produce a bandwagon or cascade effect into other states
or to other elected officials in the state.
A single successful experiment with consumer protection from a politician
in a state can inspire other politicians to do the same, as normative
entrepreneurs unhesitatingly copy good ideas. Thus, when Andrew Cuomo
succeeded Eliot Spitzer as New York's Attorney General, he continued
Spitzer's focus on consumer protection in financial services. Spitzer set up the
standard by which Cuomo would be judged, but Cuomo was also able to see
the political reward (the governorship) that Spitzer reaped from making
consumer protection in financial services a hallmark of his tenure as Attorney
General. Likewise, states copy other states in such diverse consumer-protection
areas as foreclosure moratoria,283  securities regulations,284  Internet
commerce, 285 environmental protection,286 and three-strikes laws. 287 The very
282 Id. at 909.
283 E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2923.5-6 (West Supp. 2009) (imposing delay and a net present
value maximization requirement); MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROPERTY § 7-105.1 (LexisNexis Supp.
2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 244, § 35A (Supp. 2008) (effecting a 90-day pre-foreclosure cure period).
See Comment, Constitutional Law-Mortgage Foreclosure Moratorium Statutes, 32 MICH. L. REV. 71
(1933).
284 Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP.
L. 33, 92 (2006) (stating that within two years after Kansas enacted the first blue sky law, twenty-three
other states followed suit with laws patterned after Kansas's).
285 Nevada enacted the first SPAM law in 1997. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.705-35,
205.492-513 (LexisNexis 2006) (enacted 1997). Between 1999 and 2004, thirty-four other states
adopted SPAM laws. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.479 (2008) (enacted 2003); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-
1372 (2003 & Supp. 2008) (enacted 2003); ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 4-88-601 to -607, 5-41-201 to -206
(2001 & Supp. 2006) (enacted 2003); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17529, 17538 (West 2008) (enacted
2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2.5-101 to -105, 13-6-105, 13-6-403 (West 2002 & Supp. 2005)
(enacted 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-451 to -453 (2009) (enacted 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, §§ 937-38 (2001) (enacted 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 668.60 to .610 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009)
(enacted 2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-603E (2003) (enacted 2000); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/16D-1 to -7 (West 2003) (enacted 2000); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2Z, /7, 511/1, /5, /10, /15
(West 2003) (enacted 2000); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-5-22-1 to 24-5-22-10 (LexisNexis 2006) (enacted
2003); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 714E.1-2 (West 2003) (enacted 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-6, -107
(2005) (enacted 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:73.1, :73.6 (2007) (enacted 2000); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:106.A(7) (2004) (enacted 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1497 (2003) (enacted 2003);
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 14-3001 to -3003 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2008) (enacted 2002);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.2501 to .2508 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008) (enacted 2003); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 325F.694, 325F.70 (West.2004) (enacted 2003); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.100, .1120,
.1123, .1126,.1129,.1132, .1135, .1138, .1141 (West 2001 & Supp. 2009) (enacted 2003); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 57-12-11, -23 to -24 (LexisNexis 2004) (enacted 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-75.4, 1-539.2A,
14-453, 14-458 (2007) (enacted 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-27-01 to -09 (2007) (enacted 2003);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.64 (LexisNexis 2005) (enacted 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§
776.1 to 776.7 (West Supp. 2009) (enacted 2003); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5903, 7661 (West 2000
& Supp. 2008) (enacted 2002); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2250.1-2250.8 (West 2008) (enacted
2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-47-1 to -3 (2001 & Supp. 2002) (enacted 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§
37-24-6, -36 to -40 (2004) (enacted 2002, §§ 37-24-36 to -40 repealed 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-
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18-2501 to -2502 (2001) (enacted 1999); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 46.001 to .011 (Vernon
2007) (enacted 2003); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-328.1, 18.2-152.2, 18.2-152.3, 18.2-152.4, 18.2-152.12
(2003) (enacted 2003); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.190.010 to .050 (2000) (enacted 1999); W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 46A-6G-1 to -5 (LexisNexis 2006) (enacted 1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.25 (West 2005)
(enacted 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-12-401 to -404 (2007) (enacted 2003).
286 The Clean Air Act permits California to set its own emissions standards with permission
of the EPA Administrator, and allows other states to match California's standards. Thirteen states have
adopted the California standards to date, and several others have announced plans to do so. Ben Feller,
Obama Pushing Stronger Fuel-Efficiency Standard, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 26, 2009. A similar
pattern can be seen developing for California's climate change legislation. Seth W. Eaton, Comment,
Winter Is Frigid, so I Say Bring on the Greenhouse Effect! A Legal and Policy Discussion of the
Strategies the United States Must Employ To Combat Global Warming, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 787, 789 n. 11
(2008) ("In early 2007, the Montana Legislature introduced a bill in its House proposing legislation with
very similar language to the California law. See Montana Global Warming Solutions Act, H.B. 753,
60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mt. 2007). Texas, similarly, mirrors the language of the California law in its bill
pending before the state senate. Texas Global Warming Solutions Act, S.B. 945, 80(R) (Tex. 2007).
California's initiative will continue to encourage other states to enact legislation to address climate
change.").
Notably, California's famous Proposition 65, the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement
Act of 1986, CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, §§ 25102-27001 (2009), available at
http://ccr.oal.ca.gov/linkedslice/default.aspSP--CCR-1000&Action=Welcome (click "Search for a
Specific Regulatory Section," enter the appropriate title and section numbers, and then click "Search"),
which requires certain products' labels to warn of cancer or reproductive toxicity risks, has not been
copied by other states. Massachusetts and Connecticut have considered such legislation, but have not
enacted any such legislation. Megan Danko, Protecting Our Food: A Criticial Look at the National
Uniformity for Food Act of 2004 and Food Safety in America, 17 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 253, 269
(2005).
287 The "three strikes" laws mandating life sentences for repeat criminal offenders
proliferated in the 1990s. Washington was the first state officially to propose in 1992, and adopt in 1993,
a statute entitled "Three Strikes, You're Out," which required a mandatory sentence of life in prison
without parole when offenders were convicted of a third violent offense. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
9.94A.030, 9.94A.570 (West 2003 & Supp. 2009) (enacted 1993). It was followed in 1994 by a similar
law in California that gained strong support after the highly publicized murder of Polly Klaas by a
habitual offender. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1999 & Supp. 2009) (enacted 1994). Similar statutes
were adopted or modified in twenty-three other states between 1994 and 1999, with a twenty-fourth
state adopting such a statute in 2006. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125 (2008) (enacted 1996); Amz. Rav.
STAT. ANN. § 13-713 (2008) (enacted 2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-501 (2006 & Supp. 2007) (enacted
1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-801 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008) (enacted 1994); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 53a-40 (2003) (enacted 1994), invalidated by State v. Bell, 931 A.2d 198 (Conn. 2007); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 775.084 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009) (enacted 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7 (2008)
(enacted 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8.5 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2008) (enacted 1994); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.1095 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008) (enacted 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-219
(2007) (enacted 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.010-.012 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2007) (enacted
1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.1 (West 2005) (enacted 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-23
(LexisNexis 2004) (enacted 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-7.7, -7.12 (2007) (enacted 1994); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 12.1-32-09 to -09.1 (1997 & Supp. 2007) (enacted 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 51.1
(West 2002) (enacted 1999); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 42-9714 (West 2007) (enacted 1995); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 17-25-45 (2003 & Supp. 2008) (enacted 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-120 (2003) (enacted
1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.5 (2003 & Supp. 2008) (enacted 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
I Ia (1998) (enacted 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-297.1 (2008) (enacted 1994); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
61-11-18 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2008) (enacted 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.62 (West 2005 &
Supp. 2008) (enacted 1993).
The "three-strikes" laws of the 1990s are only the latest round of a long tradition of habitual
offender statutes that date back to the 1800s. See Thomas R. Goots, Comment, "A Thug in Prison
Cannot Shoot Your Sister": Ohio Appears Ready To Resurrect The Habitual Criminal Statute-Will It
Withstand an Eighth Amendment Challenge?, 28 AKRON L. REV. 253, 257 & n.38 (1995) (citing R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 12-19-21 (1993) (first enacted in 1896); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-7-7 (1993) (first
enacted in 1877); and W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (1993) (first enacted in 1849)). It appears that
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similarity of most state laws speaks to the replicative tendency of normative
entrepreneurs in state government. Hydraulic regulation is thus able to harness
the power of normative entrepreneurship in state government.
The spread of hydraulic regulations among states could also be spurred on
by yardsticking, as voters compare their own protections with those of other
states. For example, state sales tax rates are often driven not by what might be
an objectively good rate, but by comparison with, and competition with, the
rates of neighboring states. 88 Citizens see their tax rates as high or low relative
to neighboring states, not relative to an absolute or to a national average. It is
not known whether this type of yardsticking extends to non-fiscal matters, such
as consumer-protection regulation. In theory, though, a yardsticking effect
could create popular demand for a leveling up to neighboring states' practices.
3. Cost Efficiency of the Highest Common Denominator: Regulatory
Costs from Variation in Levels of Regulation
Because of bandwagon and cascade effects, state hydraulic regulation
would likely produce a substantially uniformly high level of consumer
protection nationwide. To do so would not require uniform law among the
states; indeed, uniform law is unlikely even with bandwagon and cascade
effects. There is no guarantee that state attorneys general or legislatures would
uniformly perform better than federal banking regulators. Not all attorneys
general and legislators are likely to see populist consumer protection as
outweighing bank campaign contributions, and attorneys general are limited to
enforcing the laws enacted by state legislatures. There might not be sufficient
motivation or authority for hydraulic consumer-protection regulation to be
effective in many states.
For hydraulic regulation to be effective, uniformity is not necessary.
Instead, it would merely require a sufficient threshold of states in terms of
population to pursue rigorous standards. Any variation in state law applicable
to the secondary market would create uncertainty as to which state's laws
Massachusetts first enacted its Habitual Criminal Act in 1818. See Note, Attempts to Combat the
Habitual Offender, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 565, 566 (1932). By 1842, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Virginia had
enacted similar laws. Case of Samuel H. Hopkins, 5 LAW REP. 97 (1842). In 1926, New York enacted a
new form of habitual offender legislation that became known as the Baumes Law, which provided for
enhanced penalties upon a second conviction and mandatory life imprisonment upon a fourth
conviction. Note, Attempts To Combat the Habitual Offender, supra, at 565. Other states followed New
York's example and enacted their own version of the Baumes Law; "[b]y 1939, such statutes were in
effect in 43 jurisdictions of the United States." Note, Court Treatment of General Recidivist Statutes, 48
COLUM. L. REV. 238, 238 (1948).
288 Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and
Yardstick Competition, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 25, 26 (1995); Massimo Bordignon et al., In Search of
Yardstick Competition: A Spatial Analysis of Italian Municipality Property Tax Setting, 54 J. URB.
ECON. 199, 201 (2003); Jack L. Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63
AM. POL. ScI. REv. 880, 890-92 (1969).
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apply.289 This is a very real problem for non-real-estate consumer credit
products, because consumers can move and because of the vagaries of state
choice-of-law laws. The uncertainty caused by variation in law would force
secondary market investors either to demand a discount on their investment or,
if they could not value the uncertainty within a reasonable range, simply refuse
to invest.
Thus, if only a few states enacted hydraulic regulations, it could still have
the effect of forcing a nationwide leveling up of standards in the secondary
debt market. Originating institutions would therefore find it efficient to level up
to the most stringent state's standards, not only because it would increase their
access to secondary market liquidity, but also because it would produce
economies of scale through uniformity. Thus, when California sought to go
above the federal floor for vehicle fuel efficiency standards, it "would have
forced the car companies either to sell two separate fleets of vehicles--one for
states with the higher standard, one that met the federal standard-or more
likely, to achieve the higher standard across all vehicles." 290 It appears that
many auto manufacturers have chosen to produce only "50-state" cars that
meet the California standards, rather than produce both "49-state" cars and
"California" cars.291
Reputation pressures could also play a role in encouraging originating
institutions to comply with the strictest state's consumer-protection standards
nationwide. Not all financial institutions will necessarily want to do so, but to
the extent that they do not and their competition does, it could place them at a
comparative disadvantage to their competitors, who could advertise that they
had "safer" or "cleaner" products.
292
There is no certainty in this; competition can forestall voluntary leveling
up. For example, with credit cards, competition among issuers is on the basis of
289 To be sure, this uncertainty would reduce federally chartered financial institutions'
welfare. Preemption doctrine is focused on promoting federally chartered financial institutions' welfare,
but this emphasis loses sight of the purpose of federally chartered financial institutions-increasing the
public's welfare. Banks are but a mere instrumentality for doing so, and to the extent that preemption is
contrary to the public interest, it lacks any ultimate justification.
290 Micheline Maynard, E.P.A. Denies California Emission's [sic] Waiver, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
19, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/19/washington/20epa-web.html?_r=l &fta=y.
291 See Press Release, Honda, Two of Every Three Honda Automobiles Sold To Be a Low
Emission Vehicle for 1999 (Nov. 11, 1998), available at
http://world.honda.com/news/l998/c981 Il .html; see also Press Release, Mercedes Benz, Mercedes Is
the First To Bring a Diesel Model Back to California (Oct. 16, 2007), available at
http://www.emercedesbenz.com/Oct07/16_MercedesIsThe_FirstToBring_A_Diesel_ModelBack_
ToCalifornia.html.
292 Some steps in this direction can already be seen. Then-Senator Obama proposed a
government safety rating system for credit cards, much like auto crash-test safety ratings. See Credit
Card Star Safety Act of 2007, S. 2411, 110th Cong. (2007). The Pew Charitable Trusts is also working
on developing a private rating system for credit cards. See Letter from R. Dwane Krumme, Gen.
Manager, Credit Card Standards Project, The Pew Charitable Trusts, to Leonard Chanin, Assistant Dir.,
Div. of Consumer & Cmty. Affairs, Bd. of Govemors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 3, 2009), available
at https://federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2008/October/20081029/R- 1314/R- 1314_29314_1 .pdf.
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teaser interest rates and rewards programs, not the total net cost of the card,
which would include other interest rates and fees. The nature of competition in
the credit card industry prevents any card issuer from offering a product with
transparent total net cost, as it would be priced much higher than the teaser
rates and at a tremendous competitive disadvantage. 293 Problems in markets'
competitive structure could render specific applications of hydraulic regulation
ineffective. 294 We cannot be sure in the abstract of how hydraulic regulation
would affect the overall level of regulation, but it is reasonable to anticipate
that it would often result in industry compliance with the highest common
denominator effect of state financial institution regulation in a national
economy.
4. Avoidance of Capture Through Target Dispersion
The ability of even one or two states to set the standard for the nation is
the third architectural benefit of hydraulic regulation. It creates dispersed
targets for regulatory capture, which makes capture harder because in order to
be effective, there would need to be complete or near complete capture of all
the targets. Instead of industry having to capture one federal consumer-
protection agency or a handful of banking regulators, there would be fifty state
295legislatures and attorneys general that would have to be captured. At best,
this situation presents a permanent bulwark against capture, and at worst it
resets the state of capture and significantly delays its reappearance.
5. Avoidance of Capture Through Private Enforcement
While the statutory basis for hydraulic regulation requires the efforts of
elected officials, the enforcement of hydraulic regulation does not. Hydraulic
regulation could take the form of private rights of action or defenses to claims.
Especially if combined with statutory damages and class-action facilitation
provisions, hydraulic regulation could be self-executing without state
enforcement.
Private enforcement of hydraulic regulation would harness the energies of
a different type of entrepreneur-the plaintiffs' bar-to ensure enforcement.
While plaintiffs' attorneys' interests are not always aligned with the public
interest, the plaintiffs' bar is not subject to industry capture, even if it is subject
293 Credit Cardholders' Hearing, supra note 4, at 117-39 (statement of Adam J. Levitin,
Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Center).
294 Moreover, multiple regulatory equilibria might emerge, with some states adopting a high
regulatory standard and others with a low one. While this might cause efficiency losses, as it would
impose limits on economies of scale, it would still result in the high-standard states being able to protect
their own citizens as they see fit, rather than having lax regulation imposed upon them.
295 See infra text accompanying notes 354-356 regarding choice-of-law issues.
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to industry settlement offers. Private enforcement would also increase the
effectiveness of hydraulic regulation.
D. The Costs of Hydraulic Regulation
Hydraulic regulation is a regulatory response of the possible, not the
perfect. It has a variety of costs that should be taken into account when
evaluating it as a policy response to the crisis in consumer protection in the
lending industry.
First, hydraulic regulation would impose non-targeted regulatory costs in
the form of multiplicity of regulation. While hydraulic regulation aims to
impose costs, its purpose is to create costs tied to specific substantive
provisions of consumer debt, not general regulatory costs, which might be
borne by consumers. Further, duplicative state regulation would waste limited
enforcement resources, to the extent that private enforcement must be
augmented by state enforcement. For these reasons, hydraulic regulation would
not be as efficient as a single federal regulatory agency, although its
efficiencies might compare reasonably well to the current spread of federal
consumer protection. Even if hydraulic regulation would not be the most
efficient regulatory regime, its inefficiencies would have to be considered
together with its significant relative benefits.
Hydraulic regulation would also impose costs on the democratic process.
With hydraulic regulation, the least protective states would free-ride off the
most protective ones, but they would also bear the costs imposed by the most
protective ones. Alabama residents might face higher borrowing costs, because
national banks would have to absorb costs imposed by the California
legislature on the secondary market. From a democratic standpoint, this
situation is troubling. Alabama residents should have a voice in the policies
that affect them. The undemocratic impact of hydraulic regulation is an
important concern about hydraulic regulation, but is also a problem endemic to
the federal system that this Article does not claim to resolve. It is worth noting,
however, the difference between this problem and that of the exportation of lax
or nonexistent usury regulation by Delaware, South Dakota, Utah, and Arizona
after Marquette. The extraterritorial usury law problem is a function of federal
preemption enabling industry to flock to the laxest regulatory regime. It is not a
case of industry moving to a highest-common-denominator regulation to avoid
dealing with multiple regulatory regimes.
It is important to note, however, that hydraulic regulation will not affect
states in their competition with each other or with federal agencies to issue
banking charters. Hydraulic regulation is tied to consumer debts, not to a
bank's charter type or location. By focusing the regulation on the debtor and
not the lender, hydraulic regulation avoids the charter competition problem. An
argument might even be made that hydraulic regulation invites banks to base
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themselves in states with more aggressive regulation, as that will increase their
leverage in those states to temper the regulation. Thus, while there might be a
leveling up in industry standards, it might be tempered by increased political
leverage for savvy banks. And for states with parity concerns-that their state-
chartered lenders be on equal competitive footing with federally chartered
lenders-an exemption for state-chartered banking institutions (but not trusts
and general corporations) would be unlikely to seriously undermine the
hydraulic effect of the law, since state-chartered banking institutions would be
subject to the same market forces as the national banks.
At its core, hydraulic regulation aims to create a negative externality on
the origination market through regulating the secondary market. The hope is
that this negative externality will induce a change in behavior that will result in
a net positive social externality. It is possible, of course, that the externality
created by state regulation would result in a net negative externality for social
welfare, rather than a net positive externality.
Fortunately, the federal government serves as a check against this danger.
If state hydraulic regulation turned out to be negative innovation, there would
be political pressure from median voters nationwide for the federal government
to squelch the negative state innovation by passing clear preemption
legislation. This action is precisely what the federal government did in response
to states' opening their courts to securities law claimants. The federal
government reacted to what it saw as negative innovation by passing the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995," 6 the National Securities
Markets Improvement Act of 1996,297 and the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998,298 which sharply curtailed state securities law claims.
IV. Is Hydraulic Regulation Viable?
A. Preemption Problems for Hydraulic Regulation
The key challenge for hydraulic regulation is preemption doctrine.
Hydraulic regulation is viable only if state regulations are not preempted as
applied to non-federally chartered secondary-market consumer debt holders.
The preemption danger for hydraulic regulation is twofold: first, that any
regulation not of general applicability that has more than an incidental indirect
impact on federally chartered financial institutions would be preempted; and
second, that any regulation that seeks to have such an effect would be
preempted.
296 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 67 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006)).
297 Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.) (preempting state securities registration requirements).
298 Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.) (preempting state-law securities fraud suits).
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1. Impact of the Regulation
Consider a state law that limits the enforceability of debts containing or
missing particular terms when in the hands of entities other than national banks
or federal thrifts. Such a law would severely limit the secondary market for
debts containing this sort of term. Would that regulation frustrate a national
bank's exercise of its powers?
Case law makes clear that state regulations, even if applied to an entity
other than a national bank or thrift, cannot impair the bank or thrift's statutory
powers, 299 nor can state regulation force banks to choose among their
powers.30 But as Pacific Capital Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut observes, limiting
the number of potential business partners for a bank is not a sufficient
impairment of bank powers to trigger preemption. 30 1 Among the undisputed
powers of national banks and thrifts are the power to set the terms under which
they originate loans and the power to sell loans into the secondary market.
302
Whether current case law is correctly decided and cohesive is debatable.
But if we accept it as such, it would set the highest threshold for hydraulic
regulation to meet, and would allow us to discern some basic principles:
(1) states cannot impair banks' ability to set the terms of loans;
(2) states cannot impair banks' ability to sell the loans into the
secondary market;
(3) states cannot force banks to choose between setting the terms
under which they make loans or selling them into the secondary
market.
Accepting current case law, any hydraulic regulation that did any of these
would be preempted. So would hydraulic regulation pass this shibboleth?
First, if a limited reading of Watters, Ayotte, and Blumenthal is correct,
then we can differentiate between banks' agents and banks' counterparties.
Hydraulic regulation is of banks' counterparties, not their agents. Arguably this
alone differentiates Ayotte, the State Farm cases, the RAL cases, and the
Blumenthal remand issue, and makes hydraulic regulation more like O'Donnell
or the Blumenthal dismissal of the bank's action. Ayotte, the State Farm cases,
and the RAL cases can be cabined off by limiting them to regulation of banks'
agents, not banks' counterparties or counterparties of counterparties (such as
regulation of securitization trusts). Regulation of counterparties of
counterparties might simply be too far removed from a national bank or thrift
299 Ayotte, the State Farm cases, the RAL cases, and possibly Blumenthal, on the remand of
the banks' action, support this proposition. See supra Parts ll.D.2.a-c.
300 See supra Part lI.D.2.a.
301 Pac. Capital Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut, No. 3:06-CV-28 (PCD), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
55627, at *29 (D. Conn. Aug. 10, 2006).
302 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2006).
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to merit preemption, and the concern over duplicative regulation that animates
preemption would not exist in such a case.
But even without the agent/counterparty distinction, hydraulic regulation
would not limit the terms under which national banks and thrifts could
originate loans or their ability to sell them into the secondary market or force a
choice between these powers. By imposing costs on the secondary market
keyed to the terms of consumer debt paper, a hydraulic regulation would lower
the price that the secondary market would pay for the paper. Even if the
regulatory costs were criminal sanctions, like in Pacific Capital Bank, N.A. v.
Milgram, however, the secondary market price would not be reduced to zero,
because there are certain secondary market purchasers that states cannot
regulate-national banks and thrifts. National banks and thrifts are themselves
secondary market purchasers, and no matter how draconian a state regulation of
the secondary market might be, they would be exempt from it, which means
that state regulation could not shut down the secondary market. Accordingly,
state hydraulic regulation could impose costs that might constrict the secondary
market for consumer debt and thereby lower the resale price of the debt, but
they cannot destroy the market.
Hydraulic regulation therefore does not trigger preemption by frustrating
national banks' and thrifts' power to resell loans into the secondary market.
Hydraulic regulation merely constricts the size of the secondary market. This
situation is like that in Pacific Capital Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut, where the
requirement that RALs be made only in tax preparer offices limited the number
of potential business partners for national banks and thrifts, but did not frustrate
their ability to issue RALs, and thus did not trigger preemption. The NBA and
HOLA and regulations thereunder do not guarantee a robust secondary debt
market, much less a price floor for that market.
Because a secondary market would still exist for consumer debts, even
with the most extreme regulatory costs, hydraulic regulation would not
frustrate national banks' and thrifts' power to set the terms under which they
originate loans. National banks and thrifts would remain free to originate loans
under whatever terms they wanted. Loans containing certain terms would face
more restricted secondary markets, but that is no different than the current
situation-the resaleability of debt paper always depends on its terms.
Thus, hydraulic regulation would not actually force national banks and
thrifts to choose among their powers-they could issue loans on whatever
terms they chose, and sell those loans into the secondary market. However, the
secondary market for loans containing certain terms would be more restricted,
so resale prices might be lower. Even the most severe regulatory costs would
make the sale or securitization of debts containing or lacking the regulation's
targeted terms only less profitable. Depending on individual banks'
circumstances, this situation might make it more profitable for the bank to
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either keep the loans on its books, or to cease originating loans with the
targeted term and enjoy a more robust secondary market.
Hydraulic regulation should not be viewed as an impermissible restraint
on national banks' and thrifts' powers. It constricts, but does not eliminate,
their and other lenders' resale markets, which merely alters banks' financial
calculus. Regulatory costs that are felt indirectly, through the market, should
not be preempted.
2. Intent of the Regulation
Regardless of the actual impact of hydraulic regulation, an argument
could be made that its express purpose is to end-run around preemption, and
states should not be able to do indirectly what they cannot do directly. This
argument misconceives hydraulic regulation. Hydraulic regulation is not an end
run around preemption. Instead, it is maximizing state power within what is
permitted by preemption doctrine. There are reasons to be concerned about the
scope of preemption doctrine in financial services, but until and unless the
federal government occupies the field, there are still areas subject to state
regulation.
Moreover, there are good, independent reasons irrespective of hydraulic
impacts for states to regulate securitization trusts and debt collectors.
Consumers choose their lender, but not their lender's counterparties, so
consumers have no control over who ends up owning or servicing their loans,
even though this ultimate party can greatly affect the consumer.30 3 The
traditional relational lending contract protects the consumer through social
norms and reputational constraints, which are absent from securitization trusts
and debt collectors, who do not contract with consumers and therefore are not
concerned about maintaining relationships with them. Securitization trusts and
debt collectors will likely be much less constrained in their debt-enforcement
and debt-workout behavior than originating institutions. 30 4 Thus, states have
good cause to regulate: to compensate for the loss of the unwritten relational
contract elements of a traditional lending relationship.
In any case, the intent of legislation should be irrelevant for preemption
analysis. There is no "intention preemption." The intent behind a state law does
not create a conflict between federal and state laws; the laws either conflict or
they do not.305 The intent behind a state law does not determine whether the
303 See Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: The Workout
Prohibition in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
304 See, e.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (2006) (stating
that safeguards against unfair debt collection practices apply only to "debt collectors," a term defined to
exclude the originating creditor when collecting in its own name).
305 If there is such a thing as "legislative intent," it can be very difficult to divine. See, e.g.,
Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
Vol. 26:2, 2009
Hydraulic Regulation
federal government occupies a regulatory field. And state legislative intent is
irrelevant to determining whether Congress specifically preempted state action.
State legislative intent may be relevant for determining the scope of the state
law, but the scope of the law and whether it is preempted are separate inquiries.
3. When Hydraulic Regulation Should Be Preempted: A Heuristic
The proper heuristic for preemption analysis of hydraulic regulation is the
same one that emerges from banking preemption case law: whether the
regulation is being applied to an entity that is under federal regulatory
supervision. This could be through direct regulation, formal corporate
affiliation (parent/operating subsidiary) or through true agency status
(including respondeat superior liability for the principal). Watters, the State
Farm Bank cases, and Ayotte all hold that where there is (1) either (a) direct
federal regulatory authority or (b) oversight via agency and federal regulation
of the principal; plus (2) impairment of a bank or thrift's powers, there is
preemption. Conversely, Capital One, O'Donnell, and Blumenthal indicate that
that where there is (1) neither (a) direct federal regulatory authority nor (b)
oversight via an agency relationship and federal regulation of the principal; and
also (2) no impairment of powers, then there is no preemption. Absent federal
regulatory authority over an entity either directly or else indirectly via agency,
there is no risk of duplicative and potentially contradictory regulatory regimes,
and hence no need for preemption. Likewise, absent impairment of a bank's
POL'Y 61 (1994). Legislation can have multiple intentions, some legitimate and others not. And what is
to be done in states that do not maintain legislative histories? Only the text of the statute helps elucidate
intent, and that goes back to impact.
Arguments that regulation of the secondary market is tantamount to regulating federally
chartered financial institutions or that state regulations aim to end-run around preemption hydraulically
will also suffer from evidentiary problems. The impact of hydraulic regulation is inevitably theoretical
and debatable. Attempting an empirical analysis of the impact of hydraulic regulation would be
extremely difficult. First, proper data might not be available. Second, even if the data were available, it
would involve an incidence analysis that would attempt to trace changes in the originating market solely
to a single change in the secondary market. Attempting to filter out the noise of all the other factors that
impact the originating market would often be an insurmountable challenge. Incidence analysis of this
sort is unlikely to produce the statistically significant results necessary to provide empirical evidence of
hydraulic regulations impacting the originating market.
Therefore, preemption arguments based on the alleged impact of hydraulic regulations will likely
be based on economic theory, not empirical data. If the standard for preemption relates to the degree of
impact, rather than the existence of any impact at all, economic theory cannot provide the answer.
Presumably, hydraulic regulation has an impact. But this depends on how robust the post-regulation
secondary market is. If there is sufficient demand, it will not affect the resale price available to national
banks. Gauging the impact is an empirical, not a theoretical, question, and with the burden of proof on
the party challenging the regulation, this argument will be hard to prove. As a theoretical matter, we
cannot know whether in any specific case the regulatory costs imposed by hydraulic regulation will be
passed on to the originating market or be absorbed by the secondary market. The intent of a hydraulic
regulation is ultimately irrelevant to preemption analysis. Even if it were relevant, the evidentiary issues
involved in determining legislative intent of a hydraulic regulation are also formidable.
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powers, the burden imposed by state regulation is not sufficient to merit
preemption.
This preemption heuristic could be posed in either a weak, formalist form
or a strong, realist form. The weak form would simply ask whether there is a
federal regulatory agency with direct authority to undertake regulation (and
enforcement thereof) equivalent to the one the state passed. The stronger form
would further inquire whether the federal agency with authority had established
a sufficiently reasonable record of exercising that authority. In either form, the
aim of this heuristic is to establish whether preemption would create a
regulatory vacuum, either in theory or in practice.
The implications of the heuristic are clear: hydraulic regulations are not
preempted as applied to counterparties of federally chartered financial
institutions (such as debt purchasers), much less to counterparties of
counterparties (as in the case of securitization). Were it otherwise, and
preemption were not limited to the run of federal regulatory writ, it would
invite the sort of abusive practices that flourish in regulatory vacuums.
4. Hydraulic Regulation in Non-Financial Contexts
Two Supreme Court decisions have both recently rejected two state
attempts at hydraulic regulation, albeit not in the banking regulation context.
There appear to be reasonable grounds to distinguish both cases, and doing so
illuminates some of what is unique about hydraulic regulation in the financial-
services context-that the regulation must be tied to the terms of the debt and
that hydraulic regulation neither eliminates the secondary market in consumer
debt nor makes the origination of such debt unprofitable. Instead, it merely
affects the costs of one way of doing business, just like a state tax of general
applicability on paper supplies that would get passed up to financial institutions
through the market. Such a tax would not prevent a financial institution from
using paper, but it would shift its incentive structure and discourage paper
usage.
a. Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass'n
In Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass 'n,306 the Supreme Court
held that a Maine law "To Regulate the Delivery and Sales of Tobacco
Products and To Prevent the Sale of Tobacco Products to Minors" was
preempted by federal law. Maine wished to keep minors from obtaining
tobacco and maintain its tobacco tax base, so it needed to find a way to prevent
Internet tobacco sellers from reaching minors and evading taxes. Maine
therefore prohibited the sale of tobacco from non-licensed retailers, and
306 128 S. Ct. 989 (2008).
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required licensed retailers to "utilize a delivery service" that provided a
"special kind of recipient-verification service." 30 7
Motor carrier associations challenged the Maine law, arguing that it was
preempted by the ICC Termination Act of 1995308 and the Federal Aviation
Administration Authorization Act of 1994.' 09 The ICC Termination Act
provides that "[A] State ... may not enact or enforce a law ... related to a
price, route, or service of any motor carrier... with respect to the
transportation of property." 310 The district court and court of appeals both
found the Maine law preempted, and the Supreme Court unanimously
agreed. 311 The Supreme Court dismissed Maine's argument that the regulation
was of the retailer and permissible under its general police power to regulate
for public health. Instead, the Supreme Court noted that the effect of the law
was to impose a burden on interstate shippers:
The Maine law.., produces the very effect that the federal law sought to avoid,
namely, a State's direct substitution of its own governmental commands for
"competitive market forces" in determining (to a significant degree) the services
that motor carriers will provide.
We concede that the regulation here is less "direct" than it might be, for it
tells shippers what to choose rather than carriers what to do. Nonetheless, the
effect of the regulation is that carriers will have to offer tobacco delivery
services that differ significantly from those that, in the absence of the regulation,
the market might dictate. And that being so, "treating sales restrictions and
purchase restrictions differently for pre-emption purposes would make no
sense.",
3 12
Rowe is not supportive of hydraulic regulation, but it can be distinguished
from hydraulic regulation of credit markets on several grounds. First, Rowe
dealt with an express (or even field) preemption situation, not a case of conflict
preemption. There was also a clear policy behind the ICC Termination Act:
"helping assure transportation rates, routes, and services that reflect 'maximum
reliance on competitive market forces,' thereby stimulating 'efficiency,
innovation, and low prices,' as well as 'variety' and 'quality."'
313
There is neither express statutory preemption nor field preemption in
banking regulation. Nor can any particular regulatory policy be divined from
the National Bank Act of 1863 or the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933. Both
Acts were written against a backdrop of state regulatory powers and with the
307 Id. at 993-94.
308 Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2006)).
309 Pub. L. No. 103-305, 108 Stat. 1569, (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006)).
310 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2006); see also id. § 41713(b)(4)(A) (2006) (similar provision
for combined motor-air carriers).
311 Rowe, 128 S. Ct. at 995.
312 Id. at 995-96 (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass'n. v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S.
246, 255 (2004) (citation omitted)).
313 Rowe, 128 S. Ct. at 995.
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anticipation that state regulatory powers would continue for matters beyond
safety and soundness regulation. Therefore, there is a much weaker basis for
finding preemption in the banking arena. The preemption comes either from
potentially ultra vires federal regulations 31 4 or from conflicts with the enabling
statutes, but there is a presumption against finding conflict preemption.
315
Second, and perhaps most importantly, the mechanics of the regulation in
Rowe are simply different than in hydraulic regulation as proposed by this
Article. In Rowe, the regulatory costs were tied to the absence of procedures to
verify the age of the tobacco purchasers, rather than a regulation of the tobacco
product's quality per se or disclosures about the product's risks. The Maine
regulation, translated into banking terms, would make it illegal to enforce a
debt if the originator did not engage in a certain type of underwriting, say
income verification.316 That is a regulation aimed at the actor that originated
the debt; it is not tied to the terms of the debt itself or the disclosures about the
financial product.31 7 For hydraulic regulation to work, it must be tied to the
terms of the debt itself, not the origination process. The difference is important,
as it is the difference between consumer-protection and safety-and-soundness
regulation. While the former is permitted to the states, the latter is not.
b. Engine Manufacturers Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality
Management District
Rowe relied in part on the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Engine
Manufacturers Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality Management District.318 In
Engine Manufacturers, the Air Quality Management District, part of the
California state government, had prohibited local fleet operators from buying
vehicles that did not comply with strict air quality standards. The federal Clean
Air Act preempts state and local emissions standards for vehicles, but the
District tried to sidestep this preemption by regulating the buyers of the
vehicles instead of the manufacturers. The Engine Manufacturers Association
sued the District, claiming that the District's rules were preempted. The district
court granted the District summary judgment, on the grounds that the rules
affected only the purchase of vehicles and did not compel manufacturers to
314 See supra note 118.
315 Wyeth v, Levine, No. 06-1249, slip op. at n.3 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2009).
316 The equivalent hydraulic regulation would be a prohibition on the sale of cigarettes unless
the cigarettes themselves meet certain quality standards. That regulation, however, would not have
accomplished what Maine wanted, which was really keeping cigarettes out of part of the downstream
market, rather than ensuring a quality product. Had Maine been interested in regulating for quality, it
would likely have passed muster with ICC Termination Act preemption.
317 Cf Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249, slip op. at 25 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2009) (upholding state-law
failure-to-warn claims for drug labeling over a claim of preemption by FDA labeling requirements).
318 541 U.S. 246 (2004).
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take any action.319 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on these
grounds.
3 2 0
In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court found that the District's rules were
preempted, and reversed the circuit court, noting that:
In addition to having no basis in the text of the statute, treating sales restrictions
and purchase restrictions differently for pre-emption purposes would make no
sense. The manufacturer's right to sell federally approved vehicles is
meaningless in the absence of a purchaser's right to buy them. It is true that the
Fleet Rules at issue here cover only certain purchasers and certain federally
certified vehicles, and thus do not eliminate all demand for covered vehicles.
But if one State or political subdivision may enact such rules, then so may any
other; and the end result would undo Congress's carefully calibrated regulatory
scheme.
321
Engine Manufacturers is founded on a dubious concern about a slippery
slope of regulation. Absent this slippery slope assumption, the Court would
have to engage in the analysis proposed in Justice Souter's dissent, which
would require an inquiry into which of the rules being challenged "in fact
coerce manufacture and which do not.' 322 The slippery slope assumption not
only runs contrary to the standard presumption against finding preemption, but
it is also illogical. If enough states were willing to pass such rules, there would
be significant pressure for change in federal law. It is hard to imagine a
situation in which a majority of states would opt for a different standard, and
yet the federal standard would remain unmoved. Therefore, a concern about the
collective effect of state regulation seems overstated.
Irrespective of the reasonableness of the Engine Manufacturers slippery
slope concern, hydraulic regulation designed to protect consumers in financial
services can be differentiated from the vehicle emission standards regulation in
Engine Manufacturers. Even assuming the slipperiest slope, with every state
imposing an identical regulation on securitization trusts, that would still not
coerce the origination of any particular type of debt. Securitization is but a part
of the secondary consumer debt market. It is an important part, no doubt, but
consumer debts could still be profitably originated without securitization, and
there would still be a robust secondary market among federally-chartered
institutions trading in the debt amongst themselves. This contrasts with
automobile manufacturing. Automobile manufacturers must sell their cars to
make a profit. They cannot make money just by building cars. Any regulation
that restricts their sale market if they do not comply with certain terms would
have a definitive coercive effect. A bank, however, does not need to sell its
319 Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1118
(C.D. Cal. 2001).
320 Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 309 F.3d 550 (9th Cir. 2002).
321 Engine Mfrs., 541 U.S. at 255.
322 Id. at 256.
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debt assets to make a profit. Loans generate income by themselves. Therefore,
there is a weaker coercive effect in the banking context, which argues against
the presumption made by the Engine Manufacturers majority.
Engine Manufacturers is also differentiable because it deals with express
preemption against the background of a "carefully calibrated regulatory
scheme" in the same area-public health. Express preemption does not exist in
the bank regulation world, aside from a few specific instances, such as
preemption of state usury laws for federal thrifts, : and the only "carefully
calibrated regulatory scheme" in banking regulation is that for bank safety and
soundness, not for consumer protection. When states engage in hydraulic
regulation for consumer protection in financial services, they are not trying to
go above a floor set by Congress, but are instead operating in an entirely
different area.
Rowe and Engine Manufacturers show that the Supreme Court has been
hesitant to embrace hydraulic regulation schemes, but that hesitancy might well
depend on the specific nature of the regulation.
B. Other Potential Obstacles to Hydraulic Regulation
Preemption doctrine is the most significant potential obstacle for
hydraulic regulation, but it is not the only one. Certain features of securitization
as well as holder-in-due-course doctrine and the dormant commerce clause also
present potential issues.
1. Securitization of Receivables, Not Accounts
Some securitizations involve the sale solely of receivables ("flow
securitization"), not of the underlying account. The account is retained by the
originator. This is the typical method for credit-card securitizations and other
types of revolving debt. 24 This arrangement creates a potential problem for
hydraulic regulation. If a regulation affects the terms of the account, rather than
the terms of the receivable, it would no longer be indirect regulation and would
be preempted. Of course, the difference between affecting the terms of a credit
card account and the terms of a debt owed on that account is semantic at best.
Credit card receivables accrue interest and fees solely per the terms of the
account. Affecting the terms of the receivable is impossible without affecting
the terms of the account. Traditional preemption doctrine provides the solution,
however. State law should be preempted as applied to the account (future debt
originations), but not as applied to the receivable (existing debt sold into the
323 12 U.S.C. § 1463(g) (2006).
324 FDIC, supra note 25 1, at 9.
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secondary market). So long as the latter is not preempted, hydraulic regulation
will ensure that market pressure will affect the terms of the account itself.
2. Retained Interests in Securitization
Another problem is created when banks retain an interest in the debt they
securitize. In many securitizations, the originator retains either a credit-
enhancing, interest-only strip or holds the last-out, first-lost tranche in the
securitization structure. Additionally, in most credit card securitizations, the
originator maintains at least a seven percent undivided interest in the trust.325 Is
this a sufficient interest of a national bank in a securitization trust to place the
trust under the aegis of preemption? Federal banking regulations require certain
credit-enhancing, interest-only strips to be included in capital adequacy
requirements.
32p
The connection between national banks and securitization trusts through
retained interests seems too tenuous to engender preemption. A national bank's
interest in a securitization trust that it originates is, as a formal matter, no
different than an interest in an asset-backed security that it purchases on the
open market or any other security held by a national bank. For example, if a
national bank bought a ten percent share of IBM, IBM would not gain
preemption protection. Similarly in the O'Donnell rent-a charter payday
lending case, Goleta, the national bank, held less than ten percent of the
loans. 327 The same would go for the securitization trust. Neither OCC nor OTS
regulations nor case law have yet extended preemption to non-operating
affiliates of national banks and thrifts,328 much less to entities in which the
national bank's or thrift's ownership interest is insufficient for it to qualify as
an affiliate. Were it otherwise, we would see national banks and thrifts being
paid to purchase single corporate shares to rent out preemption. Preemption's
limits must be set to be coextensive with the regulatory authority of federal
banking regulators and either (1) formal corporate affiliation or (2) true agency
status, including respondeat superior liability.
3. National Banks as Securitization Trustees and Servicers
Another potential complication for hydraulic regulation is whether
securitization trusts would benefit from preemption when national banks and
thrifts serve as securitization trustees or servicers. The special purpose
325 Kathy Chu & Byron Acohido, Why Banks Are Squeezing Credit Card Holders, USA
TODAY, Nov. 10, 2008, at Al.
326 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A, § 2(c)(4) (2008).
327 Goleta Nat'l Bank v. O'Donnell, 239 F. Supp. 745, 748 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
328 12 U.S.C. § 22 1a (2006) (defining "affiliate" for NBA purposes as, inter alia, an entity in
which a national bank owns or controls, directly or indirectly, over fifty percent of the stock).
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vehicle-the entity, typically a trust, which technically purchases the
securitized assets from the originator and which issues securities against
them-is a legal fiction that exists on paper only. It does not have any true
independence in its actions. Instead, the collection of debt assets (accounts
receivable) is managed by an agent, called a servicer, and the overall interests
of the SPV are guarded by a securitization trustee. The involvement of national
banks and thrifts in the securitization process not just as originators, but also as
servicers and trustees, raises a different set of preemption questions.
It is hard to see hydraulic regulation as infringing on national banks' and
thrifts' trust powers-enforcing usury limits or mortgage suitability
requirements against securitization trusts does not affect the capacity of
national banks and thrifts to serve as trustees for special purpose vehicles.
Trustees exercise legal title over trust assets, but they do not actually own the
assets.329 A trustee does not carry trust assets and liabilities on its own books.
The interests that are being infringed upon by hydraulic regulation are the
trust's, not the trustee's. Just as a trust does not obtain the tax status of its
trustee, so too does it make little sense for the trust to gain the preemption
status of its trustee.
330
Likewise, it is hard to see how a national bank or thrift acting as a servicer
for a securitization trust could transmit its preemption status. Preemption is not
contagious. When acting as a servicer, a national bank or thrift is simply acting
as an agent for the securitization trust, and an agent's powers cannot exceed
those of the principal.33'
Nonetheless, the separation of debt servicing from debt ownership creates
a complication for hydraulic regulation schemes. As a result of this separation,
consumers almost never know that their debts are held by a securitization trust.
The consumers' contact is with only the servicer, which is often the same entity
or part of the same corporate family as the originator. The servicer typically
collects in its own name or the name of the originating entity. It almost never
collects in the name of the ultimate holder of the debt. Even if the consumer
sends payment (and writes a check or directs an electronic funds transfer) to the
originator, the payment might go to a lockbox account for the benefit of the
ultimate holder. This situation creates a technical problem for hydraulic
regulation. If consumers do not know that their debt is being held by an entity
that does not benefit from preemption status, it will be hard for them to
exercise any rights created under a hydraulic regulation scheme.
329 Securitization trustees do not even actively manage the securitized assets. Instead, they
are corporate trustees with very limited ministerial duties and little, if any, discretion.
330 Cf 12 U.S.C. § 92a (2006) (incorporating state law standards in defining the trust powers
of national banks).
331 See, e.g., Allen v. Scott, 135 N.E. 683, 684-85 (Ohio 1922) ("The power of an agent
cannot be greater than that of the principal. This doctrine has the sanction of Holy Writ: 'The servant is
not greater than his Lord; neither is he that is sent greater than he that sent him.' (John 13:16)").
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The mystery of the holder's identity could easily be solved by requiring
all servicers (or debt collectors in general) to state on all collection notices that
they are operating as collection agent for the entity that owns the debt and to
disclose the name and legal service address of that entity. The Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act specifically allows states to enact more stringent
laws,332 and such laws would seem to fit into the OCC's and OTS's preemption
exceptions for state debt collection laws of general applicability.
333
Federally chartered financial institutions' activities as securitization
trustees and servicers cannot extend the preemption protection to securitization
trusts. Preemption does not work like the mummy's curse, afflicting all who
touch the preemption entity.
4. Negotiability and Holder-in-Due-Course Status
The question of the transitive properties of NBA and HOLA preemption
raises the question of whether negotiability, another system with transitive
properties of immunity, could forestall hydraulic regulation. A holder in due
course ("HDC") of a debt instrument is immune from certain "personal" claims
and defenses that can be raised only against the originator of the negotiable
instrument. 334 HDCs are still subject to "real" defenses. Traditionally, personal
defenses were limited to breach of contract, fraud in the inducement,
voidability due to illegality (including usury and other consumer-protection
laws) or mental defect, discharge of an instrument by payment or cancellation,
and ordinary duress or undue influence. 335 Real defenses include infancy,
mental incapacity, illegality, duress, bankruptcy discharge, fraud in the
inception, forgery, and material alteration.
336
The Uniform Commercial Code limits HDC protection to good faith
purchasers of negotiable instruments. 337 Would good faith purchasers of debts
originated by national banks and thrifts be protected as HDCs from claims of
illegality due to loan terms that violated state laws?
A negotiable instrument must include an unconditional promise or order
to pay a fixed amount of money.338 It must be payable to bearer or order at the
332 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692n (2006) (permitting state debt collection laws that offer consumers
greater protection than the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (2006)).
333 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007(c), 7.4008(e), 7.4009(c)(2) (2008) (OCC); id. § 560.2(c) (2008)
(OTS).
334 U.C.C. § 3-305 (2005).
335 Adam J. Levitin, Finding Nemo: Rediscovering the Virtues of Negotiability in the Wake
ofEnron, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 83, 131.
336 Id.
337 U.C.C. § 3-302 (2005) (stating that a HDC must hold a negotiable note, properly
endorsed, that it took for value in good faith without notice of defects). For a consideration of expanded
definitions of negotiability to match commercial realities, see Levitin, supra note 335, at 166-75.
338 U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (2005).
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time of issue or when it first comes into possession of a holder.339 It must also
be payable on demand or at a definite time, and it may not state any other
undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment with
some express qualifications. 340 As Ronald Mann has shown, however, virtually
no modem consumer credit instruments fit this definition of negotiability.
341
Moreover, notes for purchases of goods and services, such as purchase money
automobile loans, are subject to the FTC's HDC Rule, which cuts off HDC
status for loan assignees. 4 2 There is no equivalent legal prohibition against
HDC status for mortgage and credit card debt, but the debt instruments for
these types of loans do not typically meet the requirements for negotiability.
343
To be sure, some instruments like credit card slips could easily be altered to be
negotiable, but it would be at the expense of increased fraud risk.
Although, as Mann has shown, GSE-conforming mortgage notes do not
meet the requirements of negotiability, most courts routinely hold mortgage
notes to be negotiable, 344 and, for mortgages, HDC status appears to shield
securitization trusts from most litigation over predatory loan terms. 34 5 Yet, even
if and when HDC status is available to assignees of consumer debts, it shields
them only from those defenses specified by state law. States are free to define
346what claims and defenses are good against an HDC, 6 and in some states usury
339 Id. § 3-104(a)(1) (2005).
340 Id. § 3-104(a)(2)-(3) (2005). A negotiable instrument may contain "(i) an undertaking or
power to give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment, (ii) an authorization or power to the
holder to confess judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral, or (iii) a waiver of the benefit of any
law intended for the advantage or protection of an obligor." Id. § 3-104(a)(3) (2005).
341 Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44 UCLA L.
REv. 951 (1997).
342 FTC Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a) (2008).
343 Mann, supra note 341, at 963-65 (credit cards), 970-73 (mortgages). Notably, courts
routinely hold mortgage notes to be negotiable instruments (often with no inquiry into the subject).
344 See, e.g., In re Merscorp, Inc., No. 1810, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40473 (S.D. Tex. May
16, 2008); Bibler v. Arcata Inv. 2, No. 263024, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 3025 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 6,
2005).
345 Engel & McCoy, supra note 8, at 2041. See also Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course:
Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 503
(2002).
346 For certain mortgage debts, state and federal law already creates explicit assignee
liability. The federal Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) provides that assignees of
covered mortgage loans are subject to all claims and defenses the consumer could assert against the
originator. HOEPA assignee liability, however, applies only to a very limited body of mortgages.
HOEPA applies only to refinance loans. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(2) (2008) (stating that HOEPA does
not apply to "residential mortgage transaction[s]," "reverse mortgage transaction[s]," or "open-end
credit plan[s]"); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(i), (w), (bb) (2006) (defining these three terms so that
"residential mortgage transaction" includes any purchase-money mortgage transaction, "reverse
mortgage transaction" includes typical reverse mortgages, and "open-end credit plan" includes typical
home equity lines of credit). Even for refinance loans, HOEPA only applies if: (1) the annual percentage
rate at origination is greater than the yield of Treasury securities of comparable maturity plus either
eight percent (for first-lien loans); or (2) total fees and points exceed eight percent of the greater of the
total loan amount or $400. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(aa)(l)-(aa)(4) (2006); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.32(a)(1) (2008).
As a result, HOEPA covers at most five percent of subprime, first-lien home mortgage loans and does
not cover the prime or Alt-A markets at all. Engel & McCoy, supra note 8, at 2053. State assignee
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was historically a real defense that traveled with a claim. 347 HDC status is an
obstacle to effective hydraulic regulation, especially in the mortgage market,
but not an insurmountable one.
5. Dormant Commerce Clause Issues
The use of state consumer-protection laws for hydraulic regulation might
also face dormant commerce clause challenges, as the regulations would have
extraterritorial effects. 348 Yet, the Supreme Court has given states considerable
leeway in the face of commerce clause challenges, where state laws do not
overtly discriminate against interstate commerce,349  and existing state
consumer-protection laws have failed to apply to national banks and thrifts
only because of specific preemption statutes (or regulations), not because of
commerce clause issues.
Most likely, the dormant commerce clause issues involved in hydraulic
regulation would have to be decided on a case-by-case basis; it is extremely
unlikely that hydraulic regulation is per se an overreaching extraterritorial
maneuver. Instead, the constitutionality will depend heavily on the specifics of
the regulation.
The uncertainty regarding the constitutionality of a hydraulic regulation is
itself sufficient for the regulation to have its intended effect. A regulation is
presumptively constitutional unless ruled otherwise; unless it is challenged, the
regulation stands. Ratings agencies, underwriters, and investors will shy away
from any consumer debt that would be devalued if a hydraulic regulation might
liability laws often go further than HOEPA and prohibit specific abusive terms in mortgages, although
these are often preempted. Raphael W. Bostic et al., The Impact of State Anti-Predatory Lending Laws:
Policy Implications and Insights (Harvard Univ. Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Report No. UCC08-9,
2008), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/understanding-consumercredit/
papers/ucc08-9_bostic-et-al.pdf. HDC status is an obstacle to effective hydraulic regulation, especially
in the mortgage market, but not an insurmountable one.
347 See, e.g., Andrews v. Martin, 436 S.W.2d 285 (Ark. 1969); Lucas v. Beco Homes, Inc.,
494 S.W.2d 417 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); see also AMES, BREWSTER & MCKEEHAN, supra note 269, at 149
(referring to "usury or other statutory real defense"); JAMES MATLOCK OGDEN, THE LAW OF
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 160 (2d ed. 1922).
348 See Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REv. 493 (2008) (discussing
spillover pricing impacts).
349 See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1808 (2008) (upholding Kentucky law
that excluded from taxation interest from in-state municipal bonds and noting that absent discrimination
for a forbidden purpose, state laws "will be upheld unless the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.") (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S.
137, 142 (1970)); United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786,
1796 (2007) ("[W]e should be particularly hesitant to interfere with [traditional local government
functions] under the guise of the Commerce Clause."); Minn. v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
456 (1981) (reversing injunction against enforcement of Minnesota law that banned the retail sale of
milk in plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117
(1978) (upholding Maryland statute prohibiting producers or refiners of petroleum products from
operating retail service stations within the state, and requiring producers or refiners to extend voluntary
price reductions uniformly to all service stations supplied).
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apply. The mere possibility that a hydraulic regulation could apply is sufficient
to impose an externality on the primary market in the form of lower-rated
secondary-market securities that make securitization a less-profitable and less-
efficient funding mechanism.
350
C. Can Banks Structure Around Hydraulic Regulations?
Hydraulic regulation depends on the formalities necessary to maintain a
secondary market in consumer debt. Absent these formalities, state regulations
that affect national banks through the market might be preempted. This fact
raises a serious concern that hydraulic regulation could be vitiated by clever
transaction structuring or contractual choice of law.
1. Transaction Structuring
It is entirely possible that a transactional end run around hydraulic
regulation could be devised; bank attorneys would have an incentive to do so.
But structuring around hydraulic regulation would have its own costs, which
might dissuade banks from engaging in abusive practices, particularly at the
margin.
A potential end run around hydraulic regulation would be the use of
"covered bonds." In the basic covered-bond transaction (upon which many
variations can exist), a national bank or thrift sells bonds, secured by a pool of
mortgage loans (or other assets), to an SPV. The SPV then issues securities
backed by the bonds. Covered-bond transactions thus substitute a sale of assets
to the SPV with a sale of asset-backed securities. Crucially, the mortgage loans
remain as assets on the national bank's balance sheet, so they will be sheltered
by preemption doctrine.
Covered bonds lower the cost of funds for a national bank relative to the
general issuance of unsecured bonds, because in the event of the bank's
insolvency, the SPV's claim on the bank's assets would come ahead of both
insured depositors' claims and general unsecured debt claims, like unsecured
bonds.35 1 The FDIC would also exempt covered bonds from the Federal
Depository Insurance Act's conservancy/receivership stay.352 Therefore, in the
event of the bank's insolvency, the SPV's trustee could seize the bonds'
collateral (the mortgage loans) and continue to make payments to the SPV's
own bond investors.
350 There might also be a Contracts Clause problem, at least for the initial round of hydraulic
regulations, to the extent that they apply new regulations to void existing contracts.
351 12 U.S.C. § 182 1(d)( 11)(A) (2006) (setting forth the bank insolvency priority scheme).
352 Press Release, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Covered Bond Policy Statement
(July 15, 2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/prO806Oa.html.
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There is a cost to issuing covered bonds, however, as they must remain on
the bank's balance sheet, increasing the bank's capital requirements and thus
reducing its lending capacity. 353 It also means (unless the bonds are
nonrecourse) that the bank will be responsible for any deficiency in the
collateral securing the covered bonds. If the collateral is a pool of loans, then a
decline in the loan pool's value, such as from high default rates, would create a
potential deficiency in the event of a default and seizure. This possibility will in
turn encourage the bank to engage in more careful underwriting and servicing,
which, although good from a social policy perspective, will further limit the
bank's lending activity and impose additional costs on the bank. The tradeoff
involved with covered bonds is illustrative of the costs involved with
structuring consumer finance around hydraulic regulation. While hydraulic
regulation may not be able to prevent all abusive consumer debt practices, by
adding costs to such practices it will help prevent those practices that are only
marginally profitable.
Structural avoidance of hydraulic regulation is also unlikely to happen
immediately, which could potentially reset the calculus of abusive consumer
debt practices. The non-immediacy of a transactional countermove to hydraulic
regulation is quite important. Imagine that it takes two years for a solution to be
devised and another few years before financial markets feel sufficiently
comfortable that they have uncovered all the risks and costs inherent in the new
transactional structure. During this entire time period, hydraulic regulation
would be effective, and various abusive terms would largely disappear from
consumer debts.
Once abusive terms have disappeared from consumer debts, it will be
difficult for banks to reintroduce them without incurring reputational hits.
Because of past experience with certain abusive consumer debt terms,
consumer advocates and consumers themselves will be more alert to their
reintroduction following an absence, making it harder for the terms to be
reintroduced into the market without objection.
In particular, first movers at reintroducing abusive terms will be at a
disadvantage, and competition could develop among banks on the basis of
consumer-friendly terms. For example, if bank X is the first to reintroduce a
problematic term into its contracts, it might receive negative media attention,
whereas once bank X breaks that barrier, subsequent banks to do so will attract
less attention. This creates a disincentive to be a first-mover in negative re-
innovation. Further, if banks are able to operate profitably without abusive
353 Covered bonds are widely used instead of securitization in European mortgage financings,
but European banking regulation has much looser capital requirements than American banking
regulation, so the cost to banks of keeping loan assets on the balance sheet is much lower in Europe than
in America. Other factors, like the level of deposit insurance and the percentage of mortgage loans that
are adjustable rate or have high prepayment penalties, also affect the ability to issue covered bonds.
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terms in consumer debts, political arguments that these terms are necessary for
their viability will be undercut.
Banks can structure around hydraulic regulation, but it will come at a cost,
and that cost is precisely what might deter banks from insisting on the
offensive terms targeted by hydraulic regulations.
2. Contractual Choice-of-Law Provisions
Alternatively, banks might attempt to avoid hydraulic regulation through
contractual choice-of-law provisions. Potentially, banks could fix the law
governing their loans to be that of states that would not pass consumer-friendly
regulations. This outcome is what banks have effectively achieved by moving
lending operations to states without usury caps to take advantage of
Marquette's choice-of-law ruling.
354
Whether this endeavor would be successful would, of course, depend on
individual states' choice-of-law analysis. While contractual choice-of-law
provisions are generally respected,355 the degree to which choice-of-law
provisions can be used to opt out of state consumer-protection law is
356unsettled. Courts might be reluctant to allow consumers to waive their states'
explicit consumer-protection laws, and at least for mortgages, the law of the
state in which the mortgaged property is located will be applied, as foreclosure
procedures are all a function of state law. While application of local laws
would frustrate the race-to-the-top benefit of hydraulic regulation, it would still
allow states to protect their own citizens, which is more than they can do today.
3. Opting Out of Specific State Markets
Finally, banks could simply opt out of specific state markets to avoid
hydraulic regulation. If states A, B, and C were the leaders in hydraulic
consumer-protection regulation, banks could refuse to lend in those states.
Therefore, these states would have no ability to regulate securitization trusts
(other than those indentured in the states).
As a practical matter, an opt-out strategy might not work. Although loan
offers might proclaim "offer not valid in states A, B, and C," banks lack control
over the location of the borrower after the loan is made. This fact is especially
true for unsecured loans like credit cards and student loans. A consumer could
maintain a mailing address in Texarkana, Texas, but reside in Texarkana,
354 See supra text accompanying notes 53-58.
355 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) (1971). For a discussion of the
problems of choice-of-law provisions in contracts of adhesion, see Mo Zhang, Contractual Choice of
Law in Contracts ofAdhesion and Party Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 123 (2008).
356 See William J. Woodward, Jr., Constraining Opt-Outs: Shielding Local Law and Those It
Protects from Adhesive Choice of Law Clauses, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 9, 12-13 (2006).
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Arkansas. So long as the billing address does not change, the lender has little
ability to control in which market it is making the loan. For secured loans, such
as home mortgages and automobile loans, the lender has greater control, as the
loan is based around property that is either in a fixed location or that must be
registered in a specific state. Thus, a lender could provide that an automobile
loan would terminate and accelerate upon a change in state of vehicle
registration, but that would likely not be enough to keep the lender out of the
new market because states allow a grace period to new residents to change
vehicle registration.
Even if banks could make each state market a hermetically sealed affair,
opting out of some markets would itself impose a cost on banks and thus might
not be practical as a business matter. Although national banks could viably
refuse to lend in smaller states, 357 it would be much harder for them to opt out
of populous states with strong consumer-protection traditions like California,
New York, New Jersey, Illinois, and Massachusetts. California in particular has
a tradition of progressive consumer-protection regulation and its economic
output constitutes approximately thirteen percent of U.S. GDP.358 Refusing to
lend in California is simply not viable for national lenders. Banks can limit
their exposure to hydraulic regulation by opting-out of specific state markets,
but it would come at a cost, and as with transaction structure, that cost is
precisely what might deter banks from insisting on the offensive terms targeted
by hydraulic regulations.
V. Conclusion
The ongoing mortgage crisis has shown there to be a serious failing in
consumer protection in financial services. While the failing is substantive, it
stems from the architecture of regulation. Revitalizing the role of states in
financial-services consumer protection is one major architectural solution.
Unlike the creation of a new federal financial-services consumer-protection
agency or the consolidation of consumer protection in an existing federal
agency, a revitalized role for the states is immediately possible without any
federal legislation and poses less risk of regulatory capture. Changes in the
consumer finance market have placed the majority of consumer debt in the
hands of entities that should not be not shielded from state regulation under a
proper interpretation of current federal preemption doctrine. This change
permits states to regulate the secondary market, which holds the bulk of
consumer debt, directly. It also enables indirect, hydraulic regulation upstream
357 The residents of these states would still gain the consumer protection intended by the
regulation, although it would come at the cost of less competition in the states' credit markets and
potentially less credit availability or higher credit cost.
358 Legislative Analyst's Office, Cal Facts 2006: California's Economy,
http://www.lao.ca.gov/2006/cal-facts/calfacts-economy.2006.pdf (last visited April 10, 2009).
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of the preemption-shielded primary market by imposing targeted regulatory
costs on the secondary market that will be passed along by market pressure to
the primary market and thus create a disincentive to originate consumer debts
containing the targeted terms.
Although the process of hydraulic regulation has not previously been
recognized as a distinct regulatory strategy, it already exists as an effective
regulatory tool in numerous markets, where it is used either as a method of
avoiding legal and practical jurisdictional limitations on regulation or to
increase the administrability of regulatory schemes. Applied to the financial-
services market, hydraulic regulation would provide an important tool for
correcting the consumer-protection problems created by regulatory capture and
the unique deregulatory competition among banking regulators. Hydraulic
regulation would enable states to regulate national banks effectively for
consumer-protection purposes without running afoul of federal preemption
doctrine.
To be sure, hydraulic regulation by the states would not solve all
consumer-protection problems in financial services, and regulation would
remain largely reactive. States could not analyze and license new financial
products before their introduction into the market in the way a federal agency
perhaps could do. The different regulatory models presented by hydraulic
regulation or a federal financial-services consumer-protection agency both
present trade-offs. A single federal regulator is more susceptible to regulatory
capture but can pool resources and would speak in a single voice, creating clear
standards for industry behavior. State regulation is less susceptible to total
capture, but this benefit comes at the price of forcing businesses to deal with
fifty sets of (potentially conflicting) regulations and unnecessary duplication of
limited consumer-protection resources. These regulatory models are not
necessarily exclusive, but in practice they would likely be difficult to integrate,
and the benefits for simultaneous state and federal regulation might not
outweigh the costs.
However one views the federal-state trade-off in the abstract, though, it is
necessary to recognize that both are not equally available options. Regulatory
architecture is a matter not just of ideals, but also of the practical and the
possible. For all of its merits, the creation of a federal financial-services
consumer-protection regulatory agency would require considerable political
action in Congress, and, even then, its efficacy would depend heavily on the
precise authority given to it. Hydraulic regulation is the immediately available
solution that is limited only by whatever substantive terms states require or
prohibit in consumer debts. It does not require the two levels of political
action-regulatory authorization and subsequent substantive regulation-
necessary for a federal solution.
The interlinked mortgage and credit crises have shown the need for a
serious consideration of the best way to ensure strong consumer protection in
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financial services, both for its own merits and because of its implications for
systemic risk.3 59 Hydraulic regulation offers a reinvigorated role for states that
would restore the balance between the twin financial-institution regulation
policy goals of consumer protection and the safety and soundness of banks
without the creation of new agencies or administrative structures.
Postscript
As this Article goes to press, the Supreme Court is deliberating Cuomo v.
The Clearinghouse Association LLC, which poses the question of whether the
OCC has sole authority to enforce state laws of general applicability against
national banks. If the OCC's claim is upheld, states will have lost any vestige
of direct regulatory control over national banks, and hydraulic regulation will
be the last possible route for state consumer-protection regulation in financial
services.
359 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED
FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2008), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf (proposing restructuring of federal agencies
responsible for financial-services regulation).

